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This dissertation examines the institutional processes that led a country founded on a 
grave distrust of standing armies and centralized power to develop and maintain the 
most powerful military in history. I theorize that, after World War II, the importance 
of the defense sector of the economy to defense industries, Department of Defense 
personnel and key members of Congress created strong incentives to perpetuate and 
expand the U.S. military industry. Using a multi-method approach—including 
quantitative methods, mapping techniques, archival research and qualitative 
analysis—I find that overlapping institutional interests encourage policymakers to 
extend defense procurement expenditures independent of their national security goals. 
Analysis of an original database demonstrates that economic and political factors 
encourage military spending in more rural areas with less diverse economies—areas 
 
that are disproportionately reliant on the defense dollars that they receive. The 
extension of defense benefits to more economically dependent constituencies has 
coincided with policies that systematically reduce the public costs of war, including 
deficit financing, a growing use of private contractors, and an all-volunteer military. 
This gives key constituencies a disproportionate stake in the military economy and 
makes it easier for policymakers to maintain a defense establishment without fear of 
electoral reprisal. I argue that, as a consequence, expansive defense resources have 
allowed the president to act with greater independence from Congress. While the 
hierarchical structure of the executive branch encourages presidents to initiate 
military and foreign policy—which historically includes neutrality, diplomacy and 
military engagements—the administration’s capacity to direct military actions 
without ongoing congressional cooperation depends largely on available resources 
and institutional authority. As long as congressional budgetary authorizations provide 
ongoing defense resources available for mobilization at any time, presidents enjoy 
increased flexibility in directing military engagements independently. Evidence 
suggests that political power concentrates when separate institutions find shared 
incentives to cooperate, regardless of institutional mechanisms designed to disperse 
power. Coinciding interests in defense sector expansion aggregate resources and 
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After the 2008 presidential election, constitutional law scholar Jack Balkin 
took stock of the vast powers over intelligence services and military resources that the 
new president inherited: President Obama commands congressionally approved 
surveillance policies, an executive bureaucracy devoted to homeland security and 
intelligence gathering, expansive military forces ready for mobilization at any time 
and ongoing supplies of technologically sophisticated military equipment, including 
unmanned drones, robotics and stealth technology.1 Although the previous Bush 
administration sought to utilize these resources to a greater extent than earlier 
administrations did, executive control over military and intelligence equipment is not 
new. Since the end of World War II, presidents have directed defense and intelligence 
bureaucracies and controlled ongoing supplies of military equipment and standing 
armies under an executive chain of command. Given the slate of resources at the 
president’s disposal,  many scholars and commentators fear that Congress lacks the 
tools—or the determination—to check the executive branch if the administration 
oversteps its constitutional bounds (Fisher 2004, 1989; Silverstein 1997; Adler & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Obama will begin [his administration] with broad new powers over domestic and existing 
international surveillance and congressional approval for military tribunals and existing interrogation 
and detention practices. He will oversee a new bureaucracy devoted to homeland security and greatly 
expanded intelligence services. He will command military forces and state-of-the-art weaponry 




George eds. 1996; Black 1980; Koh 1990, 1988; Wormuth & Firmage 1986; Mann & 
Ornstein 2006).  
My research analyzes how a nation founded on an acute distrust of standing 
armies and centralized power has developed and maintained the most powerful 
military in history. Textbook American history suggests that geopolitical threats—the 
ascent of Nazi Germany during World War II followed by the Soviet threat that gave 
rise to the Cold War—explain the growth of the U.S. military establishment. While 
these conflicts dramatically altered the course of U.S. foreign policy and military 
readiness, the existence of foreign threats cannot fully explain why Congress failed to 
eliminate a single Cold War weapon production line2 after the fall of the Soviet Union 
(Gholz & Sapolsky, 1999-2000, 5) or why Congress has not issued a single 
declaration of war since the eve of World War II—despite five major wars and 
hundreds of military conflicts.  
I argue that rise of a permanent military industry during and after World War 
II created shared interests between separate branches of government—including key 
members of Congress, Department of Defense (DoD) personnel and defense 
industries—to perpetuate the defense expenditures independent of policymakers’ 
national security goals. I am not simply suggesting that members of Congress from 
areas with defense industries will seek more military spending. Rather, unlike 
previous work, my research suggests that more rural areas with less diverse 
economies are disproportionately reliant on local defense infrastructure, and that 
members of Congress representing these localities prioritize defense interests more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Following Gholz & Sapoklsky (1999-2000, 5), a line is a privately held or managed facility that builds a particular weapon 
platform. The failure to eliminate a production line means that the same factories still manufacture the same aircraft, ships and 




than other members with a similar defense industry presence situated within a more 
diverse economic context. Further, I argue that members’ revealed ‘preference 
intensity’ (Hall 1996, 1987) with regard to defense spending not only influences 
internal congressional processes—such as defense committee membership and 
members’ support for various types weapons programs—but also goes on to influence 
how the Department of Defense, contractors and defense industry managers allocate 
defense contract benefits.  
Unlike prior quantitative studies, the theory of local economic reliance and the 
new emphasis on industrially homogenous, rural geography yields robust evidence 
suggesting that the institutions responsible for defense spending all have a stake in the 
status of the U.S. arms economy, and work together to perpetuate various types of 
weapons expenditures. On one hand, this evidence corroborates and extends prior 
case studies suggesting that institutional arrangements between key members of 
Congress, Defense Department personnel and defense industries encourage 
inefficiency and excess in defense procurement expenditures.  On the other hand—
and perhaps more critically—I theorize that the proliferation of military resources has 
also contributed to the president’s ability to direct military actions without consulting 
Congress. These institutional arrangements weaken the basic underpinnings of the 
constitutional system of checks and balances.  
Previous scholarship on defense spending breaks down based largely on 
methodology. On one hand, organizations, media and commentators examining 
defense policy commonly criticize the Pentagon budget for waste and inefficiency, 




Information, various years; Project on Government Oversight, various years; 
Democracy Arsenal, various years). In fact, a variety of case studies and anecdotal 
accounts support the theory that mutually beneficial relationships between key 
members of Congress, Defense Department bureaus and defense firms encourage 
greater spending than necessary on a significant number of weapons programs (see 
Higgs 2006; Cavanagh, in Sigal ed. 1999; Kotz 1988; Adams 1982; Kurth 1972; also 
see Freeman 1955; Arnold 1979; Fiorina 1989; Stein & Bickers 1997 on policy 
subsystems). Additional scholarship highlights examples of inefficiencies (Higgs 
2006; Kovacic 1990; Simon 1988; Gansler 1980) and excess (Melman 1962) in 
military spending, as well as potential for congressional influences in the distribution 
of defense benefits (Mayer 1990, 1991; Rundquist & Carsey 2002) and base closures 
(Twight 1990).  
Yet, on the other hand, political scientists utilizing statistical analyses that 
account for the behavior and preferences of all members of Congress over time have 
found little systematic evidence supporting the findings presented in case studies. 
This work challenges basic assumptions that members and Senators consistently 
support defense programs in order to protect local jobs and direct revenue to their 
constituencies (Bernstein & Anthony 1974; Cobb 1976; Ray 1981a; Fleisher 1985; 
Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991) or that defense contracts are regularly distributed to 
advance members’ reelection interests (Goss 1972; Rundquist 1973, 1978; Rundquist 





Previous scholarship examining broad trends in weapons spending and 
allocations—as opposed to individual case studies—appears to contradict the notion 
that members of Congress align with Pentagon bureaus and defense industries in 
pursuit of mutual benefits. These statistical findings lead to policy recommendations 
that increased congressional oversight of Pentagon bureaucracies—more 
accountability—will help contain defense budgets and save taxpayer dollars. 
However, additional oversight will not help contain defense budgets if the relevant 
institutions—members of Congress, defense bureaus and defense industries—lack 
incentives to enforce compliance, make strategic budget trade-offs or cancel 
outmoded programs. In fact, if the case studies suggesting that political factors drive 
defense spending are relevant on a larger scale, then granting Congress increased 
oversight may even exacerbate the problem that these scholars address.  
This project bridges the divide between prior case studies and systematic 
examinations of defense spending across cases. I argue that, while the conventional 
wisdom that members of Congress will protect their local economic interests is 
correct, these understandings are not nuanced enough to explain congressional voting 
on defense procurement spending or defense contract allocations. Rather, more 
economically homogenous constituencies experience greater reliance on existing 
defense facilities than more economically diverse areas with an equal defense sector 
presence. Members will be more likely to support defense expenditures if military 
spending is essential to the local economic livelihood. There will be a lower 
probability of congressional support from members representing areas where military 




matter more in less diverse local economies with fewer overall employment 
opportunities. 
My study provides new evidence suggesting that institutional incentives 
encourage policymakers to extend various aspects of the defense economy separate 
from their national security goals. In doing so, the study moves beyond extant 
literature in several ways. First, as stated previously, existing studies on the 
congressional politics of defense contracting do not consider the importance of the 
defense industry to a constituency’s overall economy. Unlike prior work, my research 
emphasizes how the concentration of the local defense sector relative to other 
industries affects representatives’ incentives to prioritize defense interests, stave off 
program cuts, press for greater levels of weapons spending and seek defense benefits. 
Specifically, I argue that districts with less diverse economies are disproportionately 
reliant on the defense dollars they receive. Congressional members from these 
districts prioritize defense interests more than members representing constituencies 
with an equal number of defense industries scattered amongst a more diverse, vibrant 
economic landscape. The theory of disproportionate economic reliance suggests that 
representatives’ political motivations are not shaped merely by the presence of 
defense facilities, but are also influenced by the importance of the defense industry to 
the overall local economy. In broader terms, constituency interests affect 
congressional incentives differently depending on local context.  
Second, this project extends the scope of previous work examining patterns of 
congressional support for various types of defense expenditures. In addition to 




development of nuclear weapons, I assess why members support disproportionately 
high-cost weapons systems opposed by top Pentagon officials. Previous studies of 
congressional support for weapons programs tend to assess members’ voting patterns 
on highly charged, politically controversial programs, such as anti-ballistic missiles 
(Bernstein & Anthony 1974), the Strategic Defense Initiative (commonly referred to 
as Star Wars) (Lindsay 1991; Ray 1981a) and foreign policy votes, such as funding 
for the Vietnam War (Cobb 1976). However, it is prohibitively difficult to parse the 
economic significance of these votes at a state or district level. Therefore, these 
studies produce findings that tap into partisan or ideological disagreements over 
funding. By contrast, systems that draw controversy within top Pentagon circles often 
reflect non-ideological, strategic goals. At the very least, members’ preferences for 
these systems cannot be neatly categorized as a liberal or conservative position. 
Examining congressional preferences for strategically controversial systems—in 
addition to the politically charged defense debates that previous scholars have 
considered—allows me to assess potential variation in legislative preferences for 
different types of weapons programs and to tease out members’ motivations beyond 
their ideology or their partisanship. An original database with information on the 
location of primary manufactures of the weapons systems under study allows me to 
gauge a more precise economic impact of these voting decisions.  
Third, the analysis is the first attempt to assess the influence of commercial 
defense facilities—as opposed to military bases, airfields and naval yards—on 
political incentives and national defense decisions. Commercial industries are private 




Corporation. The private defense industry generates hundreds of billions of dollars 
annually and employs millions of U.S. workers (Gholz & Sapolsky 1999-2000).3 
Defense facilities are spread across all 50 states and located in the preponderance of 
congressional districts. By some measures, the defense sector exceeds the size of the 
U.S. auto industry, the recent subject of a government bailout devised to sustain 
critical regional and state employment levels.4 Given the size and scope of the 
military sector, it is reasonable to expect that this industry exerts substantial pressures 
on political representatives.  
Fourth, the analysis benefits from improved data on contracting. Early studies 
focusing on procurement outlays suggest that constituencies do not reap considerable 
benefits from representation on defense committees (Rundquist & Griffith 1976; Goss 
1972; Rundquist 1978; Ray 1981b). However, there is reason to suspect that earlier 
work focusing solely on the allocation of prime contract dollars may have concealed 
political factors that influence these processes. While prime procurement outlays may 
flow to wealthy, urban areas with defense industry headquarters (Markuson et al. 
1991; Mayer 1991), these funds ‘trickle down’ to other areas in the form of 
subcontracts. Researchers have speculated that subcontracts are deliberately dispersed 
as widely as possible in order to attract greater political support for weapons 
programs (Mayer 1990, 218-231; 1991, 155-174; Rundquist 1978, 42). Given the 
extensive usage of subcontracting and relaxed regulations governing these processes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Defense contracting exceeded $180 billion in defense procurements and research and development in 
the 2009 fiscal year. This figure does not include expenditures for military personnel, military bases, 
nuclear weaponry or supplemental funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor does it include 
billions of dollars of annual weapons sales to foreign nations.  
4	  The defense industry dwarfs the size of the auto industry in terms of annual revenue and rivals the 




these secondary distributions offer contractors an optimal strategy to increase political 
support for weapons programs.  
Finally, unlike previous scholarship, I argue that the rise of a permanent 
military industry and the resulting politics of military procurement have serious 
consequences for the constitutional regime of checks and balances.  Specifically, 
legislators’ incentives to perpetuate defense resources and the absence of sustained 
military demobilization fundamentally weaken Congress’ institutional check on 
executive war powers. Congress’ control over funding is commonly understood to be 
the most viable tool to limit the president’s military actions (Yoo 2005, 1999; 
Silverstein 1997; Hamilton 1788, Federalist 69 in Rossiter ed. 2003; Madison 1788, 
Federalist 48, in Rossiter ed. 2003). However, as long as legislators use this power to 
extend available defense resources, presidents enjoy an enhanced ability to direct 
military actions without consulting Congress. The development of a standing military 
arsenal has created an environment in which members of Congress support the 
ongoing appropriation of defense resources and find it politically difficult to use their 
spending powers to oppose military actions.  
While party politics will sometimes spur Congress to oppose a president’s 
independent military actions (Howell & Pevehouse 2007), these legislative measures 
rarely prevent the administration from carrying out its agenda. As long as Congress 
provides funds for the equipment and manpower necessary to mobilize the military, 
presidents can draw upon these resources to initiate military action without consulting 




expect to receive it and can anticipate that Congress will experience great pressure to 
provide funds for troops that are already engaged in armed conflicts. 
Evidence of institutionally entrenched interests in the expansion of the defense 
industry does not contradict the view of defense spending as a response to perceived 
national security threats. However, it does suggest that the conventional wisdom 
provides only a partial picture of the extent and features of the military establishment. 
Additional institutionalized factors—defense revenue, job security, economic 
vulnerability and electoral strategies—shape the growth and characteristics of the 
modern U.S. military industry. Evidence presented here suggests that political 
interests in defense sector development encourage policymakers to extend defense 
expenditures regardless of geopolitical factors. These political strategies unwittingly 
counteract congressional efforts to reassert authority over military affairs. The rise of 
a permanent military industry has undermined congressional reassertion of power.  
 
The Rise of the U.S. Military Industry: Externalized War Costs, Expansive Defense 
Benefits & Disproportionate Economic Reliance  
Institutional structures influence political preferences. Accordingly, defense 
spending can be explained in part by the relationship between representatives and 
voters (Mayhew 1974). At the 1787 Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 
constitutional delegate James Wilson extolled representative government and 
separation of powers as practical limitations on unnecessary wars and executive 
control over the military (in Kurlund & Lerner eds. 1987). His reasoning, common 




elected officials. Higher tax burdens, lost productivity, military service requirements 
and potential damage to U.S. infrastructure would ensure that a declaration of war 
would be a hard sell for locally elected politicians. Therefore, Congress would declare 
war only as a last resort and be quick to dismantle the armed forces during peacetime.  
This was largely true until mid-20th century. From the American Revolution 
until the Eisenhower administration, military spending was understood to be 
disadvantageous in peacetime. Congress mobilized forces in preparation for war and 
sharply cut military spending after the end of the conflict. A series of administrations 
and Congresses increased taxes and adjusted spending priorities during wartime and 
sought to pay down war debts during periods of diminished conflict (Homats 2007). 
The strategy prioritized the nascent government’s future borrowing power by 
ensuring that the nation repaid its loans and that financial obligations were not passed 
on to future generations (Hamilton 1789, in Syrett ed. 1962).5  
Patterns of military demobilization also constrained presidential authority over 
military affairs. In the War of 1812, a staunchly pro-war Republican majority in 
Congress mobilized military forces only immediately before declaring war against 
Britain. Throughout the conflict, Congress controlled the armed forces at the expense 
of President Madison (a fellow Republican) and dictated the terms of the war. 
Following World War II, in the decades since President Truman referred to the 
Korean War as a “police action,” modern presidents have launched hundreds of 
military actions without first securing a formal congressional authorization.  Congress 
has not issued a single declaration of war.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “The creation of debt should always be accompanied by the means of its extinguishment” (Hamilton 




The twentieth century growth of executive prerogative over military affairs is 
rooted in the institutional arrangements that the eighteenth century framers debated. 
As many leading constitutional founders had anticipated, congressional authority to 
raise armies and control military expenditures ensures that legislators are accountable 
to voters for their defense spending decisions. At the same time, presidents rely on 
Congress to raise troops and supply funds to go to war. However, following World 
War II, the growth of a profitable military industry spurred economic growth and 
created new legislative incentives to procure defense resources.  
Chapter 1 shows that Congress’ constitutional power to declare war (and a 
robust legislative role in the decision to go to war) rests on the anachronistic 
assumptions that the legislature would jealously guard the nation’s defense resources, 
and that members of Congress would want to play an active role in national security 
policy.  The chapters that follow provide new evidence that the growth of the U.S. 
military establishment encourages key members of Congress from more rural areas 
with less diverse infrastructure to protect their local economies by actively supporting 
increased weapons spending. At the same time, the rise of the national security state 
and heightened threat environment creates conditions in which all members 
experience pressures to defer to executive national security goals.  
The Great Depression of the 1930s and 40s allowed for the first total military 
mobilization. Communities were economically devastated, jobs were scarce and the 
American people turned to the federal government for help. The transformation to a 
defense economy stimulated latent industrial capacity, provided U.S. jobs and 




to government intervention in a wartime economy. The pronounced rise in defense 
spending also spurred the growth of large, profitable corporations, spread across vast 
swaths of the county, that are invested in the size of the U.S. military budget and the 
types of weapons systems that the government purchases. At the same time, many 
regions and localities depend on continued defense spending to maintain economic 
prosperity—particularly in areas with a concentrated defense sector presence (US 
GAO 1997a; Markuson et al. 1991).  
Chapter 2 illustrates how, from the onset of the Cold War to the George W. 
Bush administration, defense contracting extended to increasing numbers of regions 
and localities—regardless of the size of the procurement budget. Further, since World 
War II, defense dollars have disproportionately extended to areas with less developed 
economic infrastructure, including more sparsely populated localities outside of 
central cities, the (formerly agrarian) South and South West, and finally, desert and 
mountain regions—even while the bulk of defense dollars remain heavily 
concentrated. 
At the same time, the proliferation of defense benefits has coincided with 
policies that decrease public sacrifices traditionally associated with wars and push 
costs onto future generations (see Higgs 2007; Hormats 2007). Policies such as the 
All-Volunteer Force (—followed several decades later by the rise of private 
contractors and security forces—) increased deficit spending, and the development of 
technology that makes it easier for U.S. to fight its wars far from U.S. soil (thus 
avoiding potential damage to domestic infrastructure and lost productivity) reduce the 




to utilize military force abroad at reduced cost to U.S. citizens provides obvious 
benefits, this arrangement also influences political debates over whether or not to 
employ military force in the first place.  Rather than impose direct costs on popular 
majorities, key constituencies currently profit from ongoing military spending, while 
the costs of warfare are systematically reduced. As I argue in Chapter 5, this weakens 
popular opposition to U.S. wars and major military engagements, enabling presidents 
to draw upon an expanding pool of resources while structuring institutions to 
maximize their own discretion.  
After World War II, the electoral incentives shaping defense spending 
decisions changed dramatically. In a post-war context, defense expenditures not only 
countered the rising Soviet threat but also met the needs of various local and regional 
economies. While recognizing the necessity of a private arms industry for victory in 
World War II, President Eisenhower famously warned the nation in 1961 of a 
military-industrial complex—or the “conjunction of an immense military 
establishment with a large arms industry”—and its pervasive influence within 
political and economic spheres. Since the onset of the Cold War, scholars have 
argued that an iron triangle links defense industries, Pentagon bureaucracies and 
members of Congress in mutually beneficial relationships that encourage defense 
spending separate from strategic necessities (see Mills 1956; Kurth 1972; Adams 
1982; Kotz 1988; Cavangh 1990; Higgs 2006).  
The iron triangle thesis suggests that a geographically widespread, highly 
profitable arms industry creates overlapping economic and political stakes in the arms 




with Defense Department services that compete amongst each other for limited 
resources as well as those of communities that rely on defense sector employment and 
revenue for growth. The members of Congress representing these constituencies work 
to ensure continued funding for weapons expenditures that benefit their district. These 
members’ career ambitions encourage them to protect local economic infrastructure 
by prioritizing defense interests and seeking defense benefits.  
The unique characteristics of the military economy exacerbate these alliances. 
Unlike standard U.S. markets, the government is the sole legal purchaser of most 
military equipment. As a result, the government determines the prices, insures against 
losses and subsidizes volume (Higgs 1990; Markuson et al. 1991; Patillo 1998; 
Gansler 1980). The limited number of major suppliers and lack of traditional market 
competition invites companies to manipulate economic conditions to enhance 
revenue—a behavior that economists refer to as rent-seeking. Many scholars 
concluded that shared political and economic stakes in the sustained growth of the 
U.S. military economy thus shape national defense spending priorities while 
propagating inefficiencies at taxpayers’ expense (for example, see Melman 1974; 
Adam 1982; Kotz 1988; Cavangh 1990; Higgs 2006).   
 Perhaps most prominently, C. Wright Mills’ (1956) seminal study of The 
Power Elite argues that mutual interests shared among the military, corporate and 
political elite drive defense policies while increasing authority within unelected 
bureaucracies. James Kurth (1972) performed an economic analysis of weapons 
procurement and found that, during the early stages of the Cold War, contractors and 




defense firms. As a result, business-government relations created a follow-on 
imperative in military contracting that prevented production lines from closing down. 
More recently, Gholz & Sapolsky (1999-2000) have argued that the follow-on 
imperative more aptly describes the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s than the 
Cold War era that Kurth analyzed.  
Researchers also utilize case studies in order to highlight political influences 
in defense contracting. Gordon Adams’ (1982) important case study on military 
contracting documents the flow of personnel and money between defense firms, 
executive defense bureaus, military contractors and key members of Congress. 
Additional studies have shown that political interests shared among these actors 
helped prolong the procurement of disproportionately expensive weapons systems 
that presidents and Secretaries of Defense tried to terminate, such as the B-1 stealth 
bomber (Kotz 1988) and the SSN-Seawolf Submarine (Cavangh 1990). Most 
recently, Robert Higgs (2006) discusses various inefficiencies in U.S. defense 
contracting and highlights special interests poised to take advantage of the system.   
However, statistical tests of the military-industrial complex thesis generally 
fail to comport with case study and anecdotal evidence of inefficiency and excess in 
weapons contracting. On one hand, previous work has demonstrated that the presence 
of local military bases do influence members’ incentives to join defense committees 
and direct defense procurement policies (Adler & Lapinksi 1997; Goss 1972; Arnold 
1979; Rohde & Shepsle 1973). On the other hand, though, political scientists utilizing 
statistical methods to examine congressional behavior across cases have found little 




spending decisions (Bernstein & Anthony 1974; Cobb 1976; Ray 1981a; Fleisher 
1985; Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991) or their ability to direct program benefits back to 
their constituencies (Goss 1972; Rundquist 1973, 1978; Mayer 1990, 1991). Rather, 
most quantitative studies of the politics of defense spending conclude that members 
of Congress prioritize weapons systems based on their ideological dispositions 
(Bernstein & Anthony 1974; Cobb 1976; Ray 1981a; Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991) and 
military contracts are distributed strictly on the basis of national security goals (Goss 
1972; Ray 1981b; Mayer 1991). This literature suggests that political considerations 
do not play a major role in the types of weapons that receive funding or the 
allocations of defense dollars. 
Most recently, Barry Rundquist and Tom Carsey introduced new evidence 
that members of Congress that enjoy majority party status and defense committee 
membership draw greater defense benefits to their constituencies than other 
representatives (Carsey & Rundquist 1999; Rundquist & Carsey 2002). Rundquist & 
Carsey (2002) also introduce some constituency-based evidence that states with 
greater manufacturing capacity are more likely to benefit from representation on a 
defense committee. However, the work does not distinguish locations with a 
relatively homogenous defense sector presence from diverse manufacturing 
economies. Although the authors conclude that constituency “need” in states with 
lower gross domestic production levels has no affect on the allocation of defense 
benefits, the researchers do not consider a specific local need for defense dollars. 
Previous work on congressional defense spending has not taken district 




reliance in congressional politics based on the relative concentration of the military 
industry across states and districts.  This allows me to evaluate some members’ 
motives for joining defense committees and supporting spending increases, and to 
systematically assess the willingness of the DoD and important defense contractors to 
direct dollars and projects to economically vulnerable districts of potential political 
value. This research advances understandings of both legislative behavior and defense 
policies in several ways.  
First, the theory of economic reliance considers a district’s overall economic 
context. Previous literature on defense contracting measures constituency demand 
based on the absolute number of military bases in a district (Adler & Lapinski 1997) 
and assesses economic need based on state-level GDP (Rundquist & Carsey 2002). In 
other words, Adler & Lapinski construe “demand” based on the presence of local 
military bases, but do not distinguish between a major base in rural Tennessee that 
employs a preponderance of local residents and a military installation on the outskirts 
of Chicago that encompasses only a small fraction of local economic activity.  
Rundquist and Carsey’s (2002) measure for “need” taps into a state’s economic 
output and its dependence on all kinds of government assistance—not specific 
demand for defense dollars. Unlike previous work, I conceptualize excessive demand 
for defense dollars based on the relative proportion of defense facilities to other 
industries. This theory of disproportionate economic reliance suggests that districts 
with less diverse economies, as a consequence, will become inordinately dependent 




districts will prioritize their defense interests more than members representing 
constituencies with more diverse, vibrant economies.  
At the same time, existing analyses of congressional defense spending do not 
sufficiently capture a constituency’s economic reliance on the defense programs at 
stake in a voting decision. These studies often assess constituency ‘benefit’ by 
focusing on a relatively blunt metric of economic gain, such as state-wide prime 
contract revenue (Lindsay 1991; Ray 1981a) or total subcontract revenue (Mayer 
1991; Fleisher 1985). However, Ray (1981a, 444) goes on to explain the null 
relationship between prime contract revenue and members’ hawkishness on foreign 
policy decisions by noting that the problem may lie with the general level of 
measurement: “Congressmen will still fight—and fight hard—for a defense project 
with direct implications for their districts, but may allow their ‘world’ view, as 
opposed to their ‘constituency’ view, to determine general national security 
measures.” Similarly, while Richard Fleisher (1985) finds that the percentage of 
expenditures for the B-1 bomber flowing to a state relative to that state’s population 
does not influence senators’ support for the program, he explains the lack of 
relationship by pointing out that California received over 60% of B-1 dollars in the 
time period examined. The high concentration of benefits reduced the economic 
importance of the program in other states. 
Second, my research assesses local reliance on defense funds based on the 
locations of commercial defense facilities. Previous studies consider the number of 
local military bases (Adler & Lapinksi 1997) and naval yards (Mayer 1991), largely 




as stated previously, the private defense sector generates billions of dollars in 
revenue, employs millions of Americans, and offers a more comprehensive picture of 
nation-wide defense employment than the presence of military bases. Although these 
data are not publicly available, tracking the locations of major commercial defense 
industries nationwide affords a reasonable measure of local demand for defense 
revenue.  
Third, the analysis is also the first study to systematically track prime 
contracts to the subcontracting level, where the preponderance of defense funds 
eventually go. While Kenneth Mayer (1991) utilizes specified subcontracting data to 
assess the overall dispersion of program benefits, my data afford a more refined 
analysis of the distribution of subcontracts in more economically vulnerable districts. 
It is well known that prime contracts typically flow to wealthy, urban areas 
(Markuson et al. 1991; Mayer 1991). Prime contractors, however, enjoy wide 
discretion in distributing assignments and selecting suppliers for parts or technical 
services for weapons programs (Mayer 1990, 1991). While prime contract 
distributions are not as susceptible to political manipulation (Lindsay 1990; Mayer 
1991), subcontracting affords more opportunity for political factors to enter into the 
calculus.   
Chapters 3 and 4 support the theory that local reliance on defense jobs is a key 
driver of military spending preferences in Congress, and these congressional 
preferences go on to influence the allocation of defense subcontracts. Consequently, 




economic vulnerabilities in these regions and encourage members of Congress to 
support military expenditures that are critical to local revenue and employment.   
The results suggest a symbiotic relationship among key players, where 
spreading substantial defense benefits across multiple districts increases political 
demand for weapons systems among Congress members and sustains rural economies 
that are reliant on the defense industry. Defense subcontracting helps meet districts’ 
economic needs for employment and local economic development, which in turn 
generates greater political demand for weapons systems. These overlapping interests 
encourage defense expenditures in excess of strategic requirements.  
 
Lash Odysseus To the Mast, But He’s Always Got One Hand Free 
While chapters 2-4 demonstrate that key members of Congress gain politically 
from their defense spending decisions, Chapter 5 argues that the ongoing availability 
of military resources strengthens executive authority at the expense of Congress. 
Specifically, legislative policies that perpetuate weapons expenditures (and hence, 
expand military capabilities) allow executives more flexibility to pursue their national 
security agenda as they see fit. An ongoing weapons arsenal obviates the traditional 
need for presidents or executive officials to obtain funding, weapons and armies from 
Congress prior to military engagements. This arrangement weakens Congress’ ability 
to provide an effective check on the president’s military actions, 
As background to this theory of institutional incentives, it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the structure of U.S. political institutions. I do so to point out that 




determine—certain political behaviors. Specifically, institutional structures encourage 
presidents to act imperialistically--that is, to promote the authority of their own 
institution and increase their capacity for leadership (Moe & Wilson 1994; Moe 1999; 
Whittington & Carpenter 2003; Howell 2005).6  
Historical analysis suggests that external factors—including Congress, public 
opinion, and resource limitations—effectively constrained presidential authority to a 
greater extent before World War II than within the current political atmosphere. 
Although presidents have historically pushed the bounds of their authority in military 
and foreign affairs, James Madison’s explicit deference to the legislature in the War 
of 1812 is a far cry from Harry Truman’s first major unapproved war in 1950. 
Institutional structures alone cannot account for these discrepancies—at least not 
beyond the circular claim that some presidents used their powers more aggressively 
than others. Thus, while the hierarchical structure of the executive branch facilitates 
presidential willingness to initiate foreign policy, I argue that the administration’s 
capacity to do so ultimately depends on available resources and institutional 
authority.   
By contrast, Congress’ more democratic structure encourages individual 
members to prioritize their own political self-preservation–that is, to gain electoral 
favor with fellow partisans and local constituents—rather than behave 
imperialistically (to promote the power of their own institution) (see Mayhew 1974; 
Arnold 1990; Olson 1971). Congress’ presumed institutional weakness is partly a 
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product of its institutional structure: Individual members’ preoccupations with 
maintaining broad appeal to voters, the institutional demand for compromise among 
hundreds of competing member interests and the need to push legislation through 
both an upper and lower chamber tend to weaken members’ ability to check executive 
authority (see Olson 1971; Koh 1988; Silverstein 1997). Further, the military 
bureaucracy answers directly to the president and reinforces informational disparities 
between the administration and Congress on key intelligence issues (Smist 1994). 
These institutional features are exacerbated by members’ eagerness to perpetuate the 
slate of resources at the president’s disposal. As a result, Congress flexes its foreign 
policy muscles only intermittently, to challenge a president of the opposite party or 
when a war becomes unpopular (see Arnold 1990; Levinson & Pildes 2006; Howell 
& Pevehouse 2007).  
Recent scholarship suggests that congressional majorities facing a president of 
the opposing party are more likely to heighten the political costs of the president’s 
military actions (Howell & Pevehouse 2007). However, broader patterns of Congress’ 
ongoing military build-up and delegation of power to executive agencies also work to 
counteract members’ willingness and ability to prevent these action altogether. 
Therefore, while the congressional opposition may seek to create negative publicity in 
response to a military operation already in progress, Congress rarely takes steps to 
prevent an administration from carrying out its military endeavors in the first place.  
From a separation-of-powers standpoint, these institutional structures weaken 
the regime of checks and balances to the extent that legislators’ self-preservationist 




II, members of Congress have vested interests in procuring resources necessary for 
policies that they find it difficult to take responsibility for determining collectively. 
Instead, members of Congress are likely to work alongside executive allies, with 
whom they can vest resources and authority. Institutional ambitions in Congress thus 
augment those of the executive—a far cry from the framers’ reliance on 
“ambition…made to counteract ambition” (Federalist 51).  
An ongoing weapons arsenal creates overlapping institutional incentives to 
perpetuate weapons procurements and concentrate authority over national security 
policy within the executive branch. Like Odysseus’ futile attempt to hear the sirens 
and resist their song, intermittent congressional attempts to curtail executive authority 
fall short because key members have a political stake in extending weapons 
expenditures that the executive branch is structured to control.  
 Chapter 5 shows that, since World War II, Congress has provided hundreds of 
billions of dollars in annual expenditures to build up a permanent weapons arsenal. 
These resources provide a base level of funding that presidents can draw upon to 
initiate military engagements. At the same time, presidents have structured the 
national security establishment in order to initiate military policy with as few 
restrictions as possible. To do so, presidents devise mechanisms with which to utilize 
force covertly, structure executive organizations to carry out their foreign policy 
decisions, and pursue strategies that both exacerbate informational asymmetries and 
reduce effective congressional oversight (Howell 2005).  
Evidence suggests that the practical need to consult Congress and obtain a 




War II, in large part because congressional budgetary authorizations continue to 
provide ongoing military resources. At the same time, presidents structure the 
national security and intelligence community in order to insulate and control the 
available military technology that Congress appropriates. While executive 
motivations and strategic motivations to utilize force are beyond the scope of this 
project, the president’s ability to make these decisions independently is greatly 
enhanced by Congress’ willingness to procure ongoing defense resources.  
Members of Congress may prioritize expenditures that weaken their 
institutional war powers for several reasons. This project provides evidence that key 
members representing the most economically reliant constituencies seek to perpetuate 
weapons expenditures in order to enhance their own electoral self-preservation. These 
members have incentives to support various types of weapons programs regardless of 
the geopolitical climate and in spite of their partisanship. Of course, there are other 
factors that spur support for weapons spending.  All members of Congress have 
political incentives to support national defense spending during periods of perceived 
crisis or heightened threat. Further, as I discuss in Chapter 3, party leadership may 
also seize opportunities to adopt a hawkish foreign policy stance in efforts to improve 
their party’s brand name.  
Evidence suggests that structurally and institutionally entrenched goals—
employment, revenue, and job security—shared among key congressional actors, 
DoD personnel, and the defense industry perpetuate high priority growth in the U.S. 
military economy. Consequently, the modern U.S. military establishment promotes 




military policy. Further, the extension of defense benefits to increasing regions and 
localities—including more economically reliant areas—has coincided with a series of 
policies that have systematically reduced the public costs of war, in terms of loss of 
U.S. lives, military service requirements and taxation. This makes it easier for 
administrations to utilize force abroad. Although the U.S. political system was 
designed to establish institutional and popular checks on centralized power, political 









“The system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not 
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such 
distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at 
large; and this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of 
Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that 
nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.” 
-James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, December 11, 17877  
 
 In 1789, when Britain sought an alliance with the United States against Spain 
following Spanish seizure of the port at Nootka Sound (an inlet off of Vancouver 
Islands), President Washington adopted a policy of neutrality without consulting 
Congress. The administration was intent on keeping the nation at peace and favored 
using neutrality as leverage to protect Louisiana and Florida from British conquest, 
obtain a favorable treaty of commerce with Britain, and acquire rights from Spain to 
use the Mississippi River. Leading members of Washington’s cabinet—Alexander 
Hamilton, Henry Knox, John Jay, and John Adams—unanimously agreed that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




neutrality required that Britain be denied a right of passage through U.S. territory to 
advance against Spain. If Britain should enter the U.S. without permission, 
Washington’s cabinet strongly encouraged him “…to immediately convene the 
Legislature; to make the most vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand 
of satisfaction; to commence negotiations for alliances; and if satisfaction should be 
refused, to endeavor to punish the aggressor by the sword” (Hamilton, quoted in 
Sofaer 1976, 103). Britain did not ask permission or advance troops. Accordingly, 
Washington’s administration unilaterally determined a policy of neutrality. At the 
same time, however, leading cabinet members urged congressional involvement prior 
to potential military mobilization—in part because the executive required 
congressional support to raise troops and purchase weaponry.   
Washington’s commitment to neutrality in European conflicts—including his 
1793 Proclamation of Neutrality following a controversial interpretation of the U.S-
France Treaty of Alliance—reflects a presidential prerogative in foreign affairs that 
has persisted throughout U.S. history. Yet, despite Washington’s inclination to steer 
the nation clear of European entanglement without consulting Congress, he and other 
early U.S presidents consistently solicited congressional authorization prior to U.S. 
military engagements (Corwin 1951; Sofaer 1976; Fisher 2004).  
This chapter seeks to explain early presidential deference to congressional war 
powers in light of a consistent presidential willingness to determine the course of 
foreign affairs independently. I argue that U.S. presidents have systematically pushed 
the outer bounds of their institutional authority in both military and foreign affairs. 




nation’s military affairs with as few limitations as possible. Prior to World War II, 
however, executive unilateralism in military engagements was generally constrained 
by congressional control over military resources. Congressional authority over the 
type of armed forces at executive disposal, the extent of federal revenue available for 
military mobilization, lack of a functional procurement system, and absence of a 
permanent weapons arsenal all limited the executive’s ability to initiate military 
actions without congressional cooperation.   
As this chapter will demonstrate, the framers of the Constitution created an 
executive poised to take initiative in military and foreign affairs, but expected that 
this power could only be exercised in consultation with Congress. As leading 
Federalists argued in support of ratification, the public costs of war within the nascent 
republic, legislative control over resources, and structure of congressional 
representation also imposed political constraints on military appropriations. The 
Federalists anticipated electoral costs of maintaining standing armies and 
perpetuating weapons acquisitions: military service requirements, higher taxes, and 
reliance on foreign investments. These burdens help explain the absence of a large 
peacetime armies or permanent weapons arsenal until the Second World War. Indeed, 
prior to World War II, the onerous public costs of war, limited technological 
advancement (and hence, absence of imminent threat to the relatively isolated 
republic), and “balanced” society of economically independent property-holders 
facilitated a policy of congressional demobilization following major military 
engagements.8 Accordingly, executive initiative in military affairs was constrained in 
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size, scope and latitude, in large part because presidents systematically relied on the 
legislature to mobilize forces and raise funds to go to war.  
In Part I of the analysis, I argue that leading Federalists sought to structure 
political institutions to empower the national government and enable it to effectively 
repel external enemies, while at the same time guarding against unnecessary military 
excursions. Federalists and Anti-Federalists statements convey a general 
understanding that needless wars would drain national revenue and provoke public 
resentment. While the two factions disagreed as to whether a strong federal 
government would prove to be an oppressive force in the lives of citizens, neither side 
anticipated a context in which permanent military appropriations would be construed 
as profitable amongst key constituencies, or where members of Congress would find 
electoral incentives to appropriate military expenditures indefinitely.9 
Part II explores congressional control over military policy during several key 
periods of American political development. Following Washington’s command of 
eighteenth century foreign policy, U.S. presidents systematically pushed the bounds 
of their military authority. However, evidence suggests that resource limitations 
substantially minimized earlier presidents’ willingness and ability to act 
independently. Indeed, lacking a unified military, professional army and functional 
procurement system, early nineteenth century U.S. presidents systematically 
requested legislative authorization prior to military deployments and sought ongoing 
congressional cooperation to supply military resources (see Sofaer 1976, 269; 
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Hormats 2007, 53). As Congress began to authorize greater numbers of military 
personnel, devise more expansible armies, and establish a standardized procurement 
system, mid-nineteenth century presidents began to capitalize on an ability to move 
existing troops without congressional authorization and seek legislative approval only 
after military hostilities appeared inevitable. At the turn of the century, presidents 
gained leverage from modern naval resources authorized during industrialization, in 
addition to existing weapons arsenals equipped with supplies left over from previous 
wars. These resources allowed early twentieth century presidents to circumvent 
congressional approval in various regional conflicts.  
 
Structuring Institutional War Powers 
Lessons from the 18th Century Continental Army  
The First Continental Congress was formed in 1774, when representatives of 
several colonies met to discuss mutual grievances under King George III. The 
Congress assumed the responsibility to initiate foreign affairs and conduct the 
Revolutionary War, although the states retained all of their legislative powers.  
George Washington’s Revolutionary War experience provoked pronounced 
dissatisfaction with the lack of power in the Continental Congress and its inability to 
raise funds. As early as 1870, after Charleston fell to the British, Washington 
complained in a private letter to a member of Congress about the present state of 
finances and lack of power in Congress “competent to the great purposes of war” 
(Letters of May 14 and May 31, 1780, Fitzpatrick ed., Vol. 18). With the adoption of 




declare war and conduct foreign affairs, but still lacked means to raise armies. 
Congress had to impose requisitions on the states in order to raise funds, although it 
had no authority to compel compliance among recalcitrant state legislatures (Articles 
VI-IX). The arrangements continued under the Articles continued much as it had 
under the Continental Congress (see Sofaer 1976, 23; Wood 2003, 71).  
Indeed, on March 4, 1783, six months prior to the signing of the Treaty of 
Paris and the culmination of the War, General Washington expressed forebodings to 
Alexander Hamilton of “the sufferings of a complaining army on one hand, and the 
inability of Congress and tardiness of States on the other.” He implored Hamilton that 
“unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes, that the distress we 
have encountered, the expense we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the 
course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing” (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, 
Newburgh, 3/4/1783; Vol. 26, in Fitzpatrick 1931-44 ed.). On June 8, 1783, he 
submitted a public letter to the States lamenting the inefficiencies and resource 
shortages that hindered the war effort.10 He found irredeemable fault with the 
Articles, which lacked centralized control over the military and produced collective 
action problems among States, creating a danger to military supply levels and troop 
morale:  
…The inefficiency of measures, arising from the want of an adequate 
authority in the Supreme Power, from a partial compliance with the 
Requisitions of Congress in some of the States, and from a failure of 
punctuality in others, while it tended to damp the zeal of those which 
were more willing to exert themselves; served also to accumulate the 
expences of the War, and to frustrate the best concerted Plans… The 
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discouragement occasioned by the complicated difficulties and 
embarrassments…would have long ago produced the dissolution of 
any Army, less patient, less virtuous and less persevering, than that 
which I have had the honor to command (Circular, id). 
 
In addition to impediments to the war effort, states experienced difficulties 
maintaining order after the war had ended. State authorities were unable or unwilling 
to quell public uprisings and Congress lacked the authority to do so.11 States’ refusal 
to comply with requisitions frustrated Congress’ efforts to pay down the national debt 
and made additional borrowing impossible. Further, state legislatures tended to 
exacerbate the nation’s economic problems by continuing to issue additional paper 
money. Poor economic conditions contributed to a growing demand for political 
reform (Sofaer 1976, 24; Wood 1998, 409-413).12 Alexander Hamilton (Federalist 
15, in Rossiter ed. 2003) later bemoaned that, under the Articles, “We have neither 
troops, nor treasury, nor government.”13  
While the Revolutionary War experience provoked a felt need for more 
effective governance in matters of war, the colonial experience under King George III 
also bred a pervasive anti-monarchical, anti-army sentiment (Edling 2003, 81). 
Accordingly, most framers present during constitutional ratification shared nuanced 
concerns for effective governance and individual liberty, or centralized control over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In June 1783, for example, unpaid soldiers marched to Philadelphia and protested before 
Independence Hall. Lacking authority to interfere, Congress was forced to temporarily relocate. When 
confronted with Shay’s Rebellion in 1787, Congress faced requests for assistance to contain the armed 
uprising, but again lacked the institutional authority to do so.   
12 Just prior to the Constitutional Convention, James Madison summed up these concerns in “Vices of 
the Political System of the United States,” pointing to the Confederacy’s inability to control internal 
violence and its unchecked control of state legislatures, which proved destructive to creditors: “Paper 
money, installments of debt, occlusion of Courts, making property a legal tender…affect the Creditor 
State, in the same manner they do its own citizens who are relatively creditors toward other citizens” 
(in Hunt ed.1900). 	  




the military and freedom from large standing armies. The more extreme positions, 
however, are commonly associated with leading Federalists and Anti-Federalists. 
Although these two factions sharply diverged over how best to structure government 
to obtain these ends, records of the debates over constitutional ratification suggest 
that the document’s defenders and opponents each sought to guard against excessive 
military initiatives, which were commonly associated with loss of revenue and 
burdensome public costs. The consistent application of the same themes—the internal 
costs of military mobilization and fear of standing armies—reflects not only the 
nation’s rejection of monarchy, but also its deficient procurement infrastructure, lack 
of significant naval force, isolated position, and domestic aspirations that 
characterized the eighteenth century republic. 
 
Constitutional Ratification  
The ratification debates over how best to empower government to provide for 
national defense and prevent the concentration of political power ultimately led the 
constitutional framers to devise separate institutions to declare war and conduct it. In 
accordance with Washington’s plea for effective legislative control over resources 
and adequate authority in a “Supreme Power,” the constitutional framers arranged 
political institutions to 1) transfer power to provide for the general defense from the 
states to Congress 2) empower a singular executive as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces.  
Echoing George Washington’s most pressing concerns, leading Federalists 




Federal Government [with] the care of the general defense” but left “in the State 
governments the effective powers by which it is to be provided” (Federalist 23 in 
Rossiter ed. 2003). To correct these deficiencies, the framers vested unlimited power 
to raise a peacetime army and vote for appropriations needed to support it in 
Congress.14 Federalist writings express the view that Congress was responsible to 
prepare for the nation’s defense and therefore had to be supplied with requisite means 
to secure that end.15 Familiar with the military experience during the Revolutionary 
War under the Continental Congress, Alexander Hamilton argued that imposing 
limitations on appropriations creates “constitutional shackles” that incapacitate the 
nation’s ability to prepare for its own defense (Federalist 23-25).16 Advocating on 
behalf of ratification, James Madison advanced a similar defense of Congress’ power 
to raise troops indefinitely: one cannot predict in advance the nature and scope of a 
future attack, and to attempt to do so invites foreign usurpation.17 He further 
suggested that such proscriptions on government power are not only dangerous but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Cl. 11-16 (delegating power to declare war; raise and support 
armies; provide and maintain a navy; regulate land and naval forces; call forth the militia; and provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia). Congress’ power to appropriate funds are also 
delegated in Article I, Section 8, Cl. 1, 2, and 5 (empowering Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts, and excises; borrow money on the credit of the United States; and to coin money and 
regulated its value). 
15 “…there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of 
the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to the formation, 
direction, or support of the national forces” (Federalist 23, in Rossiter ed. 2003 emphasis in original). 
 
16 Though Hamilton expressed doubts as to whether large peacetime armies would be necessary, his 
line of argument maintained that Congress should retain the authority to appropriate whatever force is 
necessary to prevent internal uprisings or foreign invasions (Federalist 24; also see Madison, 
Federalist 37, in Rossiter ed. 2003). 
17 “How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in 
like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can 




also futile, as “it is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation” (Federalist 41). 
Anti-Federalist opposition centered on this transfer of military power from the 
states to the federal government. The opponents of the proposed constitution feared 
that unlimited, centralized authority to raise military forces would invite internal, 
domestic costs that were “improvident” and “dangerous” to republican liberty 
(Brutus, Essay VIII-X; Centinel, Letter I; Agrippa, Essay V; Impartial Examiner, 
Essay I).18 Throughout ancient and modern history, “almost all” European and Asian 
nations had lost their liberty because of the establishment of a standing army.19 By 
this line of argument, it was hardly prudent to emulate them.20    
It is important to note that Anti-Federalist opposition to standing armies 
emphasized the power of the central government to overpower its own citizens; the 
potential for excessive use of force against other nations was either unforeseen or 
regarded as unimportant. Opponents of the Constitution’s army clauses expressed 
fears that the new government would impose unwarranted burdens on citizenry, 
creating an untenable fissure between governing and governed that would eventually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The Anti-Federalist essays are drawn from Storing Anti-Federalist (1985) unless otherwise noted.  
19 “…the far greater part of the different nations, who have fallen from the glorious state of liberty, 
owe their ruin to standing armies” (The Impartial Examiner; 20 February 1788, in Storing Anti-
Federalist). In Essay VIII, Brutus quoted an argument from Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of 
England delivered in the House of Commons in favor or reducing Great Britain’s army: “…The 
nations around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been enslaved…by their standing armies they 
have lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people in any country can be 
preserved where a numerous standing army is kept up” (in Storing ed. 1985).   
20 “Are we so much better than the people of other ages and other countries, that the same allurements 
of power and greatness, which led them aside from their duty, will have no influence upon men in our 
country? Such an idea, is wild and extravagant. Had we indulged such a delusion, enough has appeared 
in a little time past, to convince the most credulous, that the passion for pomp, power and greatness, 
works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our better sort, as it ever did in any country under 




degenerate to military despotism. Standing armies required recruitment of citizen-
soldiers that not only interfered with citizens’ private pursuits, but was also 
“expensive” and “inconvenient”—a considerable burden on tax payers, a drain on 
public revenue, and a gross interference with commercial and political aspects of 
republican life (The Impartial Examiner, 20 February 1788, in Storing ed. 1985).21 
Cognizant of the need for small peacetime garrisons to repel potential attacks coming 
from Spain, Britain, or the Native Americans, one prominent Anti-Federalist 
denounced an “unqualified” and “indefinite” power to raise and maintain peacetime 
armies. The argument pointed to a danger “to be apprehended from their overturning 
the constitutional powers of the government and assuming power to dictate in any 
form they please” (Brutus 1788, Essay X, in Storing ed. 1985).22 If Congress 
established a large peacetime army and used its power over the militia to disarm the 
people, then the central government would effectively hold a national monopoly on 
force and the means to make itself independent of the people.23  
The Constitution’s leading proponents emphasized the document’s 
institutional safeguards against tyranny.  Railing against Anti-Federalist reliance on 
parchment barriers—written proscriptions on government power—Hamilton (1787) 
famously advanced a structural argument that institutional mechanisms would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  “The soldiery, who are generally composed of the dregs of the people, when disbanded, or unfit for 
military service…become extremely burthensome.”	  
22 Anti-Federalists commonly expressed concerns that, like Julius Caesar’s Roman army, unlimited 
legislative discretion over military appropriations would lead Congress to dismantle state militias and 
create a large standing army “to deprive [the] citizens of freedom and reduce them to slavery” (Martin 
Luther, in Ferrand Records (1911), Vol. 3. Chapter: CLVIII: Luther Martin: Genuine Information).  
23 Patrick Henry summarized this view during the Virginia convention: “Have we the means of 
resisting disciplined armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put in the hands of Congress?” 




provide inherent safeguards against the potential abuse of political power. “If…it 
shall be resolved to extend [a] prohibition to the raising of armies in times of peace,” 
he warned, then “we must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign 
invaders…because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our 
will, might endanger that liberty by an abuse of the means necessary to its 
preservation” (Federalist 25 emphasis added). In this view, an electoral check on 
Congress not only obviates written restraints on the legislative power to defend the 
nation, but also renders such limitations unreasonable and dangerous to the common 
defense. Rather, legislative dependence on the people would effectively prevent 
members of Congress from demanding excessive sacrifices of their constituencies or 
threatening their liberties. 
The Constitution’s defenders maintained that, while “dependence on the 
people is…the primary control on the government,” the Constitution also provides 
important “auxiliary precautions.” To guard against the concentration of 
overwhelming or tyrannical power in one place, the Constitutions separates and 
divides powers in different branches, supplying each with the “necessary means and 
personal motives to resist encroachment of the others” (Federalist 51). “Ambition 
[is]…made to counteract ambition,” as each branch jealously guards its own 
constitutional responsibilities against infringement. By this line of argument, the 
division of war powers between the president and Congress creates an additional 
check on Congress’ willingness to maintain standing armies in peacetime: the 
legislature will presumably seek to guard its own constitutional prerogative rather 




fears of an “elective monarchy,” Hamilton pointed out that the Constitution’s 2-year 
limit on military appropriations expressly prevents Congress from granting the 
executive a permanent supply of military funds. For himself and other Federalists, 
however, this was perhaps a superfluous guarantee, given that he could not foresee 
any reasonable legislative incentive for doing so.24    
Consistent with Washington’s desire for a “supreme power” and Hamilton’s 
preference to infuse energy in the executive (Federalist 70), the framers empowered a 
singular executive as commander-in-chief of armed forces.25 Although many Anti-
Federalists resisted granting the executive the full slate of powers vested in Congress 
by the Confederation, one leading scholar has highlighted the “extraordinary” 
inattention paid to the commander-in-chief provision.26 Not surprisingly, Hamilton 
(Federalist 74) found the propriety of the provision, “so evident in itself and…so 
consonant with the practice of state constitutions...that little need be said to explain or 
enforce it…The direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which 
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.” James Iredell expanded on this 
point at the North Carolina convention. Consistent with the precedent already 
established in state constitutions that had vested military authority in governors, and 
the corresponding need for “secrecy, dispatch, and decision” in military operations, 
“the command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “The legislature] are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the 
support of an army if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a 
confidence” (Federalist 26, in Rossiter ed. 2003).  
25 “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” (U.S. 
Constitution, Article II, Section II, Clause 1).	  	  
26  “…The commander-in-chief power received extraordinarily short treatment…considering its 




Responding to misgivings that “the Executive powers of Congress might 
extend to peace and war…which would render the Executive [an elective] Monarchy” 
(Pickney, in Ferrand Records (1911) Vol. 3: 62-66), Iredell, Wilson, and Hamilton all 
emphasized institutional safeguards preventing the concentration of military power. 
For example, Iredell found the president’s power “sufficiently guarded” against 
gradual accretion or abuse given legislative control over military resources: “A very 
material difference may be observed between [the President’s] power, and the 
authority of the king of Great Britain under similar circumstances. The king of Great 
Britain is not only the commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, but has 
power, in time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He also has the authority to declare 
war.”27  
Others pointed out that Congress would at times be compelled to raise armies 
which “then the President is to command without any control” (Mason, in Elliot 
Debates (1836) Vol. 3: 496-98). While Federalists had no explicit answer to alleviate 
those fears (Sofaer 1976, 52), the response was largely implicit in the Federalists’ line 
of argument. First, the debates that took place during constitutional ratification reveal 
a common understanding that Congress could prevent any abuse of authority in the 
President. Second, and related, Federalist assessments reflect eighteenth century 
socioeconomic conditions, in which Congress lacked both the “pretense” and the 
electoral incentives to perpetuate military resources in peacetime.   
 Under the colonial government, state legislatures had successfully used their 
power over funds to check governors—appointed agents of the British king—in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Elliot Debates (1836) Vol. 4: 107-108; also see Ferrand Records, Vol. 3: 62-66; Federalist 69, in 




military affairs.28  Accordingly, many of the arguments put forth during the 
constitutional convention express an understanding that Congress’ power over 
revenue would be used to control military policy. Indeed, James Wilson and Edmund 
Randolph’s pointed debate over whether the House of Representatives should possess 
sole control over appropriations hinged on a shared premise that control over revenue 
could be employed to direct military affairs.29 Similarly, objections to the proposal to 
grant two-thirds of the Senate the power to override the president’s diplomatic treaties 
suggest that Congress could control the conduct of war through the exercise of its 
other powers. Nathaniel Gorham considered “the precaution unnecessary, as the 
means of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the 
Legislature,” while Gouverneur Morris found “the power of the president in this case 
harmless.” Accordingly, Abraham Sofaer (1976, 35) concludes that this debate 
“reflects a recognition that the President could not realistically pursue a war (or any 
other diplomatic policy requiring “means”) that even one branch of Congress was 
resolved against.” 
While debates over ratification reveal general awareness that Congress would 
use its power of the purse to influence military affairs, records also suggest that 
proponents of keeping the nation at peace and repressing war found solace in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “[Colonial legislatures] used their power over funds to control the conduct of military affairs, 
sometimes even dictating the disposition of troops. They investigated the military, and sought to 
discipline individual officers. They appointed committees to participate with the executive in planning 
and supervising military operations” (Sofaer 1976, 16-17).  
29 Wilson opposed granting the House sole authority to initiate revenue measures, using arguments that 
reflect his understanding of the importance of the spending power: “War, Commerce, & Revenue were 
the great objects of the Genl. Government. All of them are connected with money. The restriction in 
favor of the H. of Represts would exclude the Senate from originating any important bills whatever.” 
Edmund Randolph’s response—that the means of war ought to remain with the less corruptible 
House—demonstrates similar awareness that appropriations would be drawn upon to influence military 




parochial legislature. George Mason, an avid proponent for “clogging war” and 
“facilitating peace”, was “against giving the power of war to the executive, because 
[he was] not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because [they were] not so 
constructed as to be entitled to it” (Ferrand ed. Records (1911) Vol. 2: 318-319). 
Hamilton (Federalist 26) turned his audience’s prejudice for legislative supremacy on 
its head by undermining the premise that the parochial legislature would 
unnecessarily aggregate military resources:  “But the question again recurs, upon 
what pretense could [the president] be put in possession of a force [large enough to 
awe the people into submission] in time of peace?” Hamilton’s rejoinder implies that 
legislators would have to convince their constituencies of either interest or necessity 
in order to perpetuate military resources in peacetime—a “pretense” which was not 
clearly discernible in the burgeoning eighteenth century republic.30  
Congressional control over military resources reflects a structural view of 
liberty commonly held among Federalists: The representative structure of Congress, 
and the vast public costs of military mobilization, would prevent members from 
raising peacetime standing armies. Arguments made in support of ratification 
replayed the themes of legislative control over resources and dependence on the 
people, which would presumably prevent the executive usurpation that Anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Madison also employed the logic of legislative dependence on the people to win support for 
unlimited legislative authority over military resources: “Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of 
Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so 
small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the 
representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make 
appropriations to the army for an indefinite term…without daring, to extend the term beyond a single 
year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, 
elected freely by the whole body of the people, every second year, cannot be safely intrusted with the 
discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of two years?” (Federalist 41, 





Federalists feared. Indeed, in order for the executive to utilize military force or 
employ coercion, the legislature must raise troops and appropriate resources—an 
institutional design that hinges on citizens’ limited readiness to sacrifice their 
resources to promote the public good (Edling 2003, 114).  
While the extent of the president’s discretionary power to command or move 
existing troops is debatable, it is clear that Congress was expected to supply troops 
necessary for battle. Given the socioeconomic costs of doing so in a period of relative 
security from imminent attack, Federalists commonly advanced arguments suggesting 
that the institutional design would limit executive discretion over military matters and 
reduce the likelihood of war. By contrast, Anti-Federalist opposition to the 
Constitution’s army clauses reflect a historical understanding that an electoral check 
on legislatures is insufficient if Congress exploits its unlimited authority and acquires 
a monopoly on force, which the executive could then control with impunity. The 
arguments suggest that Anti-Federalists feared an indefinite military build-up because 
they presumed that it would inflict intolerable costs on the populace and facilitate the 
demise of the republic.  
Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed on the seriousness of international 
threats that the nation faced, the potential need for standing armies to repel foreign 
threats, and the future of liberty under a consolidated national government. However, 
each side associated large-scale military mobilization and permanent standing armies 
with the imposition of internal, domestic costs. At minimum, both sides understood 
that taxation, military service, and loss of federal revenue interfere with citizens’ 




be avoided in peacetime to the greatest extent that liberty and security will allow. 
Neither line of argument anticipated socioeconomic and geopolitical developments 
that would facilitate an expansive military industry, minimize the public costs of war 
and inadvertently strengthen executive war powers at the expense of Congress.  
 
Resource Constraints & Shared War Powers 
Prior to World War II, Congresses systematically demobilized forces 
following major military engagements. Accordingly, as many prominent Federalists 
had anticipated, independent executive military actions were constrained in size and 
scope—in large part because of the need to consult Congress to mobilize troops and 
provide resources. At the same time, however, more expansible armies, new markets 
for domestic weapons procurements, naval forces that transported wars to foreign 
territories, and the borrowing and printing of money shaped representatives’ 
inclination to grow military resources at the president’s disposal. While the most 
complete externalization of the public costs of war occurred after World War II, with 
the advent of a permanent weapons arsenal and peacetime standing armies, 
intermittent trends toward this end are clearly observable during the course of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Accordingly, presidents’ decision to engage troops 
unilaterally increased in duration and frequency as political institutions developed 







1798 – 1816: Limited Resources, Congressional Advantage  
Although many Federalists saw the nation’s military weakness as one of the 
major defects of the confederation, the Federalist Congress never created a large 
standing army. In fact, military historians typically characterize the period of early 
Federalist control (from 1798 to 1801) by the absence of a peacetime establishment, 
continual reliance on state militias, and deficient military procurement infrastructure 
(Kohn 1975; Mahon 1972; Sofaer 1976; Edling 2003). A peacetime establishment of 
approximately 3,000-3,400 personnel became the norm during John Adams’ term—
an exceptionally small army by comparative standards (Mahon 1972, 13; Edling, 138, 
2003). While the earliest U.S. presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and 
Madison—sought to direct the course of foreign affairs with as few restrictions as 
possible, these leaders lacked the resources to direct major military engagements 
without congressional cooperation. This political environment placed greater 
emphasis on diplomacy and required congressional support in order to raise requisite 
funds to support military engagements. 
Adams never assumed the presidential power to initiate war unilaterally.31 
Rather, when war with France appeared likely, Adams called Congress into special 
session and urged that it provide a navy, harbor defenses, and authorize the president 
to raise emergency forces (Stofft 1989, 115).  Congress responded by authorizing a 
series of statutes granting supplemental funding for a naval armament32 and for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Fisher (2004, 17-20) for a more complete analysis of this point.  
32 1 Stat. 547, 552, 556, 569 (1798). All statutory references are drawn from Library of Congress, 




defense of ports and harbors;33 authorizing the president to raise a provisional army34 
and to provide cannons, arms and ammunition;35 suspending commerce with 
France;36 and authorizing the president to seize certain French armed vessels37 and 
seize U.S. ships sailing to French ports.38 Pledging to pursue peaceful, diplomatic 
means, the president generally used the forces provided to him defensively and 
successfully avoided direct war with France.  
At the same time, however, Adams also demonstrated an inclination to direct 
military affairs without explicit congressional approval once Congress had procured 
sufficient resources to do so. In one of the most notorious cases of presidential 
contravention of a congressional act in the early republic, Adams issued an order to 
“intercept any suspected American ship sailing to or from a French port”—either 
disregarding or deliberately stretching statutory language authorizing seizure of U.S. 
vessels sailing to French ports as part of a general prohibition on commercial 
relations with France (id).  Following these orders, U.S. Captain George Little seized 
a Danish ship sailing from a French port. He was later accused of treason and sued for 
damages for violating explicit statutory authorization. Writing for the Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Marshall held that the captain was liable, as congressional statutory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 1 Stat. 554-55 (1798) 
34 1 Stat. 558-61, 569-70 (1798) 
35 1 Stat. 555-56, 575-76 (1798) 
36 1 Stat. 565-66, 611 (1798)  
37 1 Stat. 561, 572-73, 574-75, 578-80 (1798) 




policy prevails over inconsistent presidential orders.39 Nonetheless, the president had 
already acquired the means with which to enforce the order. 
After Adams had narrowly avoided war with France and the immediate need 
for more infantry was removed, Thomas Jefferson came to power and reduced the 
size of the army (Mahon 1972, 13). Despite Jefferson’s “pathological” antipathy for 
standing armies, he ultimately left the Federalist army firmly intact (quoting Edling, 
141; also see Mahon, id). He demonstrated similar deference to Congress in matters 
of war, but also exhibited a comparable willingness to conduct more limited military 
initiatives unilaterally. Jefferson’s first major military action consisted in sending a 
small squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean to protect against ongoing attacks by 
Barbary pirates. He explicitly referenced authorizing legislation40 and deferred to 
Congress to abandon the Mediterranean or retain its cruise ships.41 In response, 
Congress passed a series of statutes explicitly granting the president authority to 
equip armed vessels to protect commerce and carry out “warlike operations against 
the regency of Tripoli, or any of the other Barbary powers.”42 Congress avoided 
laying additional taxes and instead raised a “Mediterranean Fund” by imposing duties 
on foreign imports to support these actions.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Little v Barreme 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 1804 
40 On March 3, 1801, one day before Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, Congress passed legislation 
authorizing six frigates to be “kept in constant service in time of peace… [and] officered and manned 
as the President of the United States may direct” (Act of March 3, 1801, 2 Stat. 110-11, Section 2).  
41 “The real alternative before us is whether to abandon the Mediterranean or to keep up a cruise in it, 
perhaps in rotation with other powers who would join us as soon as there is peace. But this Congress 
must decide.” See Ford ed. (1897) 
42 2 Stat. 291-91, Section 1,3 (1804) 




While Jefferson’s response to the Barbary pirates was explicitly authorized, he 
also took more limited initiatives into his own hands. In 1807, Jefferson proclaimed a 
''qualified war” in response to a British attack on an American ship. In doing so, he 
purchased ammunition without appropriation and only later obtained congressional 
approval. However, the actual response to the attack was limited to a proclamation 
ordering all British ships out of American waters. Jefferson backed these actions with 
economic sanctions instead of military warfare. Congress later upheld the actions 
with the Embargo Act, a series of laws regulating American shippers and their 
vessels.44  
 The War of 1812 marked the first official U.S. war following the adoption of 
the Constitution. The conflict lasted from 1812 to 1816, a period characterized by 
disorganized state militias, a tiny navy, virtually no military command structure, and 
an utterly dysfunctional procurement system (Smith 25-29, in Cooling ed. 1977; 
Wilentz 2005, 157). Indeed, the costs of military mobilization were so high that 
Madison’s initial request for additional troop levels in 1811 yielded congressional 
vacillations and a refusal to raise taxes—despite a predominantly pro-war attitude 
among Republican majorities in Congress (Wilentz 2005, 154).45  Leery of full-
fledged war, Madison initially utilized economic pressures to force Britain to relax its 
blockade on American ships. It was not until this method appeared unavailing that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Act of December 22, 1807, 2 Stat. 451-52; Replaced by Act of January 9 1808, 2 Stat. 553; Act of 
March 12 1808, 2 Stat. 473; Act of April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 499-502; Act of March 1 1809, 2 Stat. 528-
533. 






sent a message to Congress with a litany of complaints against England and 
requesting an official declaration of war (Stofft 1989, 122-23). The Republican-
controlled, pro-war, nationalist House led by Speaker Henry Clay voted to go to war, 
followed later by a more divided Senate.  
 Congress increased the size of the army only immediately before declaring a 
war against Britain (Mahon 1976; Stoffs 1989). Legislators were initially reluctant to 
provide a navy and refused to authorize new frigates. Opponents argued that a small 
navy would prove needlessly costly against Britain’s large fleet (Sofaer 1976, 273). 
Traditional Jeffersonian-Republican aversion to standing armies left Madison with “a 
small regular army scattered across the country [and] a larger but disorganized militia 
still under official control of individual states” (Wilentz 2005, 157). Reminiscent of 
the Revolutionary War experience, state militias were “barely trained and poorly 
supplied… [earning] a strong reputation among the officer corps for uselessness” 
(Wilentz 2005, 164). Lacking a functional procurement system, contractors often 
reneged on weapons deals or produced chronically unreliable and faulty weapons 
systems (Smith 27-28, in Cooling ed. 1977). As a result, Congress controlled the 
armed forces at the president’s expense by refusing increases in the size of the army 
and navy,46 micro-managing military procurement policies,47 imposing specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In 1815, Madison requested 20,000 soldiers and Congress only approved up to 10,000 (Act of March 
3, 1815, 3 Stat. 224).  
47 Congress authorized military experiments with torpedoes (Act of March 30, 1810, 2 Stat. 569) and 




mandates and limits on appropriations,48 and authorizing administrative 
reorganization of the armed forces49 (Sofaer 1976, 267-291).  
Politics further exacerbated these logistical problems. Federalists had strongly 
opposed the war and voiced opposition by resisting conscription; four states even 
refused to send militias. The lack of means at the president’s disposal with which to 
prosecute the war has led scholars to conclude that Congress had the upper hand: The 
dearth of military resources meant that “[Congress] controlled the extent and type of 
armed force at the executive’s disposal” (Sofaer 1976, 269; also see Hormats 2007, 
53).  
The war exacted severe economic costs and ended in international 
embarrassment. Further, British forces caused severe internal destruction within 
Northeastern states and the capitol, provoking threats of secession among New York 
Federalists. Accordingly, after the war, Congress “scrambled” to get rid of 30,000 
infantrymen and immediately reduced the size of the army from 30,000 to 10,000 
men, despite Madison’s request to retain 20,000 personnel (Mahon 1972, 14). In 
1817, President James Monroe confronted a Congress that construed additional 
military preparedness as politically costly and strategically unnecessary. Without a 
compelling rationale for a military establishment, Congress reduced the size of the 
army to its pre-1812 level and confined its duties to internal policing.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Congress attached restrictions to the completion of fortifications of certain forts and harbors (Act of 
Feb. 10, 1809, 2 Stat. 516). After the war with Britain ended, Congress suspended appropriations for 
several fortifications despite executive opposition.  
49 Congress created a superintendent of supplies and reorganizing general staff (Act of June 26, 1812, 2 





Mid-Eighteenth Century: Expansible Armies, Polk’s “Undeclared” War  
Throughout the nineteenth century, U.S. military forces engaged in 
intermittent battles over land against the Native Americans. These domestic conflicts 
led Congress to increase the size of regular peacetime armies and to appropriate funds 
for the “suppression of Indian hostilities.” Accordingly, the onset of the Second 
Seminole War—the longest and most expensive Native American war—coincided 
with increasingly professional armies and a peacetime establishment that was, while 
relatively small, substantially larger in absolute numbers than the 3,000 personnel 
peacetime army afforded to Adams, Jefferson and Madison.  
Two additional developments aided presidents’ leverage and flexibility in the 
command of armed forces: First, following the War of 1812, an Ordnance 
Department centralized command of weapons developments and standardized the 
procurement system, contributing to greater contractor reliability and a more stable, 
uniform weapons arsenal (Smith 29, in Cooling ed. 1977).50 Second, following the 
Second Seminole War in 1842, the legislature demobilized forces by decreasing the 
size of regiments rather than the eliminating entire units. This strategy reflects the 
first deliberate attempt to maintain an expansible army (Stofft 1989, 166).51  
In 1846, President James Polk asserted greater willingness than his 
predecessors to move existing forces in a manner that precipitates war. Louis Fisher’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 However, prohibitive capitalization costs, increasingly rigorous production standards, frequent 
model changes, and uncertainty of further patronage contributed to growing contractor attrition rates 
throughout the 1830 and 1840s. 
51 Congress reduced troop size by nearly one-third, from 12,500 to 8,500 personnel. Though still small 
by comparative standards, the troop count was considerably higher than it had been prior to the War of 




(2004, 29-30) analysis of presidential war power makes sense of this shift based on 
increases in military resources: “The power of the Commander in Chief is at its low 
point when there is no standing army because a president cannot deploy troops until 
Congress raises them. But when a standing army does exist, ready to move at the 
president’s command, the balance of power can shift decisively. Such was the case 
with the Mexican war.”  
In 1836, Texas won its independence from Mexico, spawning nearly a decade 
of debate concerning whether the U.S. ought to recognize the independence of Texas. 
Andrew Jackson had initially declined to do so, given his fears of reprisal from 
Mexico and a corresponding deference to congressional prerogatives.52 In 1845, 
Congress had passed a joint resolution to annex Texas from Mexico and admit it into 
the union. Subsequently, President Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to move his 
forces—1,500 personnel—from Fort Jesup (on the Louisiana border) to a point ‘on or 
near’ Rio Grande in order to repel a potential Mexican invasion, without reference to 
or concern for congressional prerogatives in matters of war. After receiving a 
message from the War Department detailing an attack on a U.S. detachment, Polk 
drafted a message to Congress declaring that a state of war exists. Congress 
responded by passing a declaration of war, immediately increasing the size of the 
army, appropriating $10 million, and authorizing the president to call 50,000 
volunteers to support existing forces in Mexico for a one-year term.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 “It will almost always be considered consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and most safe, that 
[the power of recognizing the independence of Texas] should be exercised, when probably leading to 
war, with a previous understanding with that [legislative] body by whom war alone can be declared, 
and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished” (Jackson, quoted in Fisher 




During the War of 1812, nine out of ten infantrymen were militiamen. Only 
one out of ten foot soldiers was a militiaman during the Mexican War; three were 
Regulars and six were volunteers (Mahon 1972, 23). Reduced reliance on (largely 
undependable) state militias, combined with greater numbers of active duty soldiers 
and standardized procurement policies, contributed to both military readiness and 
Polk’s willingness and ability to move existing troops without advanced 
congressional approval. With sufficient resources, presidents can move troops to 
enhance the likelihood of war, anticipating or exploiting a legislative premium on 
safety of military personnel and altering the congressional debate over the 
appropriation of additional funds. Following the termination of conflict, however, 
Congress reduced the army to a smaller peacetime force than the 10,000 personnel 
authorized in 1815—an action that left forces “stretched very thin”, especially given 
the need for police forces in the newly acquired Texas and California regions (Stofft 
1989, 180). Regular forces and militias were primarily employed against Native 
Americans and to quell civilian disturbances up until the Civil War.   
 
Late 19th Century Industrialization & Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet  
In an unprecedented act of emergency prerogative, the Civil War Congress 
issued the printing of legal tender. Printing paper money allowed for a dramatic 
increase in federal borrowing,53 which allowed President Lincoln to successfully 
prosecute the war against the South and facilitated a historical shift in power from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Federal spending ballooned from less than 2% of GPD to in early 1861 to 25% of GDP by the spring 
of 1865 (Hormats 2007, 83).  (See Chapter 2 for further analysis of the rise of federal borrowing during 




states to the federal government.54 The ease of government borrowing allowed for 
moderate expansion of domestic procurement infrastructure and greatly increased 
investments in European procurements during the course of the Civil War (Smith, in 
Cooling ed. 1977). However, continual military appropriations after the Civil War 
had ended were almost universally construed as unnecessarily costly. One military 
historian directly attributes the immediate “discontinuation of the contract system” to 
the “tightfistedness of Congress” (Smith 1977, 37, 39).55 It was not until late 1880s 
and 1890s, when new markets for steel and raw materials emerged, that Congress 
gradually began to authorize the development of new naval vessels.   
 The period of late nineteenth century industrialization coincided with a 
historically unprecedented congressional interest in regional expansion. The U.S. 
established rights to a coaling station in Samoa and underwent a series of attempts to 
annex Hawaii after the native government threatened to withdraw U.S. rights to a site 
for naval station at Pearl Harbor.56 At the same time, the navy sought to secure 
coaling stations in the Caribbean while private firms promoted efforts to build an 
isthmian canal in Panama.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Although several prominent members of Congress expressed reservations about the constitutionality 
of the issuance of paper money, a palpable need for national resources (and legislators’ reluctance to 
impose the income tax) contributed to the passage of the Legal Tender Act. Indeed, Senator William P. 
Fessenden considered legal tender “of doubtful constitutionality,” but supported the bill because “to 
leave the government without resources in such crisis is not to be thought of.” Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens remarked that, “If nothing could be done by Congress except what is enumerated in 
the Constitution, government would not last a week” (quoted in Hormats 2007, 77).  
55 Defense appropriations fell from $1 billion in 1861 to $57.7 million in 1870 (Smith, id, calculated in 
real dollars).   




In 1896, the Cuban insurrection against Spanish occupiers destroyed sugar 
and tobacco plantations, adversely affecting U.S. importers and exporters.57 U.S. 
public sentiment strongly favored the rebels; expansionism, business interests, and the 
goal of Cuban independence all contributed to overwhelming legislative support for 
war with Spain. In 1898, Senator John Mellon Thurston highlighted the nation’s 
economic interests in a war against Spain: “War with Spain would increase the 
business and earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of 
every American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and domestic 
commerce.”58 
While presidents Cleveland and McKinley resisted mounting congressional 
pressure for war in favor of diplomatic measures, a series of events undermined these 
efforts toward diplomacy:  The destruction of the U.S. battleship Maine in the Havana 
harbor, the loss of 260 lives, and the administration’s conclusion that Spain was 
responsible for the explosion59 eventually led President McKinley to proclaim that the 
right to intervene in Cuba “may be justified by the very serious injury to the 
commerce, trade, and business of our people and by the wanton destruction of 
property and devastation of the island.”60 In 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The U.S. supplied roughly half of Cuban imports and received nearly 90% of Cuban exports (cited in 
Fisher 2004, 41).  
58 Congressional Record, 55 Congress, Session 2, March 25 1898. (In fact, as early as 1809, Thomas 
Jefferson admitted that, “…I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting addition that could be 
made to our system of States, the possession of which would give us control of the Gulf of Mexico and 
the countries and isthmus bordering it.” Quoted in Foreman (1900, 185)).  
59 McKinley’s message to Congress suggested that that the Spain was the perpetrator. Subsequent 
studies conclude that the blast came from the interior of the ship, suggesting that Spain did not cause 
the incident.   




recognizing the independence of Cuba, demanding that the Spanish government 
relinquish its authority and withdraw from the territory, and authorizing the president 
to utilize land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect.  
 Despite longstanding congressional support for war with Spain and months of 
negotiations preceding the outbreak, military historians conclude that the country was 
militarily ill-prepared for the conflict (Stofft 1989, 322; Mahon 1976, 35). Many of 
the nation’s new fleets remained untested, and the United States still lagged nearly a 
decade behind Europe’s military technology (Smith 1977, 38). The extensive 
modernization and build-up of naval forces rapidly outpaced the dwindling and ill-
equipped army, leading to a reliance on antiquated weapons systems leftover from the 
Civil War and substantial dependence on Congress for mobilization of a large 
volunteer contingent (id).61 The Navy successfully fought the most decisive battles of 
the Spanish American War, contributing to both U.S. victory and to Congress’ 
willingness to promote further naval expansion and modernization (Stofft 1989, 344).   
 As a result of the Spanish-American War, the Navy acquired more bases for 
its operations, such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, which allowed for more regional 
interventions to protect expanding investments and trade. The following year, in 
1899, Congress authorized the procurement of a new, modern battleship, while many 
of the “emergency” ships added for the war in 1898 were returned to civilian status. 
By 1907, at the end of Roosevelt’s administration, a decade of congressional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Despite the need for military personnel, the conflict with Spain did not lead to a notable increase in 
the Regular Army. Instead, Congress passed an act calling for a Volunteer Army consisting of 
regiments raised and officered by the states within organized militia units (Mahon, id). Subsequently, 
McKinley called forth 125,000 military volunteers to support the U.S. naval blockade. U.S. 





investment in naval mobilization allowed the president to dispatch a fleet consisting 
of four squadrons of four battleships each for worldwide travel. The massive display 
of sea power, known as the Great White Fleet, demonstrated to the world that the 
U.S. navy was capable of operating not only in the Pacific, but also in a global 
theater. 
Greater U.S. military presence in the Pacific presented new strategic and 
logistical problems for the War Department. Between 1900 and 1917, War 
Department leaders Elihu Root and Henry Stimson and military chief-of-staff 
Leonard Wood initiated major reorganization initiatives to meet these challenges. In 
1903, the department reorganized command of the army and formed a corporate 
general staff to control and integrate planning. Permanent bureaucratic control over 
contracting created additional congressional influence in military procurement 
processes (Beaver 76, in Cooling ed. 1977). Civilian department heads strategically 
shifted their activities to industrial mobilization and investment in domestic 
procurement infrastructure to meet the new supply needs of the army (id).  
In the context of these War Department transformations, increased civilian 
control over contract decisions, and a historically unprecedented peacetime naval 
build-up, President Roosevelt successfully issued a policy known as the “Roosevelt 
Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The policy called for non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries, provided that a nation “keeps order and pays its 
obligations.”62 However, Roosevelt also warned that “flagrant cases of wrongdoing or 
impotence”—specifically those that provoke intervention by a European power—may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1904. Document accessed 




ultimately require U.S. military preemption. Roosevelt had already put his doctrine 
into practice in 1903, responding to Columbia’s refusal to give the U.S. rights to a 
canal in Panama (a former province of Columbia).  He recognized Panama as an 
independent republic and used armed forces to gain control of the canal zone, citing 
past revolutions, insurrections and riots as evidence that Columbia is incapable of 
maintaining order without U.S. interference.63 The Senate consented (66-14) to the 
action by ratifying the president’s treaty, and the U.S. Treasury purchased the assets 
of the Panama Canal Company.  
Military revitalization and regional interests emboldened early twentieth 
century presidents to station forces abroad and issue limited military engagements 
independently. At the same time, however, international agreements and extended 
military actions generally required ongoing congressional cooperation. When 
Roosevelt sought to intervene in the Dominican Republic in 1905 to prevent further 
accumulation of European debt, the Senate successfully blocked the president’s 
independent negotiations, defeated a proposed treaty, and forced a series of 
compromised actions. While President William Howard Taft stationed small 
contingents in Nicaragua, Honduras and Cuba, he also demonstrated caution in 
issuing larger military operations. In 1911, Taft cited his power as commander-in-
chief to position troops along the Mexican border to prepare for a timely response to 
an uprising, but also refused to intervene in Mexico without explicit congressional 
approval (cited in Fisher 2004, 49-50).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 “The experience of over a half century has shown Colombia to be utterly incapable of keeping order 
on the isthmus…We, in effect, policed the isthmus in the interest of its inhabitants and for our own 
national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world” (Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to 




In 1912, Congress increased naval resources prior to the massive mobilization 
effort during World War I. In the ensuing years, President Woodrow Wilson utilized 
naval forces to quell uprisings and undermine existing administrations in Veracuz, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In an unprecedented attempt to commence major 
military hostilities unilaterally, the president responded to the bandit Pancho Villa’s 
1916 attack on Columbus, New Mexico by sending U.S. troops to Mexico without 
consulting Congress. However, the ensuing expedition was compromised by the war 
in Europe, poor coordination, and a lack of federal funds. Wilson ultimately ordered 
the troops to withdraw from the Mexican border.64  
 
Conclusion 
The availability of military resources shapes the extent to which presidents 
seek congressional consent and ongoing cooperation for military actions. In the late 
eighteenth century, leading Federalist arguments exhibit a common understanding 
that congressional control over scarce resources would restrain the president’s ability 
to utilize force unilaterally. However, a series of socioeconomic and technological 
developments that reduced the public costs of military mobilization, combined with a 
clear national interest in domestic and regional expansion, encouraged Congress to 
maintain more expansive military resources. 
Political incentives to perpetuate peacetime military spending inadvertently 
augment executive war powers at the expense of Congress.  While the earliest U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 For a more detailed account of the Mexican Expedition see Global Security, 1916 Mexican 





presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison—sought to direct foreign 
affairs with as few restrictions as possible, these leaders also lacked a peacetime 
military establishment and functional procurement system. Early nineteenth century 
presidents demonstrated greater deference to Congress in military matters than their 
twentieth century counterparts, in large part because they lacked the means and the 
authority to direct these operations independently.  This political environment placed 
greater emphasis on diplomacy, and also required congressional support in order to 
raise requisite funds to support military engagements.  
Once Congress began to raise expansible armies to protect new territory 
during the mid-nineteenth century, President Polk seized upon his ability to move 
existing troops. Expansible armies have historically enabled presidents to precipitate 
armed conflicts, rendering Congress a reactive body and altering the legislative 
debate over both the appropriation of additional funds to support troops already 
engaged in battle and the formal authorization of war. Finally, in the late nineteenth 
century—when new markets for steel and raw materials emerged during 
industrialization—Congress authorized an unprecedented peacetime naval build-up, 
passed legislation enhancing civilian control over the allocation of defense contracts 
and worked with War Department officials to reduce reliance on European imports 
and invest in domestic procurement infrastructure. In the early twentieth century, 
Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson began to make use of newly available military 
resources, along with weapons arsenals left over from previous wars.  Each of these 




facilitated an enhanced executive ability to commence minor troop deployments 
independently.  
Domestic markets for weapons procurements and reliance on deficit spending 
reduce the public costs of war, making it easier for Congress to increase peacetime 
military expenditures without provoking resentment among voters. The growth of 
available defense resources also alters the balance of institutional war powers, 
allowing presidents to deploy existing troops without congressional permission. 
Despite intermittent congressional efforts to increase military appropriations in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Congress never maintained large 
peacetime armies until after World War II. In fact, while the army grew in real 
numbers throughout the nineteenth century, the ratio between the peacetime military 
establishment and population remained below the level of the 1790s until the advent 
of the Cold War (Edling 2003, 142). As a result, systematic demobilization following 
major military hostilities significantly constrained the scope and duration of the 
president’s independent military actions. Constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin (1951, 
15) has highlighted the quantum difference in undeclared conflicts before and after 
World War II, pointing out that the presidents’ independent military actions prior to 
the Korean War primarily consisted of “fights with pirates, landings of small naval 
contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of 
troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like.” 
As the following chapters will examine, the rise of a permanent military 
industry during and after World War II not only lessened the costs of military 




benefits that flow from ongoing military spending. At the same time, the post-war 
environment has promoted a series of policies that systematically reduce the 
traditional public costs of war. Consequently, the development of a standing military 
arsenal created an environment in which key members of Congress support the 
ongoing appropriation of defense dollars, indirectly augmenting executive ability to 
set the national security agenda. The proliferation of available defense resources 
promotes greater executive independence in military affairs at the expense of 






Ch. 2: World War II Military Mobilization: Industry Dispersion & 




During the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Josef Stalin extolled U.S. 
manufacturing as the key to Allied victory in World War II. President Roosevelt’s 
Lend-Lease program—which authorized the transfer of U.S.-manufactured arms and 
ammunition for the Allied powers—provided the Soviets with thousands of tanks, 
planes, and ground vehicles, millions of tons of raw materials and thousands of tools 
for military production. In late 1943-1944, U.S. defense production rivaled the 
combined total of all its allies and adversaries (Goldsmith 1946, 70).65  
While U.S. munitions production helped the Allied forces counter Nazi 
Germany and defeat the Axis powers, the production efforts also helped combat a 
decade-long U.S. economic depression. Nearly 9 million U.S. workers—14.6% of 
Americans—were unemployed when France fell to Germany in 1940. Unemployment 
rates hovered just below 10% when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, 
six months after President Roosevelt had initiated the Lend-Lease program (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1957). In 1944, at the height of U.S. war production, unemployment had fallen to 
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1.2% of the labor force and U.S. gross domestic product increased nearly 100%—
despite the enlistment of over 12 million Americans in the armed services (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009 Statistical Abstract, Historical Statistics).  
Idle manpower, dormant industrial resources, and shifting business-
government relations poised the nation for explosive military production. As the Axis 
powers advanced through Europe and after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, a perfect 
storm of economic need, political will and a potent existential threat transformed the 
nation to a full-scale military economy. 
This chapter shows that the economic and political consequences of full-scale 
military mobilization during World War II transformed political incentives 
surrounding U.S. defense production. In creating a mutually advantageous, inter-
dependent enterprise between the Pentagon, defense contractors and key 
constituencies, members of Congress and their constituencies would perceive more 
benefits in perpetuating and expanding defense production than in reducing costs by 
demobilizing as had occurred after previous wars. Prior studies have demonstrated 
that business relationships between defense firms and governing officials work to 
facilitate industry profits and meet an expansive government demand for munitions 
(Higgs 2006, 1990; Adams 1982; Proxmire 1970). However, previous work has 
largely neglected key structural features that have allowed the U.S. military industry 
to exist and thrive in a representative governing system that caters to both local 
constituencies and national majorities:  First, in every decade since World War II, the 
allocation of defense dollars has included increasing numbers of economic 




grow to depend on defense dollars for local economic sustainability.66 Second, the 
extension of defense revenue and employment opportunities has coincided with 
policies that decrease the public sacrifices necessary to maintain the U.S. military 
economy and utilize force abroad. As a consequence, constituencies incur increasing 
benefits from ongoing defense spending at diminished perceptions of public expense.  
Previous studies have examined regional disparities in defense contracting 
(Markuson et al. 1991) and the nation’s shift away from its traditional reliance on 
direct taxation to pay down war debts (Hormats 2007). However, scholars have paid 
less attention to the systematic expansion of benefits and the reduction of public costs 
associated with military expenditures and warfare.  
The chapter unfolds in three parts. Part I examines the factors and conditions 
leading up to total U.S. military mobilization during World War II. The analysis 
suggests that President Roosevelt capitalized on the willingness of Congress and 
courts to go along with continued deficit spending and a series of policies that 
minimized the risks of capital investment for military conversion on behalf of the 
World War II effort. In carving out a greater government role in business affairs, 
Roosevelt not only advanced military goals but also extended the premise behind 
many of his New Deal programs which were designed to lift the nation out of a major 
economic depression. As a result, the U.S. military industry grew out of ongoing 
partnerships between public and private actors, including heavily subsidized defense 
infrastructure in new regions and localities and procurement policies that cater to the 
profitability and staying power of major military firms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Chapters 3 & 4 for a more complete analysis of local economic dependencies on the defense 




Part II illustrates how defense contracting has generated profits in increasing 
numbers of states and congressional districts from Eisenhower to the George W. Bush 
administration. Throughout the Cold War, defense contracting extended from major 
metropolitan locations in the Northeast, Midwest, and Western coast to cities and 
towns throughout the Deep South and Sunbelt regions—although the Midwest 
suffered relative losses and the bulk of defense dollars remain geographically 
concentrated around major defense production sites. Even after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the scope of military allocations expanded well beyond 1970s levels—despite 
modest reductions in weapons spending and in the reduced threat environment of the 
1990s. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. War on Terror 
precipitated additional defense contracting expansion, drawing military profits into 
more and more sparsely populated areas including desert, mountain and plains 
regions.  
Part III demonstrates that increasingly widespread benefits flowing from 
defense contracting have coincided with policies that systematically reduce the public 
costs of warfare to the broad public. The All-Volunteer Force and official use of 
private military contractors and security forces contribute to substantially lower U.S. 
troop counts and fewer American military casualties. These policies drastically 
reduce public opposition to the U.S. use of force abroad—at least unless or until U.S. 
troop casualties mount and public support for ongoing military engagements erodes 
(Mueller 2005; Karol & Miguel 2007; Grose & Oppenheimer 2007; Kriner & Shen 
2007). At the same time, increased deficit spending pushes financial costs onto future 




wage war successfully. Finally, the development of technology that transports wars 
abroad imposes the bulk of the war costs—economic losses, damage to infrastructure, 
and disruption of peacetime life—onto the foreign nations where U.S. wars take 
place. 
This chapter demonstrates that the military industry has structured 
increasingly widespread economic benefits that flow from defense contracting, even 
though most defense profits remain geographically concentrated around major 
defense sites. The extension of benefits has coincided with a series of policies that 
diffuse and externalize the public costs of war. The proliferation of benefits and 
reduced public costs traditionally associated with military spending and warfare make 
it easier for administrations and congresses to push for greater levels of defense 
spending and utilize force abroad with less fear of electoral reprisal.  
 
World War II Military Mobilization  
While the United States entered World War I with a fully employed civilian 
economy, World War II coincided with a sluggish domestic economy, an 
unemployment rate, of 15% and latent industrial capacity. As a result, dormant 
resources and idle manpower could be redirected to wartime purposes with minimal 
disruption to peacetime life. Historian David M. Kennedy (1999) has commented at 
length on the influence the economic depression had on the scale and scope of U.S. 
military production during World War II. In Kennedy’s assessment, the war not only 




but these dismal economic conditions themselves allowed for total military 
mobilization on behalf of the war effort.67  
Despite a down economy, however, industries were initially reluctant to make 
a total conversion to the war effort. Businesses construed arms production as 
unprofitable, given the historical lack of stability and continuity in defense production 
during peacetime (see Cooling ed. 1977). To forge a partnership with the business 
community, the Roosevelt administration adopted a series of policies that minimized 
the risks of capital investments for businesses that converted to military production. 
First, a newly established Defense Plant Corporation (DPC) gave money to firms to 
build new facilities and purchase equipment. Private operators also leased plants from 
the government, which retained the ownership title during the war but eventually sold 
most of its facilities at a loss (Friedberg 2000, 285). Second, Congress and the 
administration agreed to reimburse whatever a company spends and guarantee an 
added profit for arms production—a “cost-plus” incentive to business that has 
remained a ubiquitous feature of military procurement and research and development. 
Finally, war spending rose from $3.6 billion in 1940 to $93.4 billion in 1944.68 The 
proliferation of available funds not only assisted the war effort, but also provided a 
stimulus to business, employment levels and national productive capacity.  
Unlike textbook capitalist economies—where risk and financing are assumed 
by the entrepreneurial actor in hopes of profitable returns—economic risks shifted 
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617).  
68 By contrast, during the 1922-1939 fiscal years, federal outlays for national security averaged only 
$744 million per year, while Congress had allocated only a fraction of these funds for weapons 




from business to the government. As two scholars put it, government investments, 
subsidies and guaranteed profit margins allowed companies to “function in a world of 
socialized risks and private profit” (Adams & Adams 1972, 284). However, unlike 
standard command economies, the U.S. government never needed to co-opt business 
for the war effort. Rather, increased spending, subsidized wages and guaranteed cost-
plus earnings ensured relatively low-risk profits flowing to major defense industries. 
These policies, in turn, helped ensure that defense production met President’s 
Roosevelt’s ambitious procurement goals. Given this coincidence of interests, it is 
little surprise that World War II military contracting quickly “became a hunting 
license” as firms engaged in a “cutthroat scramble for scarce resources” (Kennedy 
1999, 626-27). Indeed, while U.S. airframe and engine manufacturing increased 
4000% between 1940 and 1945, the government directly financed 90% of the total 
output (Friedberg 2000, 85). 
While the policies governing military production met the needs of the 
business community and the administration, regions and localities with industries 
engaged in military production also gained enhanced employment opportunities and 
local revenue. In May, 1940, President Roosevelt announced an unprecedented 
request for 50,000 planes a year for the war effort.69 This ambitious procurement goal 
called for greater annual production rates than the aircraft industry had produced in its 
entire history (Cunningham 1951, 76). While the president’s request immediately 
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required large-scale expansion and rapid production, the principal demand for aircraft 
capacity at the early stages of the war (as opposed to other types of military 
equipment) also limited the geography of military production. In 1940, government 
investments in defense manufacturing reveal a pronounced coastal bias, favoring 
regions with existing aircraft capacity. Appendix 2.1 lists major locations in which 
major aircraft companies converted their production efforts to for the war in 1940.70   
As shown in Appendix 2.1, major metropolitan areas in coastal regions 
received the bulk of defense dollars in 1940, at the onset of the U.S. military build-up. 
Aircraft capacity clustered around a few major industries, including Lockheed 
Aircraft, Douglas Aircraft and Northrop Aircraft in Los Angeles; United Aircraft in 
Hartford; and Curtiss-Wright in Paterson, New Jersey; Grumman in Long Island City; 
Curtiss-Wright in Buffalo; and Boeing in Seattle. While the nation’s interior 
regions—Kansas City, Kansas, Wichita, Kansas, Robertson, Missouri and Cincinnati, 
Ohio—contained industry subsidiaries and light airplane companies, the major coastal 
metropolises still received over 96% of military procurement dollars in 1940 
(Cunningham 1951, 109). Leading 1940 wartime industries were concentrated in 
major coastal cities with a near-monopoly on military aircraft capacity. 
By the peak of wartime production in 1944, however, the geography of 
military production changed dramatically. While the five largest aircraft companies 
averaged 3,500 employees each prior to 1940, average aircraft industry employment 
swelled to greater than 100,000 workers per company within four years (Cunningham 
1951, 115). Further, existing industries did not rely solely on in-house expansion. By 
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1944, every region, 2/3 of states, most of the nation’s larger cities, and many suburbs 
and towns were involved in military production. At the same time, domestic 
unemployment plummeted to 1.2%, while GDP increased nearly 100-fold (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009 Statistical Abstract, Historical Statistics).  
The expansion of military production took several forms: First, existing 
industries expanded their utilization and established new facilities in neighboring 
locations. Second, military industries licensed (non-military) manufacturing 
companies to supply parts and assist in national defense production. Third, the 
Defense Plant Corporation and Plant Site Board subsidized the construction of new 
facilities, primarily in interior regions of the country that lacked developed industrial 
economies. As a result, industries expanded to small cities, suburbs and towns, 
heavily influencing residential patterns, migration and population distribution in these 
areas. At the same time, direct government investments laid the foundation for 
industrial capacity in regions of the country that had previously lacked manufacturing 
economies.   
Available data on the locations of government-owned, company-operated 
facilities permits an analysis of the locations for military production chosen by the 
private sector as opposed to the government. In the private sphere, major aircraft 
companies typically favored increasing the utilization of existing plant space. Where 
space limitations precluded expansion, companies extended capacity by acquiring 
new sites in neighboring vicinities. As documented in Appendix 2.1, in 1944, branch 
plants had spread into the outskirts of large cities, occupying suburbs, towns and 




Seattle. These new plants were typically located far enough away from cities to meet 
large space requirements, yet remained within the metropolitan district and 
sufficiently near the original site to benefit from its supply channels and other 
facilities.  
In Los Angeles, Douglas Aircraft Company acquired a site on the Long Beach 
Municipal Airport and constructed a large assembly plant. Lockheed Aircraft 
acquired hundreds of facilities in the Los Angeles area scattered across small towns 
from Maywood to Van Nuys. United Aircraft Company extended production to 
Southington and Willimantic, near central operations in Hartford. Grumman Aircraft 
Company drew upon existing space, cheap rental units and available labor in small 
communities surrounding Long Island City, including Bethpage, Babylon, 
Lindenhurst and Port Washington. Bell Aircraft Corporation not only leased 
additional space in Buffalo, but also completed an assembly plant at Niagara Falls 
Airport in Wheatland, while Curtiss-Wright also extended its productive capacity to 
Buffalo Municipal Airport. Boeing Aircraft Company selected sites in Renton, 
Everett, Bellingham and Aberdeen, several miles from the home plant in Seattle.   
Nonetheless, the administration’s ambitious production goals surpassed 
industry capacity in spite of the expansion in home and branch plants. To further 
extend productive capacity, defense industries licensed automobile companies to 
manufacture airframes, engines and propellers. Unlike aircraft companies, the auto 
industry was well-versed in mass production and faced a period of reduced output.  
The administration and Congress thus drew upon the nation’s major manufacturing 




Appendix 2.2 documents the role of the automobile industry in U.S. military 
production in 1944. Auto conversion occurred primarily in traditional Midwestern 
manufacturing hubs, principally surrounding the Great Lakes region. Indianapolis 
(Chevrolet, General Motors), Chicago (Dodge, Buick), Detroit (Continental Motors, 
Packard Motor), Cleveland (Ford Motor) and Milwaukee (Nash-Kelvinator) all 
converted their facilities for subassemblies, glider production, engine production, and 
light transport units. Like the aircraft industry, demand for output led the industry to 
spread their operations in smaller towns and communities adjacent to cities with 
major operations.  
Appendices 2.1 - 2.2 show that, from 1940 to 1944, converted defense 
industries generally opted to expand their operations in geographically proximate 
areas. The geography of military production had extended from major cities in 
predominantly coastal areas to manufacturing centers throughout the Midwest and 
small towns on the outskirts of original plant sites. However, these trends also 
indicate that the complete decentralization of military output across every region and 
two-thirds of the states was not simply a result of increased government demand or 
industrial decisions made by private suppliers. Rather, the U.S. government also 
played an unprecedented role in restructuring the location of industry and dispersing 
the nation’s military output. The Plant Site Board (an executive agency established to 
determine the locations of new defense sites) bought and leased facilities in interior 
locations of the country and funded the transfer of material and production to regions 




Prior to World War II, government was not positioned to play an active role in 
the selection of new production sites. However, as the principal source of funds for 
the construction of new facilities and as the major market for the industry’s output, 
executive officials enjoyed considerable latitude over new industry locations.71 The 
National Resources Planning Board even acknowledged the federal government’s 
principal role in decentralizing military industrial capacity to regions “characterized 
by severe unemployment” and introducing industrial infrastructure in “predominantly 
agricultural areas.”72  
Appendix 2.3 lists locations with government-owned, company-operated 
facilities during World War II, where the Plant Site Board and Defense Plant 
Corporation leased facilities to businesses—often at a guaranteed profit. The 
geographic calculus immediately displays a clear government interest in inland 
locations. By eliminating overhead costs and subsidizing the geographic diffusion of 
industry, DPC transferred companies’ military production to Chicago (Douglas), 
Marietta, Georgia (Bell Aircraft), Indianapolis (Curtiss-Wright), Kansas City (North 
American), Louisville (Curtiss-Wright, Consolidated), Fort Crook, Nebraska 
(Martin), Oklahoma City (Douglas), Tulsa (Douglas), Dallas (North American), Fort 
Worth (Consolidated) and Grand Prairie, Texas (North American). Further, 
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expansion program from 1940 to 1944 was 91.8% federally financed and 8.2 percent privately 
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72  “During the armament program many of the locational effects of Federal expenditures have been 
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agricultural areas has increased greatly as a result of these projects…However, even armament 
contracts are given mainly to firms operating already existing plants, and of necessity have been 
concerned more with military requirements than with any broad purpose such as diversification or 




modification centers—joint business-government ventures—extended to new 
locations, such as Phoenix, Arizona (Goodyear), Tucson, Arizona (Consolidated), 
Daggett, California (Douglas), Elizabeth City, North Carolina (Consolidated) and 
Dallas, Texas (Lockheed).   
A Defense Zone, defined by the War College as the area enclosed by a line 
200 miles inland from the coasts and the Canadian and Mexican borders, further 
emphasized the government’s interest in interior locations. In direct compliance with 
Defense Zone requirements, new production centers emerged in Nashville, Tennessee 
(Stinson Aircraft) Omaha, Nebraska (Martin), Kansas City, Kansas (North 
American), Evansville, Indiana (Republic Aviation), Memphis, Tennessee 
(McDonnell), Lockland, Ohio (Curtiss-Wright), Kansas City, Missouri (United 
Aircraft), Beaver, Pennsylvania (Curtiss-Wright) and Wichita, Kansas (Cessna 
Aircraft). Given these trends, it is no surprise that states with the largest percent of 
private funding were overwhelmingly coastal areas, while the mobilization of inland 
locations was almost entirely government funded (Cunningham 1951, 128). 
There are several reasons why the administration might perceive an interest in 
dispersing military production in wartime. Military demands for security may place a 
premium on more remote locations in the center of the country, away from coastal 
areas that are more susceptible to external attack. Interior locations may also offer 
cheaper land, access to airfields and untapped labor supplies. In any event, these 
decisions expanded economic activity and employment opportunities to regions and 
localities that may not otherwise have established defense infrastructure or received 




 As defense industries and the armed forces drew more heavily on the nation’s 
population, availability of labor became the major consideration in the selection of 
new locations, even overshadowing inland locations. Government invested in cities 
less than the prescribed 200-mile distance from the coast, including Allentown, 
Pennsylvania (Consolidated), Burlington, North Carolina (Fairchild), Birmingham, 
Alabama and New Orleans, Louisiana (Consolidated). These government decisions 
echoed and amplified industries’ expansion to smaller suburban cities and towns, and 
even very small communities, with cheap land, available floor space and untapped 
labor.    
 Unprecedented defense industry expansion within small cities, towns and 
communities facilitated new residential patterns that persisted after the war. Table 2.1 
exhibits the major metropolitan areas and surrounding locations with defense 
production sites during World War II, the population of each census-designated area 



















The table illustrates the disproportionate impact of defense industry expansion 
on population growth and local development in small towns and communities, as 
opposed to large, populated cities with more diverse manufacturing economies. Los 
Angeles was arguably the heart of World War II defense production, with hundreds of 
defense facilities spread throughout the metropolitan landscape. While the metro area 
population grew 31% between 1940 and 1950, the smaller cities and towns within the 
metro region that engaged in World War II defense production experienced far 
greater expansion. The rapid growth of two Lockheed Aircraft facilities in Burbank 
corresponds with 129% population growth, while Douglas Aircraft expansion in El 
Segundo is associated with an 114% population increase. Downey’s (Vultee, North 
American) population grew nearly 60%, while Hawthorne (Northrop) expanded 
almost 100%. Other areas with no previous defense infrastructure—including Fresno, 
Van Nuys and Santa Ana—expanded by roughly 50% after Lockheed established 
defense plants in these areas.   
 In every metropolitan area, the small cities and towns with wartime industry 
expansion in 1944—and continued industrial capacity in 1950—experienced 
explosive population growth. Central cities with previous infrastructure exhibit far 
more modest changes. While New York City’s population grew by almost 6%, 
smaller outskirts such as Lindenhurst, New York (87% population growth) and 
Fairlawn, New Jersey (165% population growth) attracted new residents at 
disproportionately greater rates. Indeed, even more remote Midwestern locations such 




population growth) far exceeded the expansion of central auto manufacturing cities, 
like Detroit (14% population growth) and Cleveland (4% population growth).  
 Population growth in suburbs and towns with defense infrastructure also 
outpaced broader residential patterns. From 1940 to 1950, population growth in 
suburban areas expanded by 23.9% over the previous decade, on average (see Downs 
1973, 18). In-migration to suburbs, fueled by the growth of the automobile industry, 
coincided with 22.9% growth in central cities (relative to the previous decade) and 
population declines in non-metropolitan areas (Downs, id). On one hand, most cities 
with major defense infrastructure experienced less pronounced growth than the 
national average, suggesting that population flows to central cities occurred 
independently of defense production. On the other hand, however, as Table 2.1 
exhibits, suburban locations with defense infrastructure rapidly outpaced average 
levels of suburban growth from 1940 to 1950. This pattern holds up most consistently 
in areas with a sustained defense presence in 1950, including suburbs of Los Angeles, 
New York, Philadelphia, Hartford, Detroit, Cleveland and Dallas.  
The only evidence of population decline in a war industry location occurred 
when defense facilities shut down after the war. Paterson, New Jersey failed to 
expand after the devastating closure of a major Wright Aeronautical plant following 
World War II (-0.2% population change). Norwich, Connecticut may have also 
experienced out-migration after Hamilton Standard Propellers shut down (-0.9 
population change). Indeed, the discontinuation of wartime facilities corresponds with 
more stagnant population distributions from 1940 to 1950, particularly in areas that 




and residential expansion. Specifically, more lightly settled areas that attracted new 
Boeing facilities outside of Seattle, Washington—Aberdeen, Bellingham, Hoquiam, 
Everett, Chehalis and Tacoma—exhibit considerably less pronounced growth in 1950 
than the central city of Seattle (27% population growth). However, nearly all of 
Boeing’s branch plants had shut down in the postwar era, catalyzing the (temporary) 
retrenchment of industrial capacity and employment in these regions. The only 
Boeing branch plant that did not close in the period immediately following World 
War II is the facility in Renton, several miles from the home plant in Seattle. Unlike 
surrounding regions that faced dormant capacity in the post-war era, Renton enjoyed 
both continual utilization of its Boeing plant and had expanded its resident base by 
257% in 1950.  
 Finally, direct government investments in cities that lacked defense 
infrastructure prior to World War II experienced appreciable expansion. The 
populations in Phoenix (63% population growth), Dallas (47% population growth) 
and Fort Worth (57% population growth) grew at faster rates than other cities of 
comparable size, such as Hartford (6.7%), Buffalo (0.7%) and Seattle (27%). While 
cities throughout the South and Southwest generally experienced disproportionate 
population growth after World War II, prompted in great part by the development of 
air conditioning, the average Southern cities grew by 35.9% between 1940 and 1950 
(U.S. Census of Population, 1950). By contrast, Southern cities with major defense 
installations—Phoenix, Dallas and Fort Worth—grew at faster rates than the average 




Prairie, Texas (815% population growth), where government bought and leased a 
major bomber assembly plant during the war.  
Defense industry expansion facilitated decentralization of military production, 
disproportionately affecting interior regions of the country, as well as suburbs, towns 
and small communities on the outskirts of large cities. The population surges in 
suburbs, towns and regions that lacked previous infrastructure suggest that 
establishing plants in areas with less developed economies generates a 
disproportionate impact on local development.  Furthermore, as I argue at greater 
length in Chapters 3 and 4, the existence of defense facilities in areas with less 
diverse economies also inadvertently increases local dependencies on the ongoing 
flow of defense revenue in these areas.  
Despite substantial demobilization of industry in 1945, major companies 
generally retained their central locations after the war (see Appendix 2.1). In 1950, at 
the onset of the Cold War defense build-up, numerous branch plants re-opened 
outside of central cities (Appendix 2.1) and government bureaus sponsored the re-
utilization of facilities in interior locations that the private sector had abandoned 
(Appendix 2.3).  Continued government ownership of facilities throughout the Great 
Lakes, Midwest and Southern regions in 1950 suggests a persistent federal interest in 
the industry’s dispersion and expansibility. As I argue in the following section, this 
also laid the foundation for either economic revitalization or decay, based on both the 
economic vulnerability of an area and whether defense industries expanded their 





Defense Industry Expansion: Dispersing Economic Benefits 
Breaking a 150-year tradition, the United States did not fully demobilize its 
armed forces after World War II. Rather, despite the considerable retrenchment in 
1945, the U.S. maintained a military establishment of immense proportions by any 
historical standards (Higgs 2006, 30). As a result, in 1950, President Truman was able 
to call upon U.S. forces stationed overseas, utilize existing weaponry and 
independently engage troops in Korea. U.S. entrance in the Korean War and the 
nation’s broader struggle against the Soviet empire facilitated massive military 
rearmament and a culture of peacetime military spending. At the same time, the Cold 
War environment created tremendous demand for munitions from private defense 
industries.   
Military spending in the post-war era followed cyclical trends, generally 
increasing during major wars and declining following periods of armed conflict.73 
The defense budget hit relatively low ebbs following U.S. withdrawal from the 
Vietnam War in the mid-1970s and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
during the reduced threat era of the 1990s. However, U.S. defense expenditures also 
increased and receded relative to a substantially higher baseline in the decades 
following World War II than throughout the nation’s prior history (see Chapter 5 for 
figures on historical procurement expenditures).   
Prior to the war, the bulk of arms production took place in government 
arsenals and shipyards. Military officials advertised bids for products from the private 
sector, and the military purchaser awarded the contract to the lowest bidder. By one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




estimate, 87% of defense contracts followed these competitive procedures in early 
1940, just prior to U.S. defense build-up (Smith 1959, 72). In September 1940, 
however, Congress passed new procedures for defense contractors that continue to 
govern military procurement processes. Specifically, Congress authorized guaranteed 
cost-plus profits, tax breaks, advance and progress payments, negotiated contracts (as 
opposed to full and open competition) and government financing of plants and 
equipment. These factors encouraged industries to continue producing weaponry as 
quickly as possible, regardless of expense.  
As a result of these arrangements, the U.S. military industry consists of close 
relations between a few major sellers and a sole government buyer. Unlike traditional 
free markets, these unique buyer-seller relationships are governed by procedures that 
limit private risk and curb market competition (Gansler 1980). However, unlike 
standard monopsonies, the sole government purchaser does not seek to maximize its 
profits by squeezing the seller. Rather, given an appropriations process subject only to 
political limits, government actors are primarily concerned with quality and 
performance and uniquely insensitive to cost (Burnett & Scherer 1990; Gansler 
1980). Critics and commentators—including 2008 presidential candidate John 
McCain—have railed against the waste and excess that flow from cost-plus 
arrangements, where contractors are reimbursed for program expenses and typically 
lack incentives to cut costs.74 However, government willingness to cover potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For example, in the first 2008 presidential debate, presidential candidate John McCain admonished 
the cost-plus incentives that characterize defense contracting:  “...We have to do away with cost-plus 
contracts. We now have defense systems that the costs are completely out of control. We tried to build 
a little ship called the Littoral Combat Ship that was supposed to cost $140 million, ended up costing 
$400 million, and we still haven't done it. So we need to have fixed-cost contracts…We have to get a 
lot of the cost overruns under control.” Quoting John McCain, in New York Times 2008 (September 




cost overruns and provide various financial incentives to industry may be an inherent 
feature of the defense market. Extensive use of cost-plus arrangements encourages 
bids for high-risk endeavors favored by Congress and defense bureaucracies, 
including research and development and procurement of complicated weapon systems 
with unpredictable cost margins.  
In addition to procurement policies that bolster industry profits, most defense 
contracts are determined on the basis of political and administrative criteria other than 
open competition among two or more defense companies. Sole-source awards, 
follow-on contracts and ‘negotiated’ bids determine the bulk of defense allocations, 
while only 34.4% of defense dollars are allocated based on full and open price 
competition (based on data from the 2000 – 2008 fiscal year).75 The prevalent use of 
negotiated bids, cost-plus incentives and high costs to market entry (limiting the 
number of viable competitors) have contributed to the longevity and prominence of 
major defense firms, despite periods of reduced threat and changing procurement 
needs. 
 Table 2.1 lists the leading defense firms in each decade from 1940 to 2006.76 
As the table illustrates, nearly all of the leading military corporations in the 1940s and 
1950s—excluding companies with a principal civilian function such as energy or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
75 OMB Watch, Fedspending.org, Federal Contracts of the Department of Defense, FY2000-2008 
Summary. Accessed at 
http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?sortby=u&maj_agency_cat=97&detail=-
1&datype=T&reptype=r&database=fpds&fiscal_year=&submit=GO	  (updated May 28, 2009)  
76 I compiled the information in the tables with data from Burnett & Scherer (1990, 293), utilizing 
dollar volume of prime contract awards, 1940 – 1987; U.S. Department of Defense, Statistical and 
Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Procurement Reports and Data Files for Download: Historical 




automobiles—continue to rank as leading defense firms in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Further, these companies all retained their prominence through extensive industry 
mergers and acquisitions. Lockheed Aircraft, Martin Corporation, Douglas Aircraft 
and Grumman underwent strategic mergers, forming Lockheed Martin, McDonnell-
Douglas and Northrop Grumman, respectively. United Aircraft became United 
Technologies in the 1970s and retained its principal World War II production units, 
including Sikorsky Aircraft, Hamilton Propellers and Pratt & Whitney. McDonnell 
Douglas, Lockheed and General Dynamics acquired Consolidated-Vultee’s major 
business units, while General Dynamics purchased the defense divisions formerly 
held by leading auto companies like General Motors and Chrysler. Boeing Aircraft 
acquired North American and Rockwell products in the 1996, merged with 
McDonnell-Douglas the following year (under the name The Boeing Company) and 
retained prominence as the #2 aerospace firm, ranked behind only Lockheed Martin. 
The one major exception to the pattern of industry stability is the decline of the 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation in the 1960s, which Gholz (2000) attributes to 
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At the same time, a few new firms have also emerged as leading military 
corporations. Raytheon, Honeywell and TRW gained prominence for specialization in 
missile production during the 1980s and 1990s. In the late 1990s and 2000s, the 
Department of Defense began to draw heavily upon companies with expertise in 
information technology, including Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC), L-3 Communications and Computer Sciences.  
The information in the table suggests that negotiated bids and subsidized 
industry restructuring operate to keep major companies profitable, but only through 
increased market concentration. Indeed, while the top 20 defense firms procured 50% 
of the total defense dollars allocated in the 1980s, by 2006, the top 10 defense 
industries acquired nearly 40% of defense procurement expenditures.77 Defense 
industries faced with over-capacity and under-utilization can remain profitable 
through subsidized mergers and acquisitions, which make it easier to avoid 
decreasing prices or going out of business by increasing market concentration and 
limiting the number of viable competitors. Consequently, several potential problems 
have emerged: Gholz and Sapolsky (1999-2000) argue that a stream of defense 
industry mergers in the 1990s exacerbated excess capacity, which contributed to 
inefficient production methods and excessive government spending. Gansler (1980, 
26) suggests that defense industry stability in the post-Vietnam period (when the 
defense sector faced declining procurement budgets) contributed to chronic under-
utilization of resources, financial and labor problems, billions of dollars in pending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Compare Markuson et al.’s (1991, 34) figures on defense procurement during the 1980s with U.S. 






procurement claims, a dearth of available suppliers and U.S. dependence on foreign 
military sales.  
Many scholars portray mutually beneficial relations between major firms, 
government bureaucracies and key congressional actors as a detriment to the average 
citizen, by suggesting that the elites charged with policy-making reap substantial 
benefits at the expense of American taxpayers that foot the bill (see Adams 1982; 
Higgs 1990, 2006a; Wheeler 2004; Hossein-zadeh 2006).  However, this view of 
public burdens both eclipses the systematic extension of defense dollars across 
increasing regions, states and localities and obscures the economic and political 
importance of these distributions across key localities.  
To examine these trends, I compiled a database with information on defense 
procurement distributions to U.S. cities and towns from 1966 to 2006 (by decade). 
These data allow me to assess the extent of localized benefits that defense contracting 
has generated over several decades, and to gauge the importance of the defense 
industry across local economies and geographic regions. I extracted the contracting 
data from the U.S. Department of Defense Statistical Information & Analysis 
Division. However, the raw procurement information at the DoD website is sorted by 
contract identification number rather than by location. This yields hundreds of 
thousands to millions of entries per year. To aggregate the data in useable format, I 
worked with a computer programmer to write a script that parsed the information 
according to place, county and state Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
codes (currently labeled American National Standards Institute (ANSI) codes). Since 




1966 and 1976 fiscal years. Problems with inexact syntax and missing data yielded 
hundreds of missing entries per year, which I recoded by hand. In cases where a place 
no longer exists or lacks a FIPS code, I coded the entry based on information from an 
adjacent area. Based on these aggregations, the number of FIPS designated places that 
received defense contracts in a given year ranges from 5,334 in FY1976 to 15,508 in 
FY2006. (Puerto Rico, Guam and other non-U.S. territories were excluded from the 
analysis.)  
In the previous section, I suggested that defense allocations are likely to exert 
a disproportionate impact in regions and localities with less overall economic 
development. During World War II, the modest flow of defense dollars to peripheral 
locations such as El Segundo, Glendale and Hawthorne had a greater impact on 
population growth than primary defense distributions in the central city of Los 
Angeles.  Further, as shown in the previous section, the establishment of new 
government-owned facilities in developing regions such as Phoenix, Arizona and Fort 
Worth, Texas corresponded with disproportionate growth relative to more industrious 
Northeastern cities of comparable size and also exceed the growth of other Southern 
cities. All of this suggests that the post-war survival of a major facility is far more 
critical to economic welfare in a newly industrializing area such as Bethpage, New 
York (a previously unincorporated, agricultural community on Long Island) than in 
an economically diverse urban hub such as New York City.  
As a gauge for local and regional economic diversity, I apply a measure of 
population density per county.  Specifically, lower levels of population density 




the economy for local employment and revenue. Economics research commonly 
recognizes the link between population density and economic development. Dense 
cities—not simply cities—increase labor productivity (Ciccone & Hall 1996), spur 
human capital and knowledge transfers, facilitate external economies of scale and 
draw more diverse industries (Jacobs 1969; Lucas 1988; Bryan et al. 2007).78 The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service reports 
that many rural areas—defined by lightly settled development patterns—face fewer 
employment opportunities and more stunted economic growth, increasing economic 
dependencies in these regions.79 Indeed, nonmetro, rural areas commonly bid for 
government facilities—such as prisons—which have in turn become economically 
important for many rural areas (Beale 1993, 1996; Carlson 1995).  
To verify the validity of the proxy, Figures 2.1a - 2.1b contain a logarithmic 
scale of industrial diversity and population density by county. I apply Mack et al.’s 
(2007) diversity index (the CS-Index), which incorporates a multivariate measure 
tapping into county-level resources, educational attainment and levels of 
entrepreneurship.80 While the CS-Index incorporates 2000 Census data at the county 
level, using population density as an alternative metric for economic diversity allows 
me to gauge defense-dependency over previous decades. In Chapter 3 and 4, I also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 External economies of scale are achieved when an industry’s scope of operation expands and 
decreases costs for a company working within that industry. 
79 By contrast, some rural areas that benefit from greater natural resources do experience economic 
transformation along with rapid population growth. The correspondence between economic vitality and 
increased residency suggests that some areas do gradually urbanize by developing more attractive 
markets, largely affirming the rural/urban disparities that scholars address. 
80 Variables in the CS-Index include employment, population, net personal income, residence 




use population density to examine economic dependence at the congressional district 
level.  
	  
Figure 2.1a – Logarithmic Scale of Industrial Diversity & Population Density by County	  
 
As shown above in Figure 2.1a, the top three most industrially diverse 
counties according to the CS-Index—Los Angeles (CA), Cook (IL), and New York 
(NY)—are all in the top 1% of the most densely populated U.S. counties. At the same 
time, the twenty most industrially diverse counties in the CS-Index are all within the 
top 10% of counties with the highest population density, indicating a 99.9% - 90% 
correlation between industrial diversity and population density. Furthermore, Figure 
2.1b (below) illustrates that the least industrially diverse counties in the CS-Index 
demonstrate an even closer approximation to the counties with the lowest population 
density. The three least industrially diverse U.S. counties in the CS-Index—Sherman 




populated counties. The twenty least industrially diverse counties in the index fit the 
same criteria (i.e., 99.9% correlation).81  
 
	  
Figure 2.1b – Logarithmic Scale of Low Industrial Diversity & Low Density by County 
 
Given the similarity of the measures—and the enhanced availability of 
population density data both over time and across geographic units—I use population 
density as a proxy for industrial diversity, where lower levels indicate greater 
economic homogeneity and disproportionate reliance on local defense industries. I 
consulted the U.S. Census Bureau for information on county population from 1960 to 
2005 as well as land area per square mile. I used these figures to compute the 
population density (population/land area per square mile) for each U.S. county in 
every decade. I coded the population density for 3,142 counties, including boroughs 
and parishes in Alaska and Louisiana, respectively. I applied Geographic Information 
System (GIS) software to map the geographic allocation of defense dollars and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 When I exclude all of the boroughs in Alaska from the analysis low industrial diversity and low 




projects per place in relation to the county-level population density from 1966 to 
2006.82  
Like World War II military mobilization, the early stages of the Cold War 
facilitated an unprecedented dispersion of dollars and projects across increasing 
states, cities and towns. Policymakers in the Truman administration viewed military 
appropriations not only as an instrument to counter Soviet aggression, but also as a 
means to ensure full employment, smooth out the business cycle and relieve 
distressed areas (Schulman 1991, 136). Despite Eisenhower’s suspicions of the 
military-industrial complex, and his fear that military spending exacerbates deficits 
and strains the private economy, the defense establishment expanded in both size and 
scope in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.   
At the onset of the Cold War, policymakers and defense bureaucracies 
incorporated Keynesian techniques pioneered in Roosevelt’s New Deal, using 
military appropriations to stabilize and stimulate the economy (Schulman 1991, 135-
174). However, like the structured defense expansion in 1944, the geography of 
1960s military spending is not simply a product of political and economic decisions; 
it also rooted in pre-established defense sector development.  
To examine these trends, Figures 2.2 – 2.6 display the allocation of defense 
dollars from 1966 to 2006 (per decade).83 As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the distribution of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 While measuring population density per county offers less precision than a smaller unit of analysis 
such as FIPS places or zip codes, it is also easier to visualize county-level data alongside defense 
contract distributions in cities in towns. Further, counties are less subject to definitional changes, offer 
more accessible information and represent more stable units over time than FIPS places. 
83 Appendices 2.4 – 2.8 exhibit the number of defense contracts allocated per place during the same 
time period. Although the allocation of defense projects reveals wider distributions than the dollar 
amount, both metrics of defense distributions exhibit similar geographic trends in military procurement 




defense dollars in FY1966 extend across every state and a preponderance of counties, 
while clustering disproportionately around major World War II contracting sites on 
the Eastern and Western coasts, the Great Lakes region and in several key locations in 
the South. In fact, most of the predominant World War II defense contracting sites—
New York City, Los Angeles (Lockheed, North American, Douglas), Wichita 
(Boeing), St. Louis (Curtiss-Wright), Dallas-Fort Worth (Lockheed, North American 
Consolidated-Vultee), Marietta (Bell), Philadelphia, Seattle (Boeing), and East 
Hartford (United Aircraft)—had retained World War II military infrastructure and 
continued to draw the largest concentrations of defense dollars two decades after the 
war. Despite subsequent declines in the Great Lakes and the industrial Northeast, 
major manufacturing cities—including Buffalo (Curtiss-Wright), Cleveland (Martin), 
Cincinnati (Ford), Columbus (Chrysler), Detroit (GM), Chicago, Baltimore (Martin) 
and Indianapolis (GM)— continued to rank as leading defense locations during the 
Kennedy/Johnson years.
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At the same time, Figure 2.2 also suggests that many surrounding regions and 
communities outside of these urban areas developed their local economies based 
largely on the presence of defense infrastructure: Bethpage, Oyster Bay and 
Farmington (outside New York City) Sunnyvale, Burbank, Anaheim, Long Beach, 
Culver City (near Los Angeles), Morton and Ridley Park (adjacent to Philadelphia), 
Smyrna and Kennesaw, located adjacent to Dobbins Air Force Base and the Atlanta 
Naval Station (near Marietta), communities surrounding McConnell Air Force Base, 
Fort Riley and Fort Leavenworth (outside Wichita), Fort Leonard Wood and 
Independence (outside St. Louis), Grand Prairie, Garland, Irving and Addison (near 
Dallas-Fort Worth), Southington, East Windsor and Bloomfield (near Hartford), and 
Renton, Bellevue and Tukwila (surrounding Seattle) developed as major contracting 
sites based on the constant flow of smaller increments of defense dollars. The only 
new locations that emerged as predominant contracting sites in 1966 and lacked 
major World War II infrastructure were Orlando and Patrick Air Force Base (in 
Florida) and Denver and Colorado Springs, Colorado.  
In addition to the inertial effect of World War II military mobilization on the 
Cold War defense economy, congressional politics and economic development played 
a significant role in the allocation of defense dollars in the South.  During the Great 
Depression, the South was an overwhelmingly agrarian region within an 
industrialized nation. However, government investments in defense infrastructure 
during and after World War II laid the foundation for an industrial Southern economy 




House and Senate vied for military contracts as a basis for revitalization of their 
regional economy (see Zelizer 2009). By 1956, southerner William Faulkner declared 
that: “Our economy is no longer agricultural. Our economy is the Federal 
Government” (quoted in Schulman 1991, 135).  
In the House, Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas ran a decentralized leadership in 
the 1940s and 1950s, permitting powerful committee chairs to exercise unprecedented 
influence. Rayburn’s leadership style facilitated a defense budget that was handled 
through the congressional committees, allowing members to assume a greater role in 
the procurement process. Senator Richard Russell, a Democrat from Georgia and 
Armed Services Committee chair from 1954 to 1968, stacked his defense committee 
with Democratic allies from defense-dependent states, including Georgia, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Washington and Missouri. House and Senate Armed 
Services committee members, predominantly comprised of Southern Democrats, 
almost uniformly adopted tough-on-defense, internationalist postures (see Zelizer 
2009; Trubowitz 1998). These key legislators sought to draw military contracts to 
their constituencies during a period of Republican realignment and heightened 
electoral vulnerability. Indeed, the growth of overall defense shares throughout the 
Southern region is clearly visible during the 1960s and accelerated throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (see Figures 2.2 – 2.4).84 
 In 1969, Mississippi Democrat John Stennis took over as chair of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee. In the House, Mississippi Democrat Sonny Montgomery, 
an ardent internationalist and defender of the national security state, served as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Also refer to Appendices 2.4 – 2.7, which illustrate a parallel trend in the number of defense 




influential Armed Services committee member. Both legislators represented 
Pascagoula, Mississippi, a prominent site for the naval industry by the 1970s and one 
of the fastest growing defense locations in the nation (see Figure 2.3, below). 
Alabama Senator John Sparkman played an instrumental role convincing the U.S. 
Army to choose Huntsville as a location for a missile research program and 
successfully fought to block the closure of the Redstone Arsenal during one of his 
earliest terms of office in 1949. Since the 1960s, Huntsville has continued to draw 
increasing defense profits over time, with smaller amounts flowing to Fort Rucker, 
Anniston, and Maxwell Air Force Base (see Figures 2.2 – 2.6).85 
 Senate Armed Services committee member John Tower, the first Republican 
U.S. senator from Texas since Reconstruction, oversaw military contracts flowing to 
Bell, Lockheed and Boeing plants in Dallas and Fort Worth from 1961 to 1985 (see 
Figures 2.2 – 2.4). At the same time, Grand Prairie, McKinney, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, 
El Paso, Lockland Air Force Base, Garland, Corpus Christi, Plano, Hurst and 
Richardson continued to thrive on smaller increments of defense appropriations 
throughout the Cold War era (id). Representative George Mahon (D-TX, 19) 
represented defense-dependent constituencies in the Texas panhandle, including 
Lubbock and Amarillo, from 1935 to 1985. As Chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee, Mahon not set the defense budget, but also helped establish Reese Air 
Force Base (six miles West of Lubbock) and Webb Air Force Base (South of 
Lubbock). In Mendel Rivers’ Charleston South Carolina district, federal funds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




funneled to an air force, naval base and missile center, in addition to McDonnell 
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Scholars have argued that the transition to a military economy during and after 
World War II spawned a new industrial map of the United States, where regions that 
gained the most defense dollars have become disproportionate economic beneficiaries 
and regions that have lost their share of defense dollars over time have suffered 
considerable losses (Markuson et al. 1991). Indeed, Figure 2.3 demonstrates that, 
despite reduced defense spending in the 1970s, areas throughout the South and West 
continued to procure large concentrations of defense dollars while the Great Lakes 
regions and the Northeast corridor experienced the most severe procurement declines. 
Curtiss-Wright had closed its operations in Buffalo; Wright-Paterson Field failed to 
attract industry suppliers in Dayton; Chrysler lost out on missile contracts to the Air 
Force; and General Motors reconverted to auto production. Only Ford Aerospace 
succeeded as a defense supplier, after transferring production from Detroit to the 
Houston Space Station, California and Colorado.  
Bucking the trend, however, the largest concentration of defense dollars 
allocated in 1976 channeled to St. Louis, Missouri, home of Curtiss-Wright 
Aerospace and Senator Stuart Symington, a leading Democrat on the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. At the same time, the data in Figure 2.3 also reveal that 
previously minor defense sites such as Hawthorne, Sunnyvale and Burbank (Los 
Angeles suburbs); Bethpage, New York (a formerly unincorporated Long Island 
community); Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Newport News, Virginia procured 
disproportionately large concentrations of defense funds, rivaling Los Angeles, 




 These patterns accelerated during the defense build-up of the 1980s. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.4, regions throughout the South and West continued to gain 
military dollars, while Great Lakes and Northeastern regions continued to suffer 
relative losses. Marietta, Georgia and Huntsville, Alabama emerged as leading 
defense recipients, along with prominent 1970s sites like Pascagoula, Bethpage, 
Sunnyvale and El Segundo.  One scholar argues that the foreign policies advanced by 
Presidents Reagan and Bush reflected the political imperatives of the nation’s newest 
industrializing regions—and the heart of the realigned Republican Party—the South 
and West (Trubowitz 1998, 171). Indeed, only New York, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts counter-balanced the strong Southern and Western currents—although 
upstate New York continued to experience declines. Perhaps in response to these 
trends, a New York delegation—comprised of Representatives Joseph Addabbo (D-
NY, 5), Sam Stratton (D-NY), Thomas Downey (D-NY, 2) and Senators Al D’Amato 
(R-NY) and Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)—became vocal legislative advocates for 
(often controversial) military projects built by Grumman (in Bethpage and 
surrounding Long Island regions) and General Electric (in Schenectady, Binghamton 
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Despite moderate defense reductions after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War, most places faced a period of stagnated defense activity. 
Few areas faced considerable retrenchments. In fact, as Figures 2.5 shows, the most 
significant losses almost uniformly occurred in the Northeast and Midwest, 
particularly in Troy, Michigan, Cleveland, Ohio and along the Northern Atlantic 
coast. Arlington, Virginia, Huntsville, Alabama and Grand Prairie and Lewisville, 
Texas even acquired relative gains. Given the reduced threat environment of the 
1990s, the size and scope of these defense allocations suggest that the defense budget 
is not only expansive; procurement allocations are also systematic. The constituencies 
in the South and West have continuously benefited from military contracting, while 
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There are a number of factors that might explain the unequal allocation of 
benefits and geographically targeted defense cuts: First, the 1990s marks a strategic 
shift to procurement of radar equipment, telecommunications and electronics. The 
Department of Defense favors companies best adapted to emerging military needs, 
including Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman, as well as new 
technologically adept firms like Raytheon and TRW. During the 1990s, these 
industries conducted many of their operations in Northern Virginia, allowing for 
strategic proximity to the Pentagon and influencing contract distributions in McClean, 
Arlington, Falls Church and Manassas. Major firms also clustered around key areas in 
the South and West with pre-existing defense infrastructure, including Huntsville, 
Fort Worth and Grand Prairie. These patterns in the re-location of military 
appropriations during this time period correspond with arguments that the assembly-
line auto culture of the Midwest locked out aerospace companies in the early Cold 
War years and operated as an impediment to defense activity in the region (Markuson 
et al. 1991, 62-68).  
Second, there may be political and economic reasons why policymakers, 
defense bureaus and defense industry managers favor certain geographic entities over 
others. Industries are likely to benefit from economies of scale by concentrating 
production efforts in key areas. While Southern locations provide access to airfields, 
military bases and coastal proximity, defense companies have also enjoyed strong 
political support in Southern states and districts—including legislative advocacy for 
military programs, representation on defense committees and direct access to defense 




industrializing areas in the post-war South relied on military contracts for economic 
growth to a greater extent than fully industrialized regions (Wright 1986; Schulman 
1991). Not surprisingly, these economic imperatives influenced political preferences 
and legislative strategies in the region (Schulman 1991; Trubowitz 1998; Zelizer 
2009). Defense industries may choose where to concentrate production efforts with 
this political climate in mind. In any event, regardless of the motivations influencing 
defense locations, evidence indicates that industry and government decisions to 
concentrate defense production in more economically reliant regions influences 
subsequent political strategies.  
 Following the 1990s stagnation, the twenty-first century U.S. War on Terror 
coincided with enormous growth in defense contracting. Figure 2.6 illustrates the 
pronounced rise of defense allocations, not only in size but also in scope. Larger 
defense shares spread into Desert, Mountain and Great Plains regions with relatively 
little defense infrastructure.  Perhaps most stunningly, the relative increase in the 
number of defense contracts distributed substantially outpaced the growth of defense 
dollars allocated in 2006 (also see Appendix 2.8). Dispersing contracts at a greater 
rate than dollars effectively divides up the defense pie into smaller pieces, spreading 
projects more thinly but also across greater numbers of constituencies. The allocation 
of defense dollars remains highly concentrated in historically predominant defense 
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While most locations experienced greater defense activity in 2006, military 
contracts exploded in Corpus Christi and Amarillo, Texas, Fort Lewis, Washington, 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Newport News, Virginia—even relative to 1980s 
allocations.  Despite a decline in national defense shares in the Northeastern and 
Midwestern regions, Figure 2.6 demonstrates that large concentrations of federal 
funds flowed to Northrop Grumman’s headquarters in Bethpage, New York (former 
home to Grumman Aircraft Engineering); Raytheon headquarters in Tewksbury and 
Waltham, Massachusetts; a major Boeing plant in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania, and 
General Dynamics facilities in Sterling Heights, Michigan and Dayton, Ohio.  
Finally, Figure 2. shows that the most sparsely populated areas of the nation—
Desert, Mountain and Plains states—increased their shares of military contracts at 
greater rates than previous decades. Increased levels of defense dollars and projects 
flowed to defense plants located near air force bases, airfields, missile ranges in Utah 
(Clearfield, Hill AFB), Colorado (Littleton, Colorado Springs, Peterson AFB), New 
Mexico (Kirtland AFB, White Sands Missile Range and Albuquerque), Oklahoma 
(Tinker AFB, Oklahoma City), Hawaii (Hickam AFB) and Alaska (Anchorage, 
Elmendorf AFB). As I discuss at greater length in Chapters 3 & 4, the ongoing 
expansion of the U.S. military industry not only stimulates economic activity and 
development in more sparsely populated areas—the post-war South, suburbs and 
towns, and most recently, desert and mountain areas—but also generates and 
intensifies economic dependencies on military contracts in these areas.  
Most strikingly, the figures show that throughout the Cold War, defense 




amount of procurement funds available. The number of cities, towns and 
communities that received defense contracts increased three-fold over four decades—
from over 5,000 locations in 1966 to more than 15,000 places in 2006—even though 
the amount of 1966 defense outlays is roughly equivalent to 2006 expenditures (see 
chapter 5 for historical defense spending figures). Despite declines in the procurement 
budget following U.S. withdrawal from the Vietnam War during the 1970s, the 
number of places that received defense contracts in 1976 paralleled 1966 allocations, 
when policymakers contended with an alleged missile gap and passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution authorizing the Vietnam War (n=5,334 in 1966; n=5,534 in 1976). 
Perhaps more strikingly, after the Cold War, during the reduced threat years of the 
1990s, the number of places that received defense contracts rivaled the number of 
defense contracts recipients during the Reagan build-up of the 1980s (n=8,113 in 
1986; n=8,071 in 1996). While defense procurement spending in the 1980s exceeded 
2006 expenditures by a slight margin, the number of places that received defense 
dollars and contracts nearly doubled in 2006, during the Iraq War (n=15,508).   
While the proliferation of defense benefits gives greater numbers of 
constituencies some stake in the status of the military industry, there is reason to 
suspect that the impact of defense distributions varies considerably in different 
economic contexts. Smaller increments of the defense budget—tens of thousands, or 
even tens of millions of dollars per year—are unlikely to have a tangible effect in 
economically diverse areas, like New York City, Chicago or Boston. However, these 
allocations are likely to have a more pronounced effect in more rural areas with less 




Figures 2.2 - 2.6 demonstrate that, in addition to the broad proliferation of 
defense contracts over time, smaller increments of defense dollars have increasingly 
extended to the (formerly agrarian) South and Southwest, desert and mountain 
regions, and more sparsely populated locations surrounding large cities. While the 
bulk of defense dollars remain heavily concentrated, leading contract recipients have 
shifted from large, diversified cities in the Northeast and Western coasts to former 
suburbs, towns and agricultural areas, particularly in the South and West. These 
allocations may exacerbate economic vulnerabilities in these regions, placing a 
political premium on maintaining defense facilities critical to local revenue and 
employment and securing the flow of defense dollars to these areas.  
 
Externalized Costs  
In 1792, James Madison delivered an argument that structural restraints in a 
republican form of government will help prevent unnecessary wars. With implicit 
reference to the nascent American republic, Madison suggested that a polity 
concerned with limiting wars and perpetuating peace must give the populace an 
electoral check on policymakers, while imposing the direct costs of war on the 
electorate: “…[War] should not only be declared by the authority of the people, 
whose toils and treasures are to support its burdens, instead of the government which 
is to reap its fruits: but…each generation should [also] be made to bear the burden of 
its own wars, instead of carrying them on, at the expence of other generations” (in 




Madison’s essay challenges the structure of European monarchies, which 
lacked mechanisms instituting popular control over rulers and allowed leaders to 
impose the costs of war on the general public while reaping all of the benefits. Those 
that declared war and directed military conflicts received glory for victories and paid 
little for defeat, while the public ultimately funded the wars and fought and died at the 
monarch’s caprice. However, a representative government vested with the power to 
declare war, raise armies and tax and spend will be less likely to initiate questionable 
military ventures when their electoral fortunes hinge on the public appeal of their 
actions. Further, the people will be less likely to support unnecessary wars when they 
must ultimately bear the sacrifices.   
As Madison had predicted, the U.S. representative governing system requires 
a base level of popular support for a prolonged war effort. From the Revolution 
through the Eisenhower administration, large numbers of Americans were asked to 
sacrifice in wartime by joining the armed services and carrying a heavier tax burden. 
Administrations and congresses were then held accountable for wars and military 
actions during the next election cycle. However, elected officials can also work to 
conduct and finance wars in a way that makes it easier to sustain popular approval.  
Since World War II, the rise of permanent military industry and dispersion of 
defense activity has coincided with a series of policies that reduce the public costs 
traditionally associated with U.S. wars. The ability to obviate or reduce public 
sacrifices during wartime evades Madison’s prescription, imposing the bulk of the 




generations of taxpayers and foreign nations where U.S. wars take place rather than 
the political majorities that support them. 
Figure 2.7a displays U.S. troop counts in as a percent of the U.S. population in 
major wars from War of 1812 to the Iraq War of 2003.86 The figures show that, 
historically, sustained U.S. military actions required larger numbers of volunteers, 
reservists or conscripted soldiers in the armed services (relative to the U.S. 
population) in the centuries before the end of the Vietnam War than the decades that 
followed. 
	  
Figure 2.7a– U.S. Troop Count as Percent of Population, 1812 - 2009 
^Union Forces Only 
*Including NATO International Security Forces 
**Highest total troop count (October 2007 surge) 
 
In fact, prior to 1973, every U.S. war lasting for more than two years included 
the enlistment of at least 4% of the nation’s population in the armed services. Only 
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Division (SIAD), Military Casualty Information (various years); Brooking Afghanistan Index, 
compiled by Campbell & Shapiro (2009, 10); Brookings Iraq Index compiled by O’Hanlon (2009, 24); 





the Mexican War (1846-1848) and Spanish-American War (1898)—continental 
conflicts of shorter duration—contained lower troop counts. Despite its brief duration, 
U.S. entrance in World War I from 1917-1918 placed more than 4 million U.S. 
soldiers in combat. During World War II, more than 16 million Americans shared in 
the sacrifice by serving in the military. The overseas troop count during World War II 
comprised over 12% of the U.S. population—the largest troop commitment in the 
nation's history, excluding the combined total of Union and Confederate soldiers that 
fought in the Civil War.  Even the Korean War—an undeclared conflict—included 6 
million U.S. troops sent into battle, or nearly 4% of the population.  
Figure 2.7b exhibits U.S. troop count in real numbers during wars and major 
military engagements. Perhaps most strikingly, U.S. troop counts have diminished 
substantially—in terms of raw numbers and as a percent of the population—following 
the Vietnam War. U.S. entrance in Vietnam required a military draft that enlisted over 
8 million men and women in combat and sparked mass protests, public unrest and 
political upheaval. In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, President Nixon 
instituted the 1973 All-Volunteer Force (AVF), eliminating the draft and 







Figure 2.7b– U.S. Troop Count, 1812 – 2009	  
^Union Forces Only	  
*Including NATO International Security Forces 
**Highest total troop count (October 2007 surge) 
 
Several decades later, during the 1990s, President Clinton pioneered the 
Balkans conflict and the 1999 Kosovo War. A military consulting firm trained the 
Croation military in its secessionist war against Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, reducing 
the number of U.S. soldiers deployed in a politically contentious civil conflict 
characterized by war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The use of private contractors 
accelerated during the George W. Bush administration. In fact, military firms and 
private contractors comprise a plurality of U.S. forces deployed in Iraq as of June 
2009 (DoD, Defense Manpower Data Center, Data, Analysis and Programs Division). 
Contractors also comprised more than half of Pentagon forces in Afghanistan as of 
March 2009, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service (Glanz 
2009). Pentagon contractors include a mixture of Americans, Iraqis, Afghans and 
other foreigners hired to provide security and perform traditional military (and DoD) 




forces, makes it easier to initiate and prolong wars or military engagements without 
recruiting a large volunteer contingent.  
While it is easier to acquire the necessary popular support to begin wars 
without a military draft or large numbers of new recruitments, evidence also suggests 
that public support for an ongoing war invariably declines when U.S. casualties 
mount—regardless of whether U.S. soldiers are draftees, reservists or volunteers 
(Mueller 1973; 2005).  To examine the rates of military casualties among armed 
personnel, Figures 2.8a-c display U.S. military deaths in wars and major hostilities 
from Revolutionary War in 1775 to the Iraq War in 2003; 11 military engagements 
post-World War II; and 9 major military actions post-Vietnam.  
Figure 2.8a shows that the Civil War and World War II dwarf historical U.S. 
military conflicts in number of American fatalities. However, these wars are unique in 
an important aspect: Both were perceived largely as existential struggles—the former 
for the survival of the union and the latter for the defeat of fascism following an 
attack on U.S. soil. Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt successfully called upon the 
nation (or the union forces) to make collective sacrifices order to combat a potent 




Figure 2.8a – U.S. Military Deaths in Wars and Major Military Engagements, 1775 – 2009	  
^Union Forces Only	  
*Including NATO International Security Forces 
**Highest total troop count (October 2007 surge) 
 
While the Revolutionary War and the Iraq War yielded similar numbers of 
U.S. military deaths, the extent of the national burden is obscured by population 
growth over time. Figure 2.8b displays U.S. military deaths as a percentage of the 
total population. The figure reveals several important factors: First, a higher 
percentage of U.S. citizens sacrificed their lives for freedom from the British Empire 
during the Revolutionary War than for Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Second, following World War II, U.S. military actions exhibit a pronounced decline 
in fatalities in relation to national population, regardless of the size, scope or duration 
of the conflict. In fact, a greater percentage of citizens lost their lives in World War II 
than in all subsequent wars combined.  Third, as a percentage of U.S. citizens killed 
in battle, the nation faced a disproportionate burden during Civil War and (to a lesser 




Figure 2.8b – U.S. Military Deaths in Wars and Major Military Engagements as Percent of 
Population, 1775 – 2009 
^Union Forces Only 
*Including NATO International Security Forces 
**Highest total troop count (October 2007 surge) 
 
Since World War II, American troops have engaged in armed combat on 
many occasions, but have only experienced sustained ground combat and suffered 
more than 1,000 deaths in actions in three cases: Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.  While 
U.S. military fatalities numbered into the tens of thousands in Korea and Vietnam, 
Figure 2.8c shows that the elimination of the draft, use of military contractors and 
security contractors and increasingly sophisticated use of military technology have 
contributed to drastically lower numbers of U.S. military deaths in major ground wars 
like Afghanistan (nearly 700 fatalities as of June 2009) and Iraq (approaching 4,500 




Figure 2.8c – U.S. Military Deaths in Wars and Major Military Engagements Post-World War II 
*Including NATO International Security Forces 
**Highest total troop count (October 2007 surge) 
 
Despite the historically low number of U.S. military casualties for a ground 
war of its capacity, public support for the Iraq War has declined for (at least) two key 
reasons: First, the unexpected duration and complexity of the Iraq War has resulted in 
900% more U.S. military deaths than any troop engagement since Vietnam. Second, 
the precipitous drop in public tolerance for the Iraq War after U.S. forces had suffered 
1,500 casualties—a historically low figure—also indicates that the populace places 
far less value on the stakes in Iraq than in previous wars (even publicly contentious 
wars) like Vietnam and Korea (Mueller 2005; Gimpel & Althaus 2009).  
Given the tenuous stakes that the American public perceives in Iraq, in 
addition to the unexpected length of the mission and increasing numbers of U.S. 
casualties, it is largely unsurprising that congressional Republicans from states and 




electoral vulnerability (Grose & Oppenheimer 2007; Kriner & Shen 2007).87 While 
evidence suggests that President George W. Bush’s public support declined as a result 
of U.S. casualties in Iraq, he still won reelection by a decisive margin (Karol & 
Miguel 2007). 
Despite this evidence of electoral accountability and a “democratic brake” on 
military ventures, private military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan—which include 
Americans, Iraqis, Afghanis and other foreigners—also outnumber uniformed U.S. 
soldiers. The extensive use of private military forces deflate official casualty statistics 
(contractor numbers and fatalities are not included in DoD military statistics), allow 
public officials to sustain major military actions without a draft or more extensive 
recruitment efforts, and limit both the negative risk on public opinion and instances of 
electoral reprisal. Despite the erosion of public support for the Iraq War and targeted 
electoral checks, the limited sacrifices required of most Americans contributed to the 
base level of public approval necessary to initiate the war. The ability to draw on 
private military support is also likely to influence elected officials that may not 
otherwise be willing to risk the potential backlash in public opinion commonly 
associated with large troop counts.   
While fewer numbers of Americans risked their lives in Iraq than in previous 
ground wars of comparable duration, Americans also made fewer economic 
sacrifices—even at the onset of the war when a majority of the public supported the 
mission. Historically, the nation’s leaders sought to pay down war debts during 
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administration’s stated goals of seizing weapons of mass destruction and stopping the spread of 





peacetime. From George Washington through the Eisenhower administration, 
presidents sought to maintain the nation’s ability to borrow on credit and avoid 
imposing heavy obligations on future generations by promoting balanced budgets and 
prioritizing deficit reductions (Hormats 2007). By contrast, enhanced reliance on 
federal borrowing and the systematic growth of the U.S. economy following World 
War II make it easier to fund wars and weapons build-ups without asking voters to 
pay higher taxes or face cuts in domestic spending programs.  
 To assess levels of federal borrowing and the size of the national economy 
over time, Figures 2.9a – 2.9b display U.S. debt obligations in each fiscal year from 
1940 to 2008 in constant (2008) dollars and as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP).88 The national debt represents government borrowing to pay for the expenses 
that it could not afford through collected revenue. This includes money owed to 
individuals and foreign governments, in addition to money borrowed from Social 
Security and other trust funds. While the national debt reflects all sorts of federal 
expenditures—not simply defense spending—it allows me to gauge levels of federal 
borrowing during U.S. wars and major defense build-ups. Although these levels may 
reflect government borrowing unrelated to defense, it also documents government 
willingness to fund expenditures on credit—as opposed to imposing tax hikes or 
mandating reductions in other programs.  
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As Figure 2.9a illustrates, U.S. debt increased dramatically from 1940 to 
1945, growing from $600 billion to over $3 trillion over the course of World War II. 
The debt declined to just over $2 trillion under Truman, despite expenses incurred 
during the Korean War, and hovered at roughly the same rate through the mid-1970s. 
The debt began to increase very gradually in the mid to late 1970s, during a period of 
economic recession and the aftermath of the Vietnam War. However, debt obligations 
remained well below $3 trillion until the 1980s, during President Reagan’s 
unprecedented peacetime defense build-up. Indeed, the federal debt grew to nearly $5 
trillion under Reagan and increased steadily under George H.W. Bush and Clinton, 
approaching $7 trillion in the mid-1990s. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
debt did not taper off until 1996, and did not decline until the 2000 fiscal year. From 
2001 to 2007, the national debt increased from $7 trillion to over $10 trillion. 
Although only a fraction of this debt can be attributed to military ventures, an ability 
to spend on credit allowed policymakers to conduct extensive wars in two global 
theaters without imposing additional taxes to support these operations.  





Figure 2.9b displays public debt as a percentage of GDP. Since GDP is a 
measure of the nation’s total economic output, the figure represents the percentage of 
the U.S. economy necessary to pay off foreign loans from 1940 to 2005, with 
projections for 2007 and 2008. As a percent of GDP, U.S. debt grew to more than 
120% of GDP in 1946, at the end of World War II, then declined slowly through the 
mid-1970s and hovered below 40% until the 1980s. In the early 1980s through the 
mid-1990s, national debt as a percent of GDP grew from 33% to 67%, or roughly 
50%--a far more muted increase than the actual dollar value suggests.89 Since 2001, 
debt obligations in relation to GDP has increased gradually and then flattened, 
hovering over 65% of GDP.  
	  
Figure 2.9b – Gross Federal Debt as Percent of GDP, 1940 - 2008	  
 
Unlike Figure 2.9a—where debt obligations in real terms exhibit the most 
dramatic increase from 1980 to 2008—debt spending as a percentage of GDP 
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underwent a sharp rise during World War II followed by a period of rapid decline in 
the decade after the war, and modest ebbs and flows in subsequent years. While the 
disproportionate debt obligation incurred during World War II reflects the massive 
spending increase on behalf of military production, it is also conditioned by the 
effects of the Great Depression and a smaller overall economy than in the years that 
followed.  In fact, excluding a brief economic decline from 1946 to 1950, in the years 
between World War II and the Korean War, U.S. GDP has increased systematically 
from 1940 to 2008, growing from $1.2 trillion to over $13.4 trillion or 1,117% (BEA, 
National Economic Accounts, in constant 2005 dollars). This suggests that the decline 
in debt obligations as a percent of GDP is largely a reflection of the overall strength 
of the modern U.S. economy: GDP has substantially outpaced federal spending 
growth even while government spending has drastically exceeded federal revenue.  
During World War II, the American people were expected to sacrifice both 
overseas and domestically. Federal campaigns and propaganda efforts encouraged 
citizens to support higher taxes, purchase war bonds and abide by government 
rationing and price controls. Since the 1980s, administrations and congresses have 
been able to avoid a major revision in fiscal policy—increasing taxes and cutting 
spending on non-military programs during wartime and periods of major defense 
build-ups—largely because wars and military procurements represent a declining 
portion of GDP compared to past conflicts. At its peak, World War II accounted for 
roughly 45% of GPD, the Korean War comprised 15%, and the Vietnam War peaked 




was below 5% of GDP, and the cost of the war was roughly 1% (Hormats 2007; 
Higgs 2007).  
Given the nation’s economic strength—which has contributed to a virtually 
unlimited ability to borrow on credit—the government has not needed to increase 
taxes or cut civilian spending in order to cover mounting military bills. Instead, 
administrations, congresses and U.S. Treasury officials have relied more heavily on 
borrowing and emergency supplemental appropriations. While lower taxes and 
increased domestic spending make it easier to spur economic growth and sustain 
support for ongoing military operations, this fiscal strategy comes at a 
disproportionate cost to future generations of taxpayers that must eventually fund 
growing debt obligations. 
 
Conclusion 
“What would become of glaziers if panes of glass were never broken?” – Frederic 
Bastiat, 1850 
  In a famous parable, a little boy carelessly breaks a window belonging to a 
shopkeeper. As a consequence, the broken window provides work for the glazier 
called upon to fix the window; the glazier can then buy bread, benefiting the baker, 
who will buy shoes, benefiting the cobbler, and so on. Suddenly, onlookers begin to 
conclude that the apparent act of vandalism is actually a public good: it causes money 
to circulate and stimulates industry. Of course, the fallacy in the argument is that the 




the costs of the shopkeeper who might have otherwise spent money on bread and 
shoes for himself.  
This chapter has demonstrated that military spending and warfare provides 
work for the defense industry, which in turn stimulates economic activity among 
constituencies engaged in defense production. At the same time, the majority of 
Americans bear fewer and fewer immediate costs of defense spending, military 
operations and warfare. Like the shopkeeper with the broken window, however, the 
costs of the U.S. military economy have not disappeared simply because political 
majorities no longer see them. Rather, foreign nations where the U.S. fights its wars 
incur harm to civilian life, including damage to economic infrastructure, lost 
productivity and loss of civilian lives. The financial expense of war and periods of 
heightened defense production also have opportunity costs in the U.S. Funds spent on 
military procurement could be spent on other purposes, including investments in 
infrastructure, health care or education. The borrowing used to finance military 
procurements will also constrain future U.S. taxpayers who might have chosen to 
spend the money in other ways. 
Historically, the main obstacles that have prevented administrations and 
congresses from initiating wars or military operations were the need to mobilize 
troops and raise taxes in order to pay for weaponry and supply troops. Domestic 
opposition to wars resulted in fewer people volunteering to serve in the armed forces, 
which deflates troop size or results in a military draft. With a permanent military 
economy, reliance on private contractors to sustain U.S. wars, and the ability to 




Ongoing U.S. military production both stimulates economic activity and 
operates as a deterrent to potential attacks on U.S. soil. The increasingly high-tech 
weaponry that research and development and defense procurement generate—from 
fighter jets and bombers to unmanned drones and robotics—makes it easier to 
identify enemy targets at reduced risk to U.S. military personnel. Further, reduced 
reliance on American troops, decreasing U.S. casualty rates, and less tangible 
economic costs make it easier to wage war within an electoral governing system (see 
Mueller 1973, 2005; Grose & Oppenheimer 2007; Kriner & Shen 2007, 
demonstrating that U.S. casualty rates are a principal source of electoral opposition to 
warfare). Defense firms, local constituencies engaged in defense production and 
political majorities all benefit from these arrangements, regardless of costs borne 
elsewhere.  
 During World War II, 16 million Americans fought overseas, while millions 
more supported higher taxes, rationing, price controls and unprecedented government 
intervention in the economic sphere. President Roosevelt’s ambitious defense 
production goals coincided with greater government willingness to experiment with 
Keynesian techniques, including enhanced deficit spending, government assumption 
of economic risk and measures to stimulate private profits.  
Given sufficient cost-plus incentives, defense industries generally expanded 
productive capacity, largely by adding to their existing facilities. Space requirements, 
access to airfields and proximate military bases also placed a premium on small cities 
and towns neighboring large metropolitan centers with existing defense infrastructure. 




secrecy, and enhanced economic needs in more rural areas—contributed to the 
establishment of new defense infrastructure in inland and Southern locations. 
During the 1960s, most predominant World War II contracting sites, 
metropolitan areas located on the Eastern and Western coasts and the industrial 
Midwest, continued to draw the largest concentrations of defense dollars. In 
subsequent decades, industrializing Southern regions drew a larger defense sector 
presence, enhanced representation on defense committees and strong political support 
for a national security state (Trubowitz 1998; Schulman 1991; Wright 1986). At the 
same time, as defense production increased in size and scope, regions and 
communities outside of urban areas became major contracting sites, even 
overshadowing many large cities.   
Like industrializing Southern areas during the Cold War, key localities that 
developed a concentrated defense sector within more rural, economically 
homogenous local contexts are likely to experience disproportionate economic 
reliance on defense dollars and projects that they receive. While this is especially true 
at the earliest stages of development, local dependencies are likely to persist until an 
area expands and diversifies quite substantially. Former suburbs, towns and 
agricultural-turned-military locales have roots in both World War II military 
mobilization (Bethpage, New York; Ridley Park, Pennsylvania; Grand Prairie, Texas; 
Bremerton, Washington; El Segundo, California) and industry decisions made during 
the Cold War (Corpus Christi, Texas; Cape Canaveral, Florida; Mountain View, 





As the following chapters will argue, the geographic concentration of defense 
industries in certain areas generates and sustains economic dependencies and 
encourages key political representatives to support ongoing defense production.  
Politicians, contractors and defense bureaucracies in turn work to allocate weapons 




Chapter 3: Defining National Defense Needs: Economic Motivations for 
Congressional Defense Spending  
 
 
This chapter assesses whether local economic reliance on the defense industry 
shapes congressional voting patterns on various types of weapons expenditures. 
Scholars tend to highlight ideological motivations in order to explain congressional 
voting behavior on defense decisions (Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991; Fleisher 1985; Ray 
1981a). Unquestionably, debates over missile defense and the size of the defense 
budget tap into underlying disagreements over multilateral versus unilateral foreign 
policy and generate intense ideological disputes. However, not all defense spending 
controversies grow out of ideological disputes. Studies rarely consider how mounting 
program costs and changing threat levels influence congressional spending on 
disproportionately high-cost weapons opposed by leading Pentagon officials. Systems 
that provoke controversy within top Pentagon circles often reflect non-ideological, 
strategic goals. Congressional decisions on these matters not only involve billions of 
dollars of taxpayer money but also require strategic defense trade-offs, including cuts 
in other parts of the military procurement budget. While varying assessments of 
national defense requirements may underlie congressional preferences for 
controversial weapons, few studies have addressed members’ incentives on these 
decisions.   
What factors motivate congressional voting decisions on high cost weapons 




of Representatives who represents a constituency that is economically dependent90 on 
defense spending will be more likely to vote for defense expenditures than a member 
from a district that is less dependent on the defense industry. I am not simply 
suggesting that members of Congress from districts with a strong defense sector will 
seek more military spending. My analysis also accounts for a district’s larger 
economic context: Districts with less diverse economies are disproportionately reliant 
on the defense expenditures that they receive, and congressional members from these 
districts will prioritize defense interests more than members representing 
constituencies with more diverse, vibrant economies. Members’ political motivations 
are not shaped merely by the presence of defense facilities, but are also influenced by 
the importance of this industry to the overall local economy. In broader terms, 
constituency interest affects congressional incentives differently depending on local 
context.  
Previous work on congressional defense spending does not adequately capture 
a constituency’s reliance on the defense programs at stake in the voting decisions 
under examination. While studies do examine various measures of constituency 
‘benefit’ flowing from defense expenditures (see Lindsay 1991; Fleisher 1985; Ray 
1981a; Cobb 1976), these evaluations do not account for the importance of the vote 
under study to a constituency’s overall economy. Rather, most studies suggest that 
parochial factors play a limited role in defense decisions, and that congressional 
preferences for defense expenditures reflect members’ ideological preferences (Cobb 
1976; Ray 1981a; Fleisher 1985; Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991; also see Krehbiel 1998). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This view suggests that members of Congress who support defense programs do so 
because of a more ‘hawkish’ ideology, while the ideological ‘doves’ that oppose such 
measures are driven by more pacifist sentiments. Yet, a member’s ideological 
orientation cannot fully explain their preference for a technologically sophisticated 
weapon system with high costs and debatable utility as opposed to more cost-
effective, proven military technology expressly favored by Pentagon officials.   
Original data presented here offers new evidence that constituency reliance on 
defense jobs is a key driver of these military spending preferences in the U.S. House 
of Representatives. Constituency dependence on defense employment influences 
members’ voting behavior beyond the partisan and ideological divisions that typically 
characterize congressional voting behavior.  
 
Local Economic Reliance 
Institutional structures encourage members of Congress to respond to local 
constituencies (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). Because Congress is set up as a body 
that is responsive to states and districts across the nation, congressional decisions on 
security policy and defense spending offer crucial insights into the nature of 
institutional incentives.  
Previous analysis of defense committee composition supports the notion that 
members of Congress prioritize constituency factors. Research has found that the 
Armed Services Committee attracts members from districts with large military bases 
and high levels of employment in arms services (Adler & Lapinksi 1997; Goss 1972; 




demand-side theory of committee representation demonstrates that members of 
committees yield greater levels of constituency benefits on average than the typical 
member of Congress. Other scholars have demonstrated that committee-based log-
rolling arrangements (Carsey & Rundquist 1997) and partisan influences (Carsey & 
Rundquist 1999; Bickers & Stein 2000; Carsey & Rundquist 2002) affect the 
distributive politics of defense contracting. Additionally, research suggests that the 
nation’s uneven economic development patterns have shaped foreign policy conflicts 
throughout key periods of U.S. history (Trubowitz 1998). 
While many studies recognize the conventional wisdom that politics plays an 
important role in defense spending, the literature also lacks systematic evidence that 
parochial interests have a major influence on representatives’ voting preferences for 
weapons systems. Instead, this line of research highlights ideological considerations 
in order to explain congressional voting patterns on defense spending decisions 
(Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1991; Ray 1981a; Fleisher 1985; Cobb 1976; Bernstein & 
Anthony 1974; Goss 1972; Grey & Gregory 1968).  
These studies do not adequately capture the importance of the voting decision 
under examination for a representative’s local economy. First, previous work often 
focuses exclusively on legislative disagreement on politically controversial defense 
decisions during the Cold War, such as “jingoistic” foreign policy votes (Cobb 1974), 
anti-ballistic missiles (Bernstein & Anthony 1974) and missile defense (Lindsay 
1991; Ray 1981a). In addition to potential strategic disagreements, debates over 
nuclear programs also tap into members’ ideological disputes over unilateral versus 




bomber). Second, and more critically, studies typically employ a relatively blunt 
metric of defense dollars flowing to a locality in order to assess members’ economic 
motivations. These measures fail to gauge the importance of the defense vote to the 
constituency’s overall economy.   
Researchers themselves commonly recognize these limitations. Bruce Ray 
(1981a, 444) explains the null relationship between statewide prime contract revenue 
and members’ “hawkishness” on foreign policy decisions by noting that the problem 
may lie with the general level of measurement: “Congressmen will still fight—and 
fight hard—for a defense project with direct implications for their districts, but may 
allow the ‘world’ view, as opposed to their ‘constituency’ view, to determine their 
positions on more general national security measures.” Richard Fleisher (1985) 
explains the lack of relationship between Senate votes for the B-1 bomber and the 
percentage of B-1 expenditures flowing to a state by pointing out that for most 
senators, voting against the program did not harm the state’s economy.91  
Previous work suggesting that local economic factors do not influence 
members’ defense spending decisions does not adequately capture a constituency’s 
reliance on the defense programs at stake in a voting decision. My analysis highlights 
a new understanding of district demand based on the geographic composition of the 
defense industry. While Adler & Lapinski (1997) measure district ‘need’ based on the 
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  Fleisher acknowledges that California received over 60% of B-1 dollars during the time period 
examined, thus minimizing the importance of program benefits in other states. “Looking at the 
behavior of [California’s] liberal Senators, Cranston and Tunney, one finds that they were constant 
supporters of the B-1. All other liberals from high benefit states can be considered as not crossing that 
minimum threshold [of economic importance]. That is, the amount of benefits that the state received 





absolute number of military bases in a district, I conceptualize excessive reliance 
based on the relative concentration of defense facilities to other industries. In other 
words, the proportion of constituents that rely on the defense sector for employment 
opportunities and local revenue provides a better measure of constituency dependence 
on this particular sector of the economy.  This suggests that members of Congress 
from more sparsely populated, rural locations—characterized by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) as more industrially homogenous areas with fewer economic 
opportunities—have greater incentives to focus on defense spending than do members 
from urban areas with a diverse industrial base.92  Indeed, there is reason to believe 
that disproportionate demand for defense benefits in more rural areas with a 
concentrated defense presence shapes members’ voting preferences to a greater extent 
than the mere capacity to accept defense projects (also see Bailey & Brady 1998).  
If economic reliance on defense spending shapes the relationship between 
representative and constituency, then congressional support for weapons programs 
will not be driven only by broader foreign policy goals. Rather, the shared goal of 
economic security will also cultivate support for such policies, and is likely to 
influence or help shape the representative and the district’s hawkish position on 
foreign policy or support for weapons programs regardless of partisanship or 
ideology. If economic dependence on defense jobs influences congressional support 
for military spending, then the following hypothesis should hold true: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See U.S. Economic Research Service: http://151.121.68.30/Briefing/Rurality/. (Also refer to ERS 





H1: Members of Congress from districts that are more reliant on the defense 
industry will demonstrate greater support for defense expenditures than 
members whose districts are less economically dependent on the military 
industry, controlling for partisanship and other factors.  
 
The Role of Partisanship   
Partisanship defines multiple aspects of congressional processes and behavior, 
from elections (Aldrich 1995) to the formation of procedural coalitions (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005) and roll call voting (Snyder & Groseclose 2000). The 1995 
Republican Party takeover resulted in greater ideological homogeneity in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties (Aldrich & Rohde 2000).  
While the theory of economic reliance posits that both Republicans and 
Democrats from arms dependent districts will be more likely to support increased 
defense funding, one might also expect to see differences between Republican and 
Democratic voting patterns. Republican Party leaders, including Republican 
presidents, have long sought to position the party as “pro-defense.” All Republican 
members of Congress are undoubtedly cognizant of the collective party strategy to 
enhance the party’s “brand name" on defense issues—regardless of the composition 
of their district. 
Given these institutional incentives, Republican Congress members should be 
predisposed to vote pro-military spending, all else equal. Accordingly, economic 
considerations may have a larger impact on Democrats, who do not have the same 




H2: Economic reliance on the defense sector will encourage Democratic 
members’ support for defense expenditures to a greater extent than 
Republican members, controlling for ideological predispositions.  
 
Controversial Weapons Spending    
Congressional debates over military expenditures take many forms. Members 
of Congress disagree over general levels of defense spending, restrictions on arms 
sales abroad, and funding for weapons programs with high costs and questionable 
strategic utility. For instance, the 1994 Republican Contract with America 
championed the need for large defense budgets, highlighting national defense 
priorities as a “conservative” cause. Successful Republican leadership on this issue 
should encourage Republican membership to mount opposition to defense cuts. If 
parties in Congress stake out opposing positions on debates over defense spending 
levels, then partisan or ideological factors will exhibit strong influences on 
congressional voting decisions on spending policies.  
By contrast, it is more difficult to conceptualize support for controversial 
weapons systems—strategically debatable programs opposed by top Pentagon 
officials as prohibitively costly or otherwise unnecessary—as a ‘conservative’ cause. 
Unlike debates over levels of military spending, questions concerning the utility or 
cost-effectiveness of a weapon system do not typically break down based on 
ideological considerations. Rather, these questions rely on expert assessments and 
factual evidence, such as whether a weapon is likely to be useful on the battlefield 




questions are more difficult to classify as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ positions. This 
suggests that economic reliance on defense revenue may drive legislative support for 
controversial weapons expenditures to a greater extent than policy debates with a 
stronger partisan or ideological content.  
H3: Economic reliance on the defense sector will encourage greater 
congressional support for controversial defense expenditures than 
other defense spending policies, controlling for ideological 
predispositions. 
 
Data and Research Design  
To conduct this analysis, I located roll call votes taken in the U.S. House of 
Representatives on three specific types of defense policies from 1993 to 1998: 
controversial weapons expenditures,93 defense cuts, and policies on arms sales to 
foreign nations. Each bill forces congressional members to take a position on a matter 
that influences the status of the U.S. arms economy. 
Congressional debate on these subjects is more limited and one-sided during 
periods of military threat. The absence of a significant military threat throughout 
much of the 1990s offers a unique opportunity to analyze variability in congressional 
behavior on such matters. This approach is especially critical given the more uniform 
congressional support for military spending during periods of heightened perceptions 
of national security threats present through much of the Cold War and following the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Controversial weapons are defined as weapons opposed by the Pentagon on account of 




terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Gray & Gregory 1968, 45; CQ Weekly, 
Defense 01446 5/27/05). 
The House of Representatives provides an appropriate focal point for this 
study for several reasons: The House offers a larger case selection than the Senate and 
a more precise measure of constituency reliance.  The shorter terms of its members 
not only link them more closely to their constituencies, but the districts are also 
smaller and often more homogenous than those of the Senate, allowing for greater 
variability across cases.   
The database consists of 36 spending bills regarding controversial weapons 
expenditures (n=17), general defense cuts (n=11), and arms sale policies (n=8) taken 
from 1993-1998 extracted from CQ Weekly. The dependent variable is the members’ 
average position (“defense spending score”) on all three types of defense policies 
during the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congress, respectively.  A ‘pro-spending’ vote (pro-
weapons spending, anti-spending cuts, and pro-ease of arms sales) was coded “1”; an 
‘anti-spending’ vote was coded “0”. The average scores per district are continuous 
measures ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more support for defense 
spending. I also disaggregated each policy type and created scores for controversial 
defense expenditure, general defense cuts, and arms sales in order to test for variation 
across policy types. In doing so, I pool the votes taken in three congressional terms in 
order to increase the number of cases examined. Appendix 3.1 provides a table of 
descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables. Appendix 3.2 lists 
these bills, resolutions and amendments.94 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Controversial weapons expenditures are defined as disproportionately high-
cost weapon systems with debatable strategic utility that top Pentagon officials, 
including the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or the president, have 
targeted for spending caps, cancellation or spending cuts. The weapons systems that 
meet these criteria include the SSN Seawolf Submarine, B-2 stealth bomber, V-22 
Osprey helicopter and F-22 stealth fighter.  Each program has been criticized by the 
Pentagon as prohibitively costly or otherwise inappropriate in an era faced with 
threats of terrorism or other forms of unconventional conflict.95 The Trident D-5 
nuclear missile and other ballistic missile systems are classified as politically 
controversial expenditures, indicating both strategic and political disagreement over 
procurement decisions.96   
Defense cuts consist of bills on spending freezes and overall reductions in 
defense spending. This includes amendments providing an across-the-board cut in 
DoD activities or reducing the level of funding allotted for Army, Navy, or Air Force 
procurements.  
Arms sale policies are defined as measures restricting or relaxing U.S. arms 
sales to foreign nations or bills tightening or relaxing restrictions on U.S. arms 
contractors. These votes force members to take a position that either grows or rolls 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 For more information on controversial weapons expenditures and Pentagon opposition refer to: 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), SSN-21 Seawolf Class; U.S. GAO 1997b, 2000, 2006; 
Bender & Robinson 1997; Bolkcom 2005 CRS Report; CDI Transcript 1992; George H.W. Bush 1992 
State of the Union, in American Presidency Project, State of the Union Messages.  
96 For example, President George H.W. Bush targeted inter-continental ballistic missiles, warheads for 
sea-based ballistic missiles and Peacekeeping missiles for spending cuts in his 1992 State of the Union 
Address, suggesting low strategic priority. However, debates over nuclear weaponry could also reflect 
members’ disagreement over multilateral foreign policy versus an independent U.S. super-power (see 
George H.W. Bush, 1992 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 






back the weapons industry. Examples include a bill to prohibit the use of funds to 
finance the sale or transfer of a defense article or service to a foreign nation, and an 
amendment omitting a government tax on the foreign sale of U.S. weapons.97   
The percentage of defense sector employment within a district would provide 
an optimal measure of district dependence on the defense sector of the economy. 
However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics yields ‘non-disclosable’ results on defense 
employment queries. Given these data limitations, an interaction term, low 
density*facilities, allows me to assess the influence of a large defense sector presence 
in more sparsely populated areas. The measure serves as a proxy for a district’s 
economic reliance on defense revenue. 
 Information on the nation-wide locations of major defense industries affords 
a reasonable measure of local defense industry presence. To create this measure, I 
collected original data on the major U.S. locations of Boeing Company, Lockheed 
Martin, Raytheon, TRW Inc., Northrop Grumman Corporation, and Alliant 
Techsystems during the 1990s. These six companies were all top DoD manufacturers 
during the period under study and primary producers of the controversial weapons 
systems examined.98  I collected information on major industry locations by 
referencing 10-K reports—annual business and financial documents—submitted by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 I include one bill that aims to expand NATO (HR3564, 7/23/96) because this measure effectively 
grants greater access for U.S. arms sales abroad.  
98 Lockheed Martin and Boeing Company manufacture the F-22 fighter plane; Northrop Grumman 
Corp, TRW Inc. and Boeing produce the B-2 bomber; Alliant Techsystems manufactures the Trident 
D5 missile. The Boeing Airborne Laser, Lockheed Martin Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Northrop 
Grumman Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and Raytheon Integrated Defense all contribute crucial 
aspects to the BMD program. In FY1995, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW Inc. (a 
subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corp.) ranked as the top four major BMD contractors.  Alliant 




each company for the 1995 fiscal year.99 I also consulted past research compiled by 
the Center for Media and Democracy on the locations of major missile defense 
industries. These search methods yielded the city-based locations of 606 U.S. defense 
facilities spread across 48 states (excepting Vermont and Delaware). I hand-coded the 
relevant districts from the Congressional District Atlas for the 103rd Congress of the 
United States (based on 1992 redistricting plans). When a city location cut across 
multiple congressional districts, I included each potentially relevant district in my 
coding scheme. Appendix 3.3 provides information on the locations of defense 
facilities and details on coding decisions.100   
A count variable indicates the number of defense facilities in a district. 
However, this measure does not gauge a district’s economic reliance on defense 
expenditures. To capture local dependence on the major defense companies in a 
district, I apply an additional proxy for local economic homogeneity.  
The USDA Economic Research Service addresses shrinking economies and 
higher prospects of job loss among residents of more rural, low-density settlements. 
Based on these classifications, more sparsely populated, rural areas with a defense 
sector presence generally experience greater dependence on this industry than more 
economically diverse, urban areas with an equal defense presence. Following USDA 
Urban/Rural Continuum Criteria, I account for rural/urban disparities by including a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 These reports are located at the Security and Exchange Commission, EDGAR Database Archive, 
Company 10K Reports, FY 1995 (http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml).   
100 Given length restrictions, the material in Appendix 3.3 will be made available upon request from 




measure of the population density of a district.101 I calculated the overall district 
population divided by area per square mile. I then calculated the inverse of this 
measure in order to create a variable for low density, where higher values indicate 
more sparsely populated areas.  
As stated previously, an interaction term (low density*facilities) captures the 
influence of a large defense sector presence in more sparsely populated areas. 
Accounting for the industrial composition of a district is critical to any complete 
assessment of constituency dependence on a particular sector of the economy.  
I also include a number of important control variables. Scott Adler’s dataset 
provides information on the military population in each district during the 1990s. I 
consulted the website for the Center of Responsive Politics for data on campaign 
contributions from the defense industry given to each congressional member. 
Referring to the Congressional Directory, I include a dummy variable for defense 
committee members (coded “1” for members of the Defense Appropriation 
Committee, Armed Services Committee,102 and Select Committee on Tactical 
Intelligence, and “0” for other members). I also control for partisanship, coding 
Republicans “1” and Democrats “0.”103 In order to test for distinct behavior across 
parties, I ran the full model separately for Democrats and Republicans. When 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  The USDA defines Urbanized Areas as “clusters of 2,500 or more people, based solely on 
population density per square mile.” See USDA Economic Research Service, Rural-Urban Continuum 
Codes, http://151.121.68.30/Briefing/Rurality/RuralUrbCon/. The measurement also corresponds with 
methodologies utilized in sociological analyses of rural history, which often define the degree of 
“rurality” or “urban-ness” based on population density or degree of isolation from large, urban places 
(see Buttel & McMichael 1988, referring to Willets et al. 1982). 
102 The Armed Services Committee was renamed the National Security Committee in 1995. I use these 
terms interchangeably.  





analyzing the parties separately, I employ a standard political science measurement 
for ideology (Poole & Rosenthal 1991, DW-NOMINATE scores) to control for 
members’ predisposed preferences or leanings. While scholars have demonstrated 
statistical and theoretical problems with the use of aggregated voting patterns in 
models predicting voting behavior (Jackson & Kingdon 1992; Jenkins et al. 2004), I 
apply the scores to provide a more conservative test of the hypotheses.104 As stated 
previously, Appendix 1 lists descriptive statistics for each variable under study.  
 
Modeling Patterns of Congressional Support for Defense Expenditures  
The study employs a continuous measure as the dependent variable. 
Therefore, multiple regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) affords an 
appropriate analysis of members’ support for defense expenditures. I run the model 
three times, for the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses. Because district composition 
does not change significantly in this period, the results should hold relatively constant 
throughout this time span.  
An interaction term (low density*facilities) allows me to assess the influence 
of economic reliance in sparsely populated districts with a large defense sector 
presence. The first interactive component, low density, measures the effect of sparsely 
populated areas with no defense facilities. The other interactive component, defense 
facilities, gauges the influence of a large defense industry presence when low density 
is set to zero. The use of an interaction term precludes standardization of the 
regression coefficients (Brambor et al. 2006). Therefore, I also report the effect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 All available national security scores measure ideology based on previous voting patterns, 




low density and defense facilities set to high and low values using CLARIFY (King et 




In an environment of relatively low international threat, what factors 
perpetuate high levels of defense spending? Table 3.1 exhibits the effect of economic 





















Table 3.1: Influence of Economic Reliance on U.S. House Members’ Support for Defense 



















































































































Note: All entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable 
indicates the average roll call vote on controversial defense expenditures, defense cuts, and arms 
sale policies per district in the House of Representatives for each separate congressional term 
(scaled 0 to 1). Votes favoring increased defense expenditures, opposing defense cuts and relaxing 
arms sale restrictions are coded “1”; votes opposing defense expenditures, favoring cuts, and 
tightening arms sale restrictions are coded “0.”  
a In thousands   
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed test),  † (one-tailed test) 
 
Controlling for partisanship, members of Congress with more economically 
reliant constituencies are more likely to vote for military expenditures than other 
members. All else equal, an increase in economic dependence (low density*facilities) 




congressional terms (p≤.05). Indeed, members representing constituencies with more 
diverse economies bear fewer localized costs in voting against these measures.105  
As expected, partisanship influences legislators’ votes on defense policies.106 
Controlling for partisanship, however, additional political and constituency factors 
also shape congressional preferences on defense spending.  An increase in the 
military population in a district yields greater support for defense expenditures 
(p≤.05, 103rd & 105th Congresses). The statistically meaningful, positive relationship 
lends support for the theory that constituency context shapes legislative behavior, 
although the finding is not consistent across all three congressional terms. In addition, 
an increase in defense sector campaign donations associates with a greater rate of 
congressional support for military expenditures, all else equal (p≤ .01). The 
consistent, positive relationship between defense donations and congressional voting 
on defense spending indicates a mutually beneficial relationship uniting members of 
Congress and arms lobbyists in pursuit of shared goals.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the symbiotic relationship 
between lobbyist and legislator. First, defense industries may attempt to ‘grease the 
wheels’ by giving to members from districts where their own corporations are 
located. Second, defense industries may give to members from districts with arms 
industries in attempts to consolidate support for the weapons sector. Third, industries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Although defense facilities yields a negative value when low density is set to zero, the variable 
takes on a positive, statistically meaningful value when the interaction term is removed from the 
model. (All other variables perform consistently.) 
106 The model exhibits similar support for the theory of economic reliance when controlling for 
ideology instead of partisanship. (Multicollinearity prevents the use of both party and ideology in the 




may strategically support their congressional allies’ continued tenure in office (see 
Hall & Deardorff 2006).  
The results in Table 3.1 demonstrate a consistent, positive relationship at 
statistically meaningful levels between local economic reliance (low 
density*facilities) and congressional support for defense expenditures. However, the 
regression coefficients do not exhibit the magnitude of influence that economic 
reliance exerts on congressional voting patterns. The effect of a one-unit increase in 
the key variable of interest, low density*facilities, yields an exponential coefficient 
because the variable is multiplicative and contains a wide range of values (see 
Appendix 3.1).  To assess the combined influence of low density and defense facilities 
on congressional voting behavior, Table 3.2 displays the expected values and 
estimated differences of congressional support for weapons spending when the 
interaction term and its component parts are set at high and low values.  
 The first column in Table 3.2 exhibits the expected value of a members’ 
support for defense spending measures when the number of defense facilities in a 
district changes from its minimum to maximum value, given equal population 
density. The second column shows estimated differences in observing congressional 
support for defense expenditures when low population density moves from the 5th 
percentile (highly urban) to the 95th% percentile (highly rural) value, given an equal 
defense presence. The third column displays the combined effect of low 
density*facilities. The interaction term captures legislative support for defense 
expenditures when a district changes from a densely populated urban area with no 




concentrated defense presence (high economic reliance). For comparison, the fourth 
column shows the estimated changes in support for defense expenditures when the 
dependent variable changes from a Democratic vote to a Republican vote. The model 
holds other control variables constant at their respective means.  
 
 
As the theory of economic reliance predicts, maximum defense sector 
presence in the most sparsely populated districts—high economic reliance—yields 
stunning levels of congressional support for weapons spending. Controlling for 
 
Table 3.2: Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on U.S. House Members’ Support for 
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Percent Change 25.09% 25.52% 66.55% 47.98% 
    
Note: Table 3.2 entries are calculated by the author from the multiple regression analysis in 
Table 3.1 using CLARIFY.  
Entries are expected values and predicted changes in expected values. The standard errors of the 
predictions are in parentheses. All control variables are held constant at their sample means. 
Higher values indicate greater support for defense expenditures.  
 
a Denotes increase in defense facilities setting population density at its sample mean. 





partisanship and other factors, members of Congress from rural districts with 
maximum defense capacity support the military expenditures under examination 96% 
of the time (p≤.001)! By contrast, members from highly urban areas with no defense 
facilities only support these weapons expenditures at a low rate of 32% (p≤.001). The 
difference is striking: Representatives from the most economically reliant districts 
support military expenditures at 67% greater rates than members from districts with 
no conceivable economic gain (p≤.001). The difference in weapons spending 
preferences between members whose constituencies have the most and the least to 
lose from the vote outcome would determine the success or failure of the programs 
under consideration. The change in district composition could thus transform the 
types of weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal.  
At the same time, members of Congress from districts with a maximum 
defense capacity support military expenditures at 25% greater rates than members 
from districts with no major defense facilities, given equal population density 
(p≤.001). Despite partisanship and other political pressures, the prospect of 
constituency gain encourages members of Congress to support increased spending for 
weapons development.  
The results in Table 3.2 also support the theory that rural areas experience 
greater dependence on the defense industry than their urban counterparts with an 
equal defense presence. Given an equal number of defense facilities, members from 
more sparsely populated areas are 26% more likely to support increased defense 




As expected, partisanship yields considerable influence on these vote 
outcomes. All else equal, Republicans are 48% more likely to support weapons 
expenditures examined than their Democratic colleagues (p≤.001). However, even the 
influence of partisanship—a deeply ingrained institutional mechanism—does not 
exceed the effect of constituency reliance on congressional voting for the weapons 
expenditures under study.  
These findings suggest that economic reliance facilitates substantial 
congressional support for weapons programs. Members from districts that are 
disproportionately reliant on the defense sector are considerably more likely to prefer 
larger defense budgets than members from districts that have no economic stake in 
the program. Indeed, the combined effect of low density and facilities yields a 
stronger influence on member preferences than the sum of two variables alone, 
highlighting the independent effect of the interaction term. Despite the highly partisan 
battles over budget-cutting and a “[frayed]…tradition of bipartisanship” in the 103rd 
and 104th Congresses (Aldrich and Rohde 2000, 16-17), economic factors exerted 
substantial pressures on members’ willingness to support defense programs.  
 
How Parties Matter 
Table 3.3 displays the effect of constituency dependence, partisanship, 
committee membership, and defense sector contributions on congressional support for 




The models control for members’ ideological predispositions (using DW-
NOMINATE scores)107 and include other important control variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 DW-NOMINATE scores are voting patterns aggregated by Poole & Rosenthal (1991) as a measure 
of intraparty homogeneity. The measure is typically employed to capture Congress members’ 
ideological leanings. I apply the scores to offer a more rigorous test of the economic hypotheses. 
Higher, positive scores indicate stronger loyalty to Republican Party positions, or more conservative 
voting patterns; negative scores indicate stronger Democratic Party loyalty, or more liberal voting 
patterns.  
Table 3.3: Influence of Economic Reliance on Democratic & Republican House Members’ Support for Defense 
Expenditures in the 103rd – 105th Congresses 
 Coefficients 
 103rd Congress (1993-1994) 
 
104th Congress (1995-1996) 105th Congress (1997-1998) 
Independent  





































































































































Note: All entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable 
indicates the average roll call vote on controversial weapons expenditures, defense cuts, and arms sale 
policies analyzed separately for Democratic (column 1) & Republican (column 2) members of the U.S. 
House in each separate congressional term (scaled 0 to 1). Votes favoring increased defense expenditures, 
opposing defense cuts and relaxing arms sale restrictions are coded “1”; votes opposing defense spending 
in these three types of bills are coded “0.”    





Elaborating on the findings in Table 3.2, which demonstrates the effects of 
economic reliance on congressional support for defense spending, Table 3.3 shows 
that a more economically dependent, rural constituency (low density*facilities) is one 
of the most consistent pressures leading Democratic representatives to break the party 
line and vote in favor of defense expenditures. Indeed, immediately following the 
Republican takeover in 104th Congress—when partisanship was presumably at its 
peak (Aldrich & Rohde 2000)—local economic reliance nonetheless associated with 
greater Democratic support for defense expenditures (p≤.01).108   
Further, other important political influences encourage Democratic members’ 
support for defense expenditures. As exhibited in the full model, Democratic 
members from districts with a high military population demonstrate greater likelihood 
to support defense expenditures than other members, all else equal (p≤.05 one-tailed 
test, 104th, 105th Congresses). The influence of military personnel on congressional 
voting patterns lends additional support for the constituency-based theory of 
representation. Additionally, campaign contributions from the defense sector 
consistently correspond with greater levels of support for defense spending among 
Democratic members (p≤.05). The consistent, positive relationship suggests that 
defense industry management strategically donates to their Democratic congressional 
allies in a mutually beneficial attempt to assist with these members’ re-election 
efforts.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Consistent with the results in Table 3.2, the negative coefficient associated with the interactive 
component, defense facilities, takes on a positive, statistically meaningful value when the interaction 
term is removed from the model. All the other variables perform consistently when the interaction term 





Democrats belonging to defense committees also exhibit greater tendencies to 
support defense expenditures than other Democratic members. The time period under 
study provides an interesting test of committee priorities. In the 103rd Congress, 
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ronald Dellums (D-CA) brought a 
number of bills to the floor to cut defense expenditures, reduce reliance on the arms 
industry, and restore a balanced budget. Two senior Democrats on the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee, Chairman John Murtha and Norm Dicks, sought to 
fend off such cuts. Despite Dellums’ strong leadership, the positive coefficient 
associated with this variable indicates that, all else equal, Democratic members 
belonging to defense committees supported military expenditures more than other 
Democrats (p≤.05, one-tailed test).   
The findings for Republican members tell a somewhat different story. It is 
immediately striking that no variable under examination exhibits a consistent 
influence on Republican support for defense measures across all three time periods. 
Further, the effects of economic and political factors on members’ voting behavior 
are not as strong or as uniform among Republican members as for their Democratic 
counterparts. Nonetheless, the positive value associated with low density*facilities 
demonstrates that Republicans with economically reliant constituencies are more 
likely to support defense spending than other Republicans, controlling for ideology 
and other factors (p<.05, one-tailed test, 103th, 105th Congresses).109 In addition, 
during the 103rd Congress, Republican defense committee members voted in favor of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Although the interaction term gauging the effect of economic reliance is not statistically significant 
in the 104th Congress, the effect of defense facilities takes on a positive, statistically meaningful value 
when the interaction term is removed from the model (p<.05, 104th Congress). The other variables in 





defense expenditures at greater rates than other Republicans—in spite of Dellums’ 
effort to reduce the defense budget (p<.01).  As expected, ideological predispositions 
do exert some influence on Republican voting patterns on defense measures (p<01, 
103rd & 104th Congresses). However, the variable does not perform consistently 
across all three congressional terms at statistically meaningful levels.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Democratic & Republican House 
Members’ Support for Defense Expenditures, 103rd Congress (1993-1994) 
Note: Figure 3.1 displays expected values calculated by the author from the multiple regression 
analysis in Table 3.3 using CLARIFY. All control variables are held constant at their sample means.  
*Denotes increase in low density setting arms facilities at its sample mean.  
**Denotes increase in defense facilities setting low density its sample mean.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how economic reliance shapes Democratic and 
Republican support for defense programs. Despite the parties’ distinct voting patterns, 
the combined influence of defense facilities*low density corresponds with a 
substantial change in both Democratic and Republican members’ support for defense 




and rural geography exhibits a positive, linear trend when explaining Democratic 
voting behavior, changing from an estimated 30% support in urban districts with no 
facilities to approximately 80% support in rural districts with a concentrated defense 
presence (50% change). Economic reliance encourages Democratic members to 
support defense expenditures to a considerably greater extent than rural geography 
(27% change), a stronger defense industry presence (13% change), or the sum of 
these two variables.  
By contrast, Republican support for defense expenditures hits a low point of 
80% support in urban areas with no defense facilities and approaches nearly 100% 
support in the most economically reliant districts. Given the strong, uniform 
Republican support for these measures documented in Figure 3.1, it is not surprising 
that economic reliance has a greater influence on Democratic members’ support for 
defense programs than their Republican counterparts. Indeed, Republicans represent 
more economically reliant districts on average than their Democratic colleagues, 
suggesting that local economic characteristics may reinforce the party’s “pro-
defense” stance on military spending.110  
Further, and exceeding theoretical expectations, nearly every economic and 
political factor examined in Table 3.3 shapes Democratic members’ support for 
defense expenditures to a greater extent than Republican members’. The goodness of 
fit statistic diminishes by nearly one fifth of its size in the model explaining variance 
in Republican (as opposed to Democratic) voting patterns on defense policies. Indeed, 
there is far less variation among Republican representatives to explain! Members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The larger mean value for low density*facilities in Republican districts indicates greater overall 




the Republican Party are already inclined to vote pro-defense based solely on their 
partisanship.  
 
Controversial Weapons Programs  
Table 3.4 displays the effect of economic and constituency factors on 
Democratic and Republican support for controversial weapons expenditures, defense 
cuts, and policies relaxing or restricting arms sales, respectively. I pooled the voting 
averages across the 103rd, 104th, and 105th congressional terms in order to increase the 
number of cases examined. To do so, I calculated the average ‘pro-spending’ voting 
score for each spending category and recorded the total ‘pro-spending’ ratio.111 The 
first column under each vote type displays the results for Democrats. The second 
column of each heading exhibits the effects among Republicans.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 I do not use fixed effects because the roll call averages are pooled across Congresses. However, 
Tables 3.1 & 3.3 demonstrate that the variables under study perform similarly across the relevant 
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The results in Table 3.4 demonstrate the consistency with which economic 
reliance on defense dollars influences Democratic members’ revealed preferences for 
defense expenditures. All else equal, Democrats with more economically reliant 
constituencies support every type of defense expenditure examined at a greater rate 
than other Democrats. A large defense presence in more rural areas encourages 
Democratic members to oppose defense cuts (p≤.001), support controversial 
programs (p≤.05) and vote to relax arms sales restrictions (p≤.001) more than other 
Democrats.112  While economic dependence exhibits the largest effect on defense 
cuts, the shared threat of economic hardship affects legislative voting on both targeted 
and generalized weapons expenditures. Senator David Pryor (D-AR) captured this 
sentiment of reciprocity when explaining his vote to continue to fund the 
controversial Seawolf Submarine over the protests of Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney: “When my military jobs get in trouble, if we have not made that [economic] 
transition…I hope the same people that asked me for my help will…remember 
our…workers and our plight” (Center for Defense Information Transcript 1992).113   
The presence of military personnel in a district encourages Democratic 
legislators to resist defense cuts (p≤.001) and to support controversial weapons 
expenditures (p≤.01), but has no statistically meaningful effect on arms sale policies. 
Democrats receiving larger defense sector contributions, however, demonstrate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The results displayed no substantial difference when I disaggregated different types weapons 
systems classified as politically or strategically controversial.  
113  Addressing the Senate Budget Committee as Defense Secretary in 1992, Dick Cheney admonished 
Congress for refusing to cancel the program: “ [W]e’ve identified these programs [for budget 
cancellation], and the SSN-21 specifically, because the thing that was driving that construction 
program was our anticipation of improved Soviet submarine capabilities” (Center for Defense 





greater support for arms sales and controversial weapons systems and mount stronger 
opposition to defense cuts than Democrats who receive smaller defense contributions 
(p≤.001). Finally, contrary to initial expectations, members’ ideologies (as indicated 
by DW-NOMINATE scores) exhibit a similar effect on Democratic members’ 
opposition to defense cuts and support for controversial weapons (b=.763, .688 
p≤.001). 
Republican members’ voting behavior largely mirrors their Democratic 
counterparts. While economic and constituency factors are less effective in explaining 
Republican support for defense expenditures, the two parties nonetheless behave 
similarly across policy types. All else equal, economic reliance on defense dollars 
encourages Republican members to oppose defense cuts (p≤.001) and to support 
controversial weapons programs (p≤.01) more than other Republicans, though it has 
no meaningful effect on arms sale policies.  
 Defense sector contributions also correspond with Republican support for 
military spending. Though these effects are not as strong among Republicans as 
Democrats, the positive association is consistent across policy types. The relationship 
between Republican legislators and the arms industry is strongest in Republican 
support for foreign arms sales (p≤.001).  By contrast, the number of military 
personnel in a district does not encourage greater Republican support for any of the 
defense expenditures discussed. In fact, Republican members from districts with a 
higher military population are less likely to support arms sale policies than other 
Republicans (p≤.05). This negative value might account for the anticipation of future 




encourage Democrats to support defense expenditures more than Republicans 
because they otherwise lack a partisan predisposition to vote for these policies.  
Unlike other factors examined, defense committee membership exerts a 
greater influence on Republican support for weapons spending than it does for 
Democrats. Republicans belonging to defense committees were more likely to 
support controversial weapons expenditures and to oppose defense cuts than other 
Republicans, all else equal (p≤.05). Arms sales policies, however, do not generate 
similar support among Republican defense committee members. The relationship 
suggests that Republican committee members are following leadership strategies on 
the policies explicitly discussed in the Republican Contract with America.    
DW-NOMINATE scores exhibit similar patterns among Republicans as for 
Democrats. While the magnitude of this effect diminishes substantially, it appears 
that the variable encourages slightly greater Republican support for controversial 
weapons (b=.188 p≤.001) than for defense cuts (b=.172 increase, p≤.01) and has no 
meaningful influence on arms sale policies. These results suggest that conservative-
oriented members tend to rally together not only in opposition to defense cuts, but 
also in support of controversial weapons expenditures. The finding is especially 
notable, considering that prominent defense “hawks” such as previous Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney and General John Shalikashvili (then Joint Chief of Staff 






Figure 3.2 – Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on House Members’ Support for Defense 
Expenditures by Vote Type, 1993-1998 (Pooled)  
Note: Figure 3.2 displays expected values calculated by the author from the multiple regression 
analysis in Table 3.4 using CLARIFY. All control variables are held constant at their sample means. 
 
Figure 3.2 reveals that economic reliance exerts a similar effect on members’ 
support for defense expenditures across policy type. All else equal, economic reliance 
yields consistent, almost uniform support for all three types of defense expenditures. 
Indeed, none of these weapons systems would garner a majority of congressional 
support if voting was restricted to legislators from areas with no economic stake in 
the program. While economic reliance yields the largest influence on members’ 
opposition to defense cuts, legislative support for controversial weapons and arms 
sale policies follow similar patterns. These findings suggest that defense cuts, arms 
sale policies and controversial weapons expenditures all threaten economic 
vulnerabilities, which in turn influence representative voting behavior in more rural, 






Commerce subcommittee chair Harold Rogers (R-KY) captured the severe 
fiscal effect of the post-Cold War budget crunch by referring to 1995 as “the year to 
eat bugs and drink rainwater” (CQWR 7-1, cited in Aldrich and Rohde 2000, 15). 
Yet, despite the need for cutbacks, in 1995-1996 the House failed to pass a single 
proposal for defense cuts that came to a floor vote. The only resolution proposing a 
defense cut that did pass in the entire time period under study reduced the amount 
spent for maintaining bases overseas (HR2401, HRC 419, 9/9/93).  
Constituency reliance on the defense sector helps explain why it is difficult for 
Congress to cut funding for military procurements and why members continue to fund 
strategically questionable weapons programs: Members of Congress support 
programs that are critical to widely shared economic interests in their district. 
Evidence presented here suggests that more economically homogenous, rural 
constituencies not only experience greater dependence on the major companies in 
their district, but also exhibit clearer, more pervasive preferences for military 
spending than diverse, urban settings with multiple, cross-cutting constituencies.  
Providing local economic support is a more straightforward process for 
representatives from rural areas than for their urban counterparts (also see Bailey & 
Brady 1998). Indeed, Democratic Representative Norm Dicks’ website boasts of his 
support for an initiative to build a new nuclear attack submarine for “special 
operations” by emphasizing the likelihood that the submarine would be based at the 




As Defense Secretary under George H.W. Bush, Dick Cheney urged Congress 
to eliminate the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotator helicopter designed to carry marine troops 
to shore: “You’ve directed me to buy the V-22, a program I don’t need…You’ve 
directed me to buy more [fighter jets]…Congress has directed me to spend money on 
all kinds of things that are not related to defense, but mostly related to politics back 
home in the district.” Despite repeated crashes in test simulations, time delays and 
cost run-ups, the 1998 House appropriations bill allocated an extra $78 million—in 
addition to $611 million included in the Senate bill—for the V-22 Osprey.  
Congressional incentives to support programs that help sustain economically 
reliant districts perpetuate weapons systems during periods of reduced threat and 
changing defense needs—regardless of whether top Pentagon officials prioritize these 
systems or consider them to be strategically necessary. Defense contractors also have 
incentives to spread out their operations across multiple districts to precisely to attract 
this sort of political support for weapons programs. Such institutional incentives may 
lend insight to problems of inefficiency and unmet strategic needs that military 
personnel commonly face (Gansler 2003). 
The role of constituency reliance is particularly important in explaining 
Democratic members’ voting behavior on defense measures because they do not have 
a partisan predisposition to support these policies. Moreover, economic factors may 
reinforce partisan behavior for many Republican members, as this party tends to 
represent more rural areas that are more heavily dependent on defense expenditures 
(see Appendix 1). Still, constituency reliance on the defense sector motivates 




examined. Evidence suggests that economic goals in more dependent, rural areas 
influence political representation and perpetuate U.S. defense production independent 








“[Defense contracting] has become a requirements stampede. What we’ve been 
doing is analogous to someone who is designing a home and gives their architect all 
the must-haves and like-to-have and then is billed $300 per square foot.”  
-Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Armed Services Committee Chairman (Congress 
Daily, 5/5/2005)  
Representative Hunter’s depiction of inefficiency and waste in defense 
contract allocations does not escape the attention of commentators and concerned 
citizens. Critics have characterized many U.S. weapons expenditures as wasteful 
profiteering and an “abuse of national security dollars,” and have encouraged 
taxpayers to “rap the industry on the snout” (quoting Democracy Arsenal 6/22/06; 
also see Center for Defense Information (various years); Project on Government 
Oversight (various years)). Congress is widely perceived as part of the problem: 
Congress members seek defense benefits for their constituencies; at the same time, 
the defense industry spreads benefits strategically in order to stimulate congressional 
support for defense spending. Institutional structures thus encourage excessive 
spending and misallocations of resources.    
 Despite conventional wisdom that politics plays an important role in defense 
spending, political scientists have found little evidence that defense contracts are 




scientists have generally found that prime defense contracts114 are awarded to a 
limited number of highly concentrated locations with corporate defense headquarters, 
usually in large cities (Markuson et al. 1991; Mayer 1991). Analyses considering 
whether the Department of Defense (DoD) directs prime contracts into the districts or 
states of key Congress members—particularly those on the Armed Services 
committees and Defense Appropriations subcommittees—have yielded 
predominantly negative results (Goss 1972; Rundquist 1973, 1978; Ray 1981b; 
Lindsay 1991; Mayer 1990, 1991; Markuson et al., 1991, 40; but also see Rundquist 
& Carsey 2002). This line of research presents problems for pork barrel theories. As 
Kenneth Mayer (1991, 4) acknowledges, these studies often lead to unconvincing 
arguments explaining why Congress lacks influence in the distribution of defense 
contracts. Nonetheless, most previous work appears to contradict the notion that 
Congress members align with Pentagon officials and defense sector management in 
pursuit of mutually entangled benefits.  
This research reconsiders the role of politics in defense spending in two ways. 
First, I theorize that any account of the distributive politics of defense spending must 
consider areas that are disproportionately reliant on defense employment.  The theory 
of economic reliance presented in Chapter 3 suggests that rural areas with less diverse 
economies stimulate greater political incentive to procure defense dollars that an 
urban area with an equal defense presence. Second, the project tracks prime contracts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Prime defense contracts refer to the military procurements awarded by federal agencies. Principal 
assignments (or subcontracts) occur when prime contractors or defense industry management award 






to the subcontracting level,115 where the preponderance of defense dollars eventually 
go.  Indeed, as Mayer (1990, 218) points out, “Scholars and procurement analysts 
have long suspected that prime contractors distribute subcontracts…so as to 
maximize the geographic spread of acquisition programs.” While researchers 
commonly presume that politics does influence the distribution of subcontracts (also 
see Rundquist 1978), data limitations have precluded a systematic examination. 
The analysis unfolds in two main parts: First, evidence shows that the 
geographic composition of the defense sector influences defense committee 
composition in the House of Representatives. Second, I find that while defense 
industry headquarters receive the bulk of prime contract dollars, my focus on a 
secondary stage in the contracting process—as opposed to previous academic work—
uncovers a striking pattern of defense projects flowing to economically reliant 
districts. 
  The study identifies local dependence on the defense sector as the most 
important factor leading members of Congress to seek representation on defense 
committees and to procure defense benefits. The findings are also consistent with the 
inference that defense industries spread out their operations across multiple districts 
in order to stimulate greater political demand for weapons systems (Mayer 1990). 
Taken in the aggregate, the consequences for national policy are likely to be 
excessive weapons spending and difficulty prioritizing defense expenditures in 
pursuit of strategic national goals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Contract benefits distributed after the prime contracting stage are either distributed to a company’s 
own facilities and subsidiaries, or subcontracted out to another company. To minimize confusion, I 





A Theory of Overlapping Institutional Incentives  
Defense contract decisions filter through numerous political networks. The 
Pentagon proposes the initial defense budget requests and submits its requests to 
Congress. The President’s bill goes to the House and Senate Defense Appropriation 
Subcommittees, which debate and amend various provisions. The subcommittees then 
submit the amended bill to Congress for final budgetary authorization. In an 
overlapping sphere, the Armed Services Committees authorize all funds and 
conditions for their expenditures, and they report needs for specific weapons and 
research and development (R&D) to the DoD. The Pentagon determines the final 
allocation for weapons production and research grants within the limits of their 
budgetary authorization. Prime contractors then distribute an array of assignments 
and subcontract projects out to other companies. This includes decisions concerning 
the principal location for the construction of contracted weapons systems. The 
reciprocal incentives motivating Congress, key members assigned to defense 
committees, the defense bureaucracy, and the defense sector—revenue, employment, 
and electoral job security—shape the distribution of defense procurement outlays. 
 
 Committee Processes   
 Constituents want jobs, organized lobbyists and corporations desire revenue, 
and political actors seek to facilitate these demands for the sake of both personal and 
collective gain. The committee system serves as a prominent vehicle by which 




credit to their constituents during a reelection campaign (Fiorina 1987; Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1994). Congress members on defense 
committees demonstrate a concern for local interests by vying for constituency 
benefits (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1994).  
Previous analyses of defense committees have found the Armed Services 
Committee draws Congress members from districts with large military bases and high 
levels of employment in armed services (Adler & Lapinski 1997; Goss 1972; Arnold 
1979; Rohde & Shepsle 1973). Scholars have also found that both committee-based 
log-rolling arrangements (Ray 1980; Carsey & Rundquist 1997) and partisan 
influences (Bickers and Stein 2000; Carsey & Rundquist 1999; Rundquist & Carsey 
2002) contribute to geographic disparities in the allocation of defense spending.  
Adler & Lapinski’s (1997) test of their “demand-side” theory demonstrates that 
constituency ‘need’ was almost always significantly higher for members of 
committees than for the typical member of Congress, thus empowering the most 
reliant members with the charge of policy-making.116 
Data presented here allow for an examination of the effect of the commercial 
arms industry on defense committee composition and contract allocations. The 
analysis reinforces the excessive reliance thesis advanced in this dissertation. While 
Adler & Lapinski measure district ‘need’ based on the absolute number of military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 However, the authors note that, “Absent from the profile of high need districts for Armed Services 
is a measure of civilian employees of military contractors” (901). The authors’ rationale for the 
exclusion points to the “[practical] impossibility” of collecting reliable employment data related to 
defense contractors and subcontractors for each congressional district across multiple decades. 
However, by tracking the locations of commercial defense industries, this research affords a reasonable 





bases in a district, I conceptualize disproportionate demand based on the relative 
concentration of the defense industry in a district. Building off of my analysis in 
Chapter 3, I argue that Congress members from more sparsely populated, rural 
districts with a defense sector presence have greater incentives to focus on defense 
spending than members from urban districts with defense industries scattered 
amongst a more diverse industrial base. The political incentive for a member to 
prioritize defense spending is not merely a function of the absolute numbers of 
defense installations in his/her district, but of the proportion of defense facilities 
relative to other industries.  
Controlling for the number of defense facilities in a district—the capacity to 
receive defense projects—members from rural areas with less diverse economies will 
be more likely to join defense committees than their urban counterparts. By the same 
logic, Congress members from small towns are likely to receive greater credit for 
acquiring projects that bolster local employment opportunities. Additionally, it is 
much easier for members to claim credit for benefits concentrated in larger, more 
sparsely populated rural districts than in more densely populated, urban areas that cut 
across multiple districts. More rural geography thus diminishes the collective action 
problems that urban members are likely to face when their district’s residents can 
benefit from employment opportunities in nearby, neighboring districts. Finally, and 
perhaps most critically, the relative effect of contract benefits in rural areas exceeds 
that of more industrialized and populated areas, as the growth or decline of a major 
industry in a rural setting or small town could revitalize or wreck a local economy 




are likely to experience inordinate dependence on the major industries in their 
locality, which in turn encourages representatives from these areas to seek distributive 
benefits that will contribute to existing infrastructure. 
Specifically, members from more industrially homogenous areas will place a 
greater premium on maintaining and increasing defense employment levels than 
Congress members from urban centers with more diverse economies. The theory that 
economic dependence motivates defense committee composition leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
H1: Congress members from districts that are more dependent on defense 
employment will demonstrate a greater likelihood to join defense committees, 
controlling for the number of defense facilities in a district and other factors 
likely to lead members of Congress to seek a defense committee assignment. 
 
Defense Contract Allocations  
Do key Congress members influence the distribution of contract benefits? Hall 
(1996, 1987) demonstrates that different levels of committee participation correspond 
with Congress members’ revealed ‘preference intensity.’ While these insights suggest 
that members’ varying priorities influence internal congressional affairs, there is 
some question as to whether such biases among members of Congress affect policy 
outcomes. I theorize that members whose constituencies have a greater economic 
stake in defense contract allocations will have stronger incentive to seek program 




allocations, then benefits will flow to the most economically dependent 
constituencies. 
 Early studies focusing on procurement outlays suggest that constituencies do 
not reap considerable benefits from representation on defense committees (Rundquist 
& Griffith 1976; Goss 1972; Rundquist 1978; Ray 1981b). However, there is reason 
to suspect that earlier work focusing solely on the allocation of prime contract dollars 
may have understated political factors that influence these processes. Prior academic 
literature on defense contracting has suffered from a lack of reliable data on 
subcontracting (Rundquist 1978; Mayer 1990; Markuson et al. 1991, 14; also see U.S. 
GAO 1998). While prime procurement outlays may flow to wealthy, urban areas, 
these funds ‘trickle down’ to other areas in the form of subcontracts (see Mayer 1990, 
218-231; Rundquist 1978). Fifty percent of prime contract dollars are typically made 
available for subcontracts (Mayer 1990, 220, citing Gansler 1980). Given regulations 
in governing contracts and standard operating procedures, the Pentagon itself may not 
distribute prime contracts politically. Prime contractors, however, enjoy wide 
discretion in distributing assignments and selecting suppliers for parts or technical 
services for weapons programs. Indeed, subcontracts are not subject to the same 
Federal Acquisition Regulation constraints and typically generate less visibility and 
reduced controversy.117 While prime contract distributions are not as susceptible to 
political manipulation (Mayer 1990, 1991; Lindsay 1990, 1991), subcontracting 
allows more leeway for political effects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 According to Defense Federal Procurement and Acquisition Policy guidelines, a contractor may 
select a subcontractor on a non-competitive basis (one that does not offer the lowest price) as long as 
s/he has “adequately substantiated the selection as offering the greatest value to the government” (U.S. 
Department of Defense: Office of Secretary of Defense. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 




Evidence suggests that prime contractors purposely spread assignments for 
defense programs over wide expanses. Mayer (1991, 9) finds that prime contractors 
commonly include more than 45 states and 250 congressional districts. A broad 
distribution of benefits can encourage legislators to favor a program that might not 
otherwise receive support. While more minor subcontracts are not as likely to 
influence representatives, new data on the “principal place of performance” allows 
me to target secondary contract assignments that include the bulk of prime contract 
distributions. Research focusing exclusively on political influences on primary 
contracts does not address these critical dissemination stages.  
Additionally, previous work finding that economic need has no meaningful 
impact on the distribution of prime defense contracts (Markuson et al. 1991; 
Rundquist & Carsey 2002) have not examined a state or district’s economic reliance 
on a particular sector of the economy. In other words, while lower state GDP may 
indicate greater economic need generally, this does not correspond with a specific 
need for defense expenditures, as opposed to other kinds of government assistance. 
While I expect that money will go to districts with a substantial defense sector 
presence, the results of Chapter 3 demonstrate that defense facilities in rural locations 
spur a uniquely high political demand for weapons programs. A conditional 
relationship between rural geography and a high defense sector concentration 
provides a more precise measure of a district’s economic reliance on defense projects.  
While one might expect representatives from more economically homogenous 
areas to pursue multiple types of government contracts—not simply defense dollars—




specifically on defense revenue to protect existing infrastructure. The size and scope 
of the defense sector relative to other industries suggests more economic dependence 
on defense revenue than on other types of government spending, such as 
transportation dollars.118 Further, government can negotiate defense procurements 
when soliciting bids is impractical, inviting greater opportunity for political 
distributions than other industries (Kovacic 1990, 110).119 As the sole legal purchaser 
in a market with a small number of active suppliers, government has an added 
incentive to keep major defense industries profitable. 
If industrial and nonparochial considerations drive defense spending 
decisions, defense dollars will flow to districts with a substantial number of defense 
facilities but a district’s economic reliance on defense spending will have no 
additional effect. However, if this theory of economic reliance influences defense 
contracting, data on defense allocations will support the following hypothesis:  
H2:  Contract benefits will flow disproportionately to rural districts, controlling for 
both the number of facilities in the district and congressional representation on 
defense committees. 
 
Research Design  
The hypothesis testing is carried out with original data on the nationwide 
locations of the defense sector. If local economic reliance on defense revenue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The Department of Defense budget is slated for $514.4 billion in FY2009 (including $183.832 
billion in procurements and R&D), compared to $68 billion slated for the Department of 
Transportation expenditures in FY2009.  
119 According to the Center for Public Integrity, no-bid contracts account for 40% of defense 
obligations from 1998-2004, averaging $150 billion per year. Subcontracts, of course, are not subject 




influences political demand, then the presence of defense facilities in more 
economically homogenous locations will influence 1) defense committee membership 
in the House of Representatives and 2) the distribution of defense procurement 
outlays from 1999-2005. I extend the scope of previous analyses by assessing the role 
of district reliance in the distribution of defense subcontracts.  
This time period of the study is appropriate for several reasons: The 106th, 
107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses capture periods of both divided and unified 
government, as well as a period of relative peace before the abrupt need to heighten 
national security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
addition, this time period also permits me to address concerns about congressional 
pork barreling in matters of defense and national security spending in the post 9-11 
context.120  
 
Dependent Variables  
To test my hypotheses, I created several dependent variables. First, I employ a 
dummy variable for defense committee membership to examine members’ incentives 
to procure defense dollars. Second, I examine defense allocations per district by 
utilizing two measures of prime contract awards: defense procurement dollars and the 
total number of defense contracts flowing to a district. Third, I gathered data on the 
number of defense subcontracts awarded per district.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The House of Representatives serves as the focal point (as opposed to the Senate or executive 
branch) because House districts create smaller units of analysis that offer a more precise measure of a 
highly concentrated industrial sector than do states. A senator from California is less likely to respond 
to economic pressures concentrated in Antelope Valley (a Los Angeles county that has become a major 
site for air force contracting) than a Congress member with a constituency comprised of more than 





Defense committee membership:  To collect information on defense 
committees, I consulted the Congressional Directory and included a dummy variable 
coded “1” if a House member belongs to a defense committee in the 106th-109th 
congresses and “0” to indicate that a member does not belong to a defense committee. 
Defense committees include the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the Armed 
Services Committee, and the Select Subcommittee on Technical & Tactical 
Intelligence.121  
Prime Contracts Allocations: Aggregating prime contract data is relatively 
easy. Unfortunately, data limitations on subcontracting and defense industry locations 
render it prohibitively difficult to account for every contractor that receives federal 
defense dollars within the context of this study. However, data on six top corporations 
account for a preponderance of the total defense procurement and R&D budget. 
Accessing the Federal Procurement Data System (www.fpds.gov), I gathered data on 
prime defense contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman, General Dynamics and SAIC from 2000-2005, and transformed the data to 
the district level for each relevant congressional term.122 This includes the top five 
defense companies measured by both defense contract dollars and total annual 
revenue, according to Washington Technology and Source Watch. Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC)—ranked the #8 U.S. defense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The Select Subcommittee on Technical & Tactical Intelligence is part of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The subcommittee is included in the dataset because it is 
responsible for making recommendations on military operations, weapons programs, and 
communications systems, as well as producing an annual intelligence authorization bill (and classified 
budget schedule) for all elements of the intelligence community.  
122 The model focuses on the 50 states, excluding foreign nations, and non-state entities (e.g., 




company—is also included to account for a top intelligence industry that receives a 
higher percentage of contracts through a competitive bidding processes than other top 
defense corporations.123 These six defense companies employ at least 600,000 people 
and collectively account for 54.3% of the total defense contract dollars spent on 
procurements and R&D (based on 2003 data).124 (Information on prime contract 
allocations will be made available from the author upon request.)  
 Subcontract Allocations: Collecting information on subcontracts proved much 
more challenging. Information recently made available on the Federal Procurement 
Data System includes the ‘principal place of performance’—or the primary location 
in which a contracted weapon system is built—identifying one major contract benefit 
distributed after the primary contract arrangement.  While the FPDS provides 
information on secondary contract distributions, or subcontracts, the data are 
classified by city. Broad city-level data are not particularly suitable for more 
specified, district-level variables. In order to compensate for this problem, I coded 
4,482 principal locations in the years 1999-2000 and 2005, utilizing both 
congressional district atlases and the Geographic Information System (GIS) software. 
This method accounts for 98% of all principal locations in the relevant years 
(4482/4581), allowing for a preliminary assessment of subcontract benefits in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Several journalists have suggested that SAIC “exploits conflicts of interests in Washington” by 
hiring top federal officials (see Barlett & Steele 2007.) Nonetheless, nearly 75% of SAIC’s defense 
contracting dollars result from full and open processes, as opposed to 6.3% that are privately 
negotiated (based on 1998-2003 data). Compare 39.3 % of contracting dollars resulting from full and 
open competition in overall Department of Defense Contracts FY2003, available at 
www.fedspending.org.)  
124 The FY2003 defense budget for $355.4 billion allocated $122.2 billion for procurement and 
research and development expenditures. Of this $122.2 billion, Lockheed Martin, Boeing Company, 
Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics and Science Applications International accrued 
$66.447 billion, or 54.38%. (For employment and total contracting data, refer to sec.gov, 




106th and the 109th congresses.125 (Defense subcontracting data will be made available 
upon request from the author.)   
 
 Explanatory Variables  
Economic reliance: Applying the measure of economic reliance on the 
defense sector described in Chapter 3, I employed the interaction term 
(density*facilities) combining the number of defense facilities per district and 
population density per square mile.  
Defense Facilities: To create a measure for defense facilities, I extended my 
dataset on the nationwide locations of leading 1990s defense firms referenced in 
Chapter 3. To do so, I collected and compiled data on the nation-wide locations of the 
six major 2006 defense contractors noted above.126 I consulted company and third 
party websites as well as corporate tax reports and other Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings from 1999 - 2006. The large number of defense-sector 
mergers throughout the 1990s streamlining process suggests that this technique 
should yield a relatively accurate portrayal of the national defense sector composition 
(U.S. GAO 1997a). These search devices yield 1,063 defense facilities spread across 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 While hand coding helped narrow the number of potentially relevant districts per location, the 
method does not entirely obviate the problem of multiple districts spread across city limits. When I 
could not determine which specific district a primary location falls within, I coded each potentially 
relevant district for the same project location. This over-includes more urban areas that fall across 
multiple districts. However, if anything, this stacks the model against the theory of economic 
dependence in districts with more homogenous industrial composition. Despite this problem, the 
measure nonetheless lends important insight on a crucial—and previously underemphasized—stage of 
the defense contracting process. 
126 Primary sources accessed include: SEC EDGAR Database Archives 
(http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml); Vault Companies (http://www.vault.com/wps/portal/na/companies); 
Washington Technology, Top 100 Government IT Contractors 
(http://washingtontechnology.com/toplists/top-100-lists/2007.aspx); Reaching Critical Will, The 





all 50 states.127 Each industry is cross-checked using Google mapping tools and 
referenced by city location and zip code. The data are transformed to the 
congressional district level using GIS software, accounting for redistricting plans in 
each Congress. The variable is coded based on the number of facilities per district.128 
(Details on defense facilities are available from the author upon request.) 
Population Density: Following the criteria set forth in Chapter 3, I apply a 
measure of population density per square mile to capture the influence of economic 
dependence. I measure district-wide population density by calculating population 
divided by district area per square mile. Population density serves as the foundation 
for U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of urbanization and for the USDA Rural-Urban 
continuum codes. A rural district with a large number of defense facilities is likely to 
have a far less diverse economy and therefore to be more economically dependent on 
defense expenditures than an urban district with an equal number of facilities.  
 
Control Variables  
Headquarters: Previous research finds that prime defense contracts often 
channel to locations with corporate headquarters (Markuson et al. 1991). To control 
for expected, nonpolitical distributions, a count variable capturing the number of 
defense industry headquarters in a district controls for these possible allocations.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 While defense facilities vary in size and employment, reporting requirements for 10K reports at the 
SEC allowed me to distinguish “major facilities” based on area per square mile. This variable did not 
add any explanatory power to the analysis and was dropped from the models.  
128 Reliance on a static measure of a district’s economic structure over a seven-year period is alleviated 
by the fact that defense employment levels--a product high investments in industry sites and past 
Defense Department decisions--ought to remain relatively stable over short increments of time. See 





Gunbelt: Markuson et al. (1991) analyze geographic effects by focusing on 
the impact of defense decisions on different regions of the United States. The authors 
find that the ‘Gunbelt’—New England, South Atlantic, East and West South Central, 
Mountain, and Pacific divisions—experienced increases in revenue and gross 
industrial capacity in the decades following World War II. East and West North 
Central suffered substantial per capita losses (12).129 The model controls for this 
regional pattern, with districts in ‘Gunbelt’ states coded “1” and districts in other 
states coded “0”.  
Defense committee membership: Members’ positions on defense committees 
are also likely to affect the distribution of defense contracts. Accordingly, a dummy 
variable indicating defense committee membership is included as both a dependent 
and independent variable.  
Defense committee leadership: A dummy variable for leadership on defense 
committees signifies the presence of defense committee and subcommittee chairs. 
The variable is coded “1” for defense committee leaders and “0” for other members.   
Ideology: Poole & Rosenthal’s (1991) DW-Nominate scores serve as a proxy 
for legislators’ predisposed preferences or ideological leanings in the examination of 
members’ incentives to join defense committees. The variable captures members’ 
aggregated voting behavior and controls for a mix of individual and constituency 
pressures that may result in greater conservatism in more rural areas.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 In Census Bureau terms, West North Central consists of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota. East North Central comprises the Rustbelt, or Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin. (All other states are included in the Gunbelt region, consistent with Markuson’s 





Party: Finally, the model includes a variable assessing the influence of 
partisanship on defense contract allocations (coded “1” for Republican and “0” for 
Democrat).  
 
Average Distribution of Defense Allocations & Facilities 
The table of descriptive statistics located in Appendix 4.1 provides 
information the mean, standard deviation, and distribution of the variables under 
study (1st, 5th and 9th deciles). An initial look at the average distribution of defense 
contracts across congressional districts confirms that prime contact allocations are 
heavily restricted. Indeed, the preponderance of congressional districts do not receive 
any prime defense contract benefits at all, and the bulk of these distributions 
concentrate in 10% of congressional districts (5th decile=0 dollars, 0 contracts; 9th 
decile=$336 million, 48 contracts; max=$17.6 billion, 862 contracts). While 
subcontracting allocations are also somewhat skewed, these data nonetheless reveal 
much wider distributions across districts, more in line with the overall composition of 
defense facilities (5th decile=1 subcontract; 1 facility, 9th decile=10 subcontracts, 7 
facilities; maximum=54 subcontracts, 47 facilities).  
The average distributions of the data cross-validate research on the gunbelt 
regions of the South and West (Markuson et al., 1991). On average, districts within 
gunbelt states receive over three times more prime contract revenue (µ=$205 million 
in gunbelt districts, µ=$63.4 million in other districts), more than twice as many 
prime contract awards (µ=20.93, µ=8.36), and more than two times as many 




Given the Republican Party’s recent efforts to label itself as “pro-defense,” it 
is also interesting to note partisan differences in the distribution of defense-dependent 
districts. Although the average distribution of defense facilities are spread relatively 
equally across Republican and Democratic districts (µ=2.50 Republican, µ=2.38 
Democrat), Republicans typically represent more rural areas with defense facilities 
(µ=2.01) than do Democrats (µ=1.18).  
The table in Appendix 4.2 lists the 20% most economically reliant 
congressional districts in the 109th Congress (83/435 districts). Economic reliance 
captures the number of defense facilities in a district conditioned by district-wide 
population density. Utilizing this measure, districts that experience excessive 
localized dependence on the defense industry span 36 states and cut across regions, 
offering important nuances to scholarship on regional trends in defense sector 
development. For example, Jim Ryun (R-KS, 2), Jerry Costello (D-IL, 17) and Dave 
Hobson (R-OH, 7) all represent constituencies that rely on defense funds, although 
these Midwestern regions are not typically associated with defense production.130 
Corresponding with the descriptive statistics in Appendix 1, Republicans represent 
two-thirds of districts that rely most heavily on the defense sector of the economy, 
reinforcing the party’s “pro-defense” stance. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Other districts that experience disproportionate reliance on defense dollars include: Bud Cramer (D-
AL, 5), Jim Marshall (D-GA, 3) and Gene Taylor (D-MS, 4) in the South; Heather Wilson (R-NM, 1) 
and Joel Hefley (R-CO, 5) (subsequently succeed by Doug Lamborn) in the South West and West 
South Central; Buck McKeon (R-CA, 25) and Norm Dicks (D-WA, 6) in the Pacific region; and 





Modeling Patterns in Defense Committee Membership & Defense Allocations 
Systematic statistical analysis offers a more refined analysis of these patterns, 
controlling for a number of factors that are likely to affect defense committee 
membership and contract distributions. The analysis of defense committee 
membership employs a dummy measure as the dependent variable. Therefore, the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption of uniform distribution of variance is 
violated. Logistic regression maximizes the likelihood of observing a given 
distribution of the probability of a defense committee assignment based on a district’s 
economic reliance on the defense sector.  
Multiple regression permits an examination of the distribution of primary 
contract dollars across congressional districts. However, the number of prime 
contracts awarded per district and the number of subcontracts received are counts. As 
count variables, these distributions are highly skewed, with the majority of the 
congressional districts receiving no prime contract awards and more than one-third of 
districts receiving no subcontracts (see Appendix 4.1). OLS regression is not 
appropriate because the data are not normally distributed. Instead, I use negative 
binomial regression to assess these measures across each separate Congress.131    
As stated, the theory that economic reliance motivates policy outcomes can be 
expressed with the interaction term combining geographic composition and a large 
defense sector presence (density*facilities). The theory of disproportionate economic 
reliance places emphasis on the interactive component (facilities), which measures 
the effect of defense facilities when population density is equal to zero (Brambor et 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 I use negative binomial regression instead of Poisson regression to account for over-dispersion in 




al. 2006).132 While this variable captures important conditional effects of facilities 
and low density, population density is never equal to zero in any populated area. For 
more meaningful interpretation, I present the conditional effects of defense facilities 
at high and low levels of density. This allows me to assess the effect of density 
holding the number of district-wide defense facilities constant at its sample mean 
(King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003). This method also provides a reasonable control 
for a district’s economic specialization as a defense supplier.  
 
The Role of Economic Reliance in Congressional Processes  
 
Table 4.1 displays the difference between the predicted probabilities of 
defense committee membership when population density changes from its first decile 
(10% value) to its 9th decile (90% value), given an equal number of defense facilities. 
The model sets the number of defense facilities at its sample mean and holds all other 
control variables constant at their respective means (see Appendix 4.1). (The 
predicted probabilities associated with these control variables are located in a logit 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Unlike standard additive models, interactive models examine conditional relationships among the 
interactive coefficients.   Rather than operative as controls (set to a variable’s respective mean value), 
interactive coefficients display the affect of the variable when the other interactive coefficients are set 





Table 4.1: Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Congressional Defense Committee Membership in the 
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Note: Table 4.1 entries are calculated by the author from the logit analyses in Appendix 4.3 using CLARIFY.  
Entries are predicted probabilities and predicted changes in probabilities.  The standard errors of the predictions 
are in parentheses. The table shows the predicted influence of an increase in population density (from rural to 
urban) when defense facilities is set at its mean value. All control variables are held constant at their sample 
means.   
  
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed test), † (one-tailed test) 
 
With regard to Hypothesis 1, the results show that legislators from urban areas 
are less likely to join defense committees than those from rural areas. Given an equal 
defense capacity, and controlling for rural members’ more conservative leanings, a 
more sparsely populated, rural setting yields a 39% to 60% increased probability of 
observing defense committee representation than a more densely populated, urban 
location (p< .05). Figure 4.1 further illustrates the consistent pattern of 




displays the predicted values at increasing levels of population density given low, 
middle, and high numbers of defense facilities in a district.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Defense Committee Membership, 
2005 
Note: Figure 4.1 displays expected values calculated by the author from the logit analysis in 
Appendix 4.3 using CLARIFY. The figure denotes an increase in population density given 
low, middle and high numbers of defense facilities in a district. All control variables are held 
constant at their sample means.  
 
As documented in Figure 4.1, given an equal number of defense facilities, 
defense committees draw members of Congress from more rural areas at 
disproportionately greater rates than representatives from highly urbanized areas. In 
line with economics literature that links urban density and economic diversity, the 
figure suggests that the size and diversity of a local economy consistently conditions 
members’ incentives to join defense committees. The presence of a single defense 
plant in localities with a population density below the mean yields a greater 
likelihood of observing a defense committee assignment than the existence of five 




members representing districts with five facilities and a population density below the 
mean exhibit a greater probability of joining a defense committee than representatives 
from densely urban districts that contain nine facilities—a disproportionately large 
defense capacity. As the theory of economic reliance predicts, members of Congress 
representing more rural constituencies with a highly concentrated defense sector 
presence exhibit the highest probability of joining defense committees—nearly 
70%—after controlling for other factors likely to influence these decisions.  
These findings suggest that the geographic composition of industry yields 
different ‘preference intensities’ (Hall 1996, 1987) among representatives that affect 
their incentives to join defense committees. Members who represent districts that are 
disproportionately reliant on the defense sector are considerably more likely to 
involve themselves in defense and national security policymaking than members from 
highly urban districts with more diverse economies. Controlling for differences in 
capacity to receive defense projects, the findings demonstrate that the economic 
under-development of a more rural constituency places a political premium on 
facilities that help keep the economy afloat. While more urban, industrially vibrant 
and high-income locations enjoy industrial capacity, the closing of large defense 
facilities in rural areas would cause greater damage to the local economy. The 
findings support the theory that disproportionate constituency dependence influences 







Primary Defense Procurement Allocations 
Table 4.2 displays the expected differences in the distribution of defense 
dollars and projects when population density changes from the 1st decile (rural) to 9th 
decile (urban). The number of defense facilities in a district and the locations of 
defense industry headquarters offer a reasonable proxy for economic specialization 
and expected non-political distributions. These variables are set to their respective 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 I report both the full model and a condensed model in Appendix 4.4 in order to account for 
multicollinearity.  The interaction term (density*facilities) yields a negative coefficient, suggesting that 
more urban districts with a large defense presence are less likely to receive prime defense contracts 
than other districts (p<.05). However, as the condensed model demonstrates, the variable takes the 
expected, positive direction when headquarters is dropped from the model (p< .10). As headquarter 
locations are correlated with defense facilities in densely populated areas (Pearson’s r= .63), it is 
reasonable to assume that multicollinearity helps explain the negative coefficient in the full model. All 





Table 4.2: Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Primary Defense Procurement Dollars (millions) and 
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Note: Table 4.2 entries are calculated by the author from the regression analyses in Appendix 4.4 & 4.5 using 
CLARIFY.  
Entries are predicted probabilities and predicted changes in probabilities. The standard errors of the predictions 
are in parentheses. The table shows the predicted influence of an increase in population density (from rural to 
urban) when defense facilities is set at its mean value. All control variables are held constant at their sample 
means.   
 ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed test), † (one-tailed test) 
 
In reference to Hypothesis 2, the findings in Table 4.2 show mixed support for 
the role of economic reliance in the distribution of prime contract dollars. In the 109th 
Congress, more sparsely populated rural districts yielded 37% more prime contract 
revenue than urban districts with an equal number of defense facilities—an expected 
difference of $51.9 million when population density changes from a highly rural to 
urban value (p<.05). While the expected differences are all in the anticipated 




statistically meaningful levels in the previous congressional terms examined. Rather, 
these distributions consistently funnel to headquarter locations (see Appendix 4.4).  
Assessing the number of primary procurements awarded per district—as 
opposed to the money funneling into these districts—offers similarly time-bound 
support for prime contracts flowing to more reliant districts. Given an equal defense 
capacity, more rural localities received 45% more prime contract assignments in the 
108th and 109th Congresses (p<.05, one-tailed test). However, changes in density 
alone do not affect the number of defense contracts allocated to a district within the 
previous two congressional terms examined. Figure 4.2 displays expected values for 
the number of contracts received as population density increases in the first session of 
the 109th Congress. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Defense Contract Allocations, 2005  
Note: Figure 4.2 displays expected values calculated by the author from the negative binomial 
regression in Appendix 4.5 using CLARIFY. The figure denotes an increase in population density 
given low, middle and high numbers of defense facilities in a district. All control variables are held 
constant at their sample means. (The number of defense facilities per district is set to lower numbers 
than in Figures 4.1 & 4.3 because the predicted values for prime contract allocations do not reach 





Holding headquarter locations and other control variables constant at their 
sample means, more rural areas received greater numbers of prime contract awards 
than densely populated districts with an equal defense presence. Like defense 
committee assignments, defense distributions advantaged more economically reliant 
districts during the 109th congressional term. This time period is relevant because it 
immediately follows U.S. entrance into the Iraq war, which spurred considerable 
increases in defense spending. Indeed, defense committee status also took on a 
positive, statistically meaningful value in the distribution of defense dollars and 
projects in the 108th – 109th congressional terms, during the Iraq war (p<.05, 
Appendix 4.4 – 4.5). As defense committees generally draw members from more 
economically reliant districts (see Table 4.1), it is also reasonable to assume that 
district dependence captures some of the same variance. 
Non-political factors—defense headquarter locations—consistently drive the 
distribution of prime defense contracts. However, the findings also provide some 
time-bound support for the inference that benefits flow disproportionately to more 
economically dependent districts.  
 
Defense Subcontract Allocations  
The theory of disproportionate economic demand suggests that more rural 
districts will receive a greater number of subcontracts or major secondary 
assignments than more urban (and less reliant) districts. The prevalence of cost-plus 




profit—reduces any incentives to subcontract to more rural areas in order to reduce 
overhead costs.  
Table 4.3 displays the differences between the expected value of subcontract 
assignments when population density increases from its 1st to 9th deciles in the 106th 
and 109th Congresses and defense facilities is set to its sample mean. Committee 
influence is also measured by examining changes in expected values when a 
member’s committee status changes from a non-defense assignment to a defense 
assignment. The model holds other control variables constant at their means.  (Refer 
to the negative binomial regression analysis in Appendix 4.6 for the predicted rates 

















Table 4.3: Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance & Defense Committee Membership on the Defense 
Subcontract Locations in the 106th – 109th Congresses* (1999-2005) (n=435) 
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Note: Table 4.3 entries are calculated by the author from the negative binomial regression analyses in Appendix 
4.6 using CLARIFY.  
Entries expected values and predicted changes in expected values.  The standard errors of the predictions are in 
parentheses. The table shows the predicted influence of an increase in population density (from rural to urban) 
when defense facilities is set at its mean value.  All control variables are held constant at their sample means.    
 
*Subcontract locations refer to the primary place of performance, or the location where most of the contract work 






Consistent with Hypothesis 2, rural constituencies receive a disproportionately 
greater number of major subcontract assignments than their more urban counterparts 
do. Given an equal number of defense facilities, rural districts receive 40% to 51% 




(p< .001). While an expected difference of 1.38 more subcontracts in rural areas than 
urban localities may appear minor, the substantive effect of this change often signifies 
millions of dollars flowing to more rural localities with an equal defense presence 
(p<.001, 106th Congress).  It is reasonable to assume that this difference is meaningful 
for the preponderance of districts that receive between 1 and 10 subcontracts 
annually, on average (see Appendix 4.1). Indeed, these findings suggest that 
subcontracts are allocated to maximize economic benefits in rural localities, which 
depend on these dollars to sustain their local economies. The graph displayed in 
Figure 2 shows expected values of the number of subcontracts received as population 
density increases, given low, middle and high numbers of defense facilities.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Estimated Influence of Economic Reliance on Defense Subcontract Allocations, 2005 
Note: Figure 4.3 displays expected values calculated by the author from the negative binomial 
regression in Appendix 4.6 using CLARIFY. The figure denotes an increase in population density 
given low, middle and high numbers of defense facilities in a district. All control variables are held 





The results are striking. As expected, rural districts exhibit greater numbers of 
expected subcontracts than densely urban areas with an equal number of defense 
facilities. The curvilinear trend exhibits steep slopes at lower levels of density, which 
consistently level off in dense, urban areas (around the 9th decile) and assume a more 
linear trajectory. However, unlike defense committee assignments and prime contract 
distributions, districts with higher levels of population density (above the 9th decile) 
typically receive the lowest levels of expected subcontract projects regardless of the 
number of defense facilities. Indeed, a rural locality with a large defense sector is 
expected to secure five times as many subcontracts as an urban district with an equal 
number of defense facilities and comparable specialization as a defense supplier. 
Furthermore, a rural area with a single defense industry is estimated to receive at least 
as many subcontracts as a densely urban district with nine defense facilities!  
The results suggest that for densely urban areas, specialization does not weigh 
heavily in the allocation of defense subcontracts. However, more rural localities with 
defense facilities—not simply sparse, rural areas—are disproportionate subcontract 
recipients. This finding does not invalidate conventional wisdom that prime 
contractors distribute projects locally and carry them out in-house; however, it does 
indicate the additional role of economic reliance in the distribution of major defense 
benefits. Highly urbanized cities with more diverse economies are less reliant on 
these projects and thus less attractive candidates from a political standpoint.  Rural 
and urban areas with equal defense capacity are unequal recipients in the 




Furthermore, members of defense committees draw greater levels of 
secondary benefits for their constituencies than other House members. Districts with 
defense committee representation yield 70% and 72% more subcontracts—an 
estimated 4.25 to 3.84 more projects (p<.001)—than other districts in the 106th and 
109th Congresses, respectively (p<.001). For more reliant constituencies, committee 
representation magnifies the economic role of defense subcontracting. While 
industrial capacity is a necessary factor in defense contracting, a district’s reliance on 
defense contracting, as well as its representation on defense committees, have greater 
effects on subcontract allocations than industrial capacity alone. The results show that 
a district’s economic dependence on defense dollars is an important factor in the 





In 2005, Representative Buck McKeon (R-CA, 25th District) of the Armed 
Services committee and Air and Land Forces subcommittee oversaw $1,099,480,365 
and 50 defense contract projects directed to his constituency in the Antelope Valley 
region. In addition, contractors for Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon 
Company, and SAIC targeted the district for 27 major subcontracts. The aerospace 
and defense industry in Antelope Valley, California employ over 20,000 residents, or 
approximately 40% of the labor force.  On his web page, Rep. McKeon publicizes his 
success procuring district projects for the B-2 Stealth Bomber, modifications to the B-
1B Bomber, the F-117 Stealth Fighter, and the development of the military’s ‘new 




the Lockheed Martin, Boeing and General Dynamics facilities that are scattered 
throughout the economically diverse Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale metropolitan area are 
further from Representative Flake’s political radar. In 2005, Rep. Flake prioritized 
eliminating earmarks from the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill134 rather than 
seeking defense projects for his constituency.135 
This study moves beyond anecdotal accounts by providing systematic 
evidence of the importance of a district’s dependence on defense spending. Economic 
dependence in more rural areas encourages political representatives to join defense 
committees, controlling for apolitical considerations in defense spending by holding 
the number of district-wide defense facilities constant. Representation on defense 
committees and rural geography, in turn, each draw subcontracts at a rate 
disproportionate to the number of defense facilities in these areas. While detailed 
information on the subcontracting process remains largely unavailable, this evidence 
is consistent with the theory that the defense industry gains politically by extending 
major assignments to more dependent, rural districts, even while prime contract 
revenue generally remains concentrated.  
Previous academic work on the distributive politics of defense spending has 
missed these patterns for two reasons: First, scholars have not accounted for the effect 
of a district’s economic reliance on defense spending. Second, research has focused 
only on the allocations of prime defense contracts, which are merely precursors to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 On his website, Representative Flake expresses his commitment to cutting federal spending levels 
and the need for tax relief, sought through a campaign to reform legislative earmarks (Flake 2005, 
April 20).   
135 In 2005, R. Flake’s 6th district of Arizona received no prime contracts from the six companies under 




subsequent dissemination. By probing more deeply into the defense contracting 
process, this study uncovers evidence that the degree to which defense procurement 
policies receive priority among individual House members varies according to the 
economic composition of a district.  
The U.S. defense industry is spread across 50 states, present in the majority of 
congressional districts, and generates hundreds of billions of dollars per year. While 
this study does not provide evidence that key members directly influence contracting 
processes, it is clear that the defense industry plays a critical role in the allocation of 
subcontracts. The use of private negotiations between contractors, top defense 
bureaucrats, and defense industry management—as opposed to an open, competitive 
bidding process—allow contractors to prioritize the distribution of benefits in contract 
arrangements to maximize the chances for program funding (Higgs 2006; Arnold 
1979, 6-7). If the Lockheed Martin corporate headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland 
receives a multi-million dollar defense contract award, then the relevant directors 
enjoy great discretion in assigning various parts of the project locally, to another 
Lockheed Martin facility, or subcontracting out to another company.  
The results of this analysis suggests a symbiotic relationship among key 
players, where spreading substantial defense benefits across multiple districts 
increases political demand for weapons systems among Congress members and 
sustains rural economies that are reliant on the defense industry. Defense 
subcontracting helps meet districts’ economic needs for employment and local 
economic development, which in turn generates greater political demand for weapons 




strategic requirements. They also bias defense contract allocations, channeling them 




Chapter 5: You and Whose Army? How Congressional Defense 
Spending Shapes Presidential War Powers 
 
 
“Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe 
judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.”  
–James Madison, 1793 (in Frisch ed. 2007, 62) 
 
"When I moved those forces [into the Persian Gulf] I didn't have to ask 
Senator Kennedy or some liberal Democrat whether we were going to do it. We just 
did it." –George H.W. Bush, 1992136  
 
On August 2, 1990, President H.W. Bush denounced the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait as an act of intolerable aggression. On August 6, 1990 Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney publicized the U.S. commitment that the president had made to defend 
Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack by Iraq.  The administration claimed that the 
president did not need congressional approval before taking military action. Bush 
cited his constitutional authority, stating: “I have the right, as commander-in-chief, to 
fulfill my responsibilities, and I’m going to safeguard those executive powers” 
(quoted in DeConde et al., 2002, 215-216). On December 3, 1990, Secretary of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136Quoted in Dowd, Maureen. 1992. “The 1992 Campaign: Republicans; Immersing Himself in Nitty-






Defense Dick Cheney testified before the Armed Services Committee that: “I do not 
believe the President requires any additional authorization from the Congress before 
committing US forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf."137  Fifty-four legislators 
responded by filing a suit in federal court to prohibit the president from using force 
without congressional authorization. (The court overruled the suit as premature.) The 
president later gave in to pressure from advisors not to defy Congress, but to persuade 
it to go along with him.  
When President Bush requested approval in a letter to Congress in January 8, 
1991, many members extolled the restoration of their proper constitutional authority. 
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) rose to “commend President Bush for recognizing 
Congress’ constitutional role.”  House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante 
Fascell (D-Fl) marveled that “[the president] acknowledged the principle! ... This is 
very important. By specific language, Congress authorized the war!” House minority 
leader Robert Michel (R-Ill) remarked that, “The Constitution, the American people, 
and the cause of freedom have been well served.”  
Despite this display of congressional exuberance, the president never 
acknowledged that statutory authorization was constitutionally required to commit 
troops in military engagements. Rather, in a press conference on January 9—one day 
after the president requested approval from Congress—Bush said: “I don’t think I 
need [a congressional resolution]… I feel I have the authority to fully implement the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. 1990. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. 
Policy Options and Implications. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d 




United Nations Resolution [678]” (CQ Weekly Report, 1/12/91, p.71).138 Accordingly, 
several scholars conclude that he consistently stood by his earlier implications that the 
administration had the right to defy any restrictions that Congress might impose 
(Glennon 1991; Fisher 2004). 
 The Gulf War scenario fits historical patterns dating back to the end of World 
War II, in which presidents have not only engaged military forces without explicit 
authorization, but have also systematically claimed the constitutional authority to act 
unilaterally in matters of national security and foreign affairs (Sofaer 1976; Koh 
1990; Ely 1993; Adler & George (ed) 1996; Silverstein 1997; Schlesinger 2004; 
Fisher 2004).139 Yet, despite the precedent of executive prerogative that presidents 
have successively drawn upon, the events leading up to the Gulf War also illustrate 
congressional efforts to reassert its institutional role in the decision to go war.  
This analysis builds upon the work on congressional incentives in post-World 
War II defense spending to shed light on how a country founded on principles of 
shared war powers has over time enhanced the president’s ability to employ military 
force without congressional approval, and to what extent periodic spurs of 
congressional involvement can work to reverse this process. I theorize that the growth 
of the U.S. military establishment after World War II created overlapping institutional 
incentives to concentrate resources and authority over military affairs in the executive 
branch.  While proponents of executive unilateralism suggest that Congress’ control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Articles 42 & 43 of the U.N. Charter state the President’s negotiations with the Security Council are 
subject to the approval of Congress. Section 8a of the 1973 War Powers Resolution reaffirms 
Congress’ role by stipulating that the introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities is not to be inferred 
from any treaty in absence of additional authorizing legislation.   
139 The post-war era also coincides with the military’s growing preeminence in political and economic 




over funding decisions provides a sufficient constitutional check on the president 
(Yoo 2005), I argue that the rise of a permanent military industry minimizes 
Congress’ willingness and ability use this tool to limit executive actions. Rather, the 
persistence of a standing military arsenal and national security community have 
structured an environment in which members of Congress not only prioritize the 
growth of defense resources, but also find it inexpedient to withdraw expenditures in 
opposition to military engagements. This, in turn, enables presidents to draw upon an 
expanding pool of resources while structuring institutions to insulate their authority 
from ongoing legislative control.  
Recent scholarship demonstrates that political parties, not institutions, 
facilitate inter-governmental competition, restoring an episodic system of checks and 
balances (Howell & Pevehouse 2007; Levinson & Pildes 2006). Congressional 
majorities facing a president of the opposing party are more likely to heighten the 
political costs of the president’s military actions with increased oversight, public 
hearings, targeted budget cuts, and efforts to create negative publicity surrounding 
executive actions (Howell & Pevehouse 2007). At the same time, however, broader 
patterns of Congress’ military build-up and longstanding informational asymmetries 
also work to counteract members’ willingness and ability to prevent these actions 
altogether. 
The analysis unfolds in three parts: Part I draws upon previous scholarship 
and offers a structural argument for presidential advantage in military affairs. Parts II 
and III consider how congressional incentives to perpetuate weapons expenditures 




available military technology have both shaped the accumulation of presidential war 
powers in the post-World War II era. Despite moments of heightened congressional 
oversight, I argue that the lack of legislative incentive to curb military expenditures—
and insufficient oversight mechanisms independent of purse strings—facilitates an 
enhanced executive prerogative in military affairs.  
 
Institutional Structures & Presidential Advantage 
The office of the president has experienced dramatic changes throughout the 
course of American political development. Far from its nineteenth century status, 
twentieth century scholars have extolled the modern presidency as a potential savior 
(Rossiter 1960; Neustadt 1990); others have used less glorified terms, defining the 
office as “imperial” (Schlesinger 1973), “impossible” (Barger 1984), “tethered” 
(Franck 1981), “plebiscitary” (Lowi 1985), “preemptory” (Howell 2005) and as a 
“blunt disruptive force” (Skowronek 1993). Despite these mixed assessments, 
presidential scholars have almost universally acknowledged the modern rise of 
executive—and hence, presidential—power (but see Barger 1984).  
A cursory reading of executive powers listed in the Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution does not immediately anticipate the observations that contemporary 
scholars make. However, expansive presidential authority does in many ways reflect 
the institutional structure set forth in the U.S. Constitution. In 1788, Alexander 
Hamilton crafted an argument in support of a unitary executive equipped with the 
energy and flexibility required for effective governance (Federalist 70-71, in Rossiter 




powers reside with Congress—the framers did adopt a system that enables a single 
executive leader to govern within the bounds set by a (presumably) jealous Congress 
(Federalist 51, Rossiter, id).  
Consequently, although Article I gives Congress almost all of the enumerated 
powers over foreign affairs,140 and the powers allotted to the president are few in 
number and (at best) vaguely defined,141 both supporters and opponents of executive 
war powers recognize that the president is ideally structured to initiate foreign policy 
(Yoo 1999, 2005; Black 1980; Koh 1988). As early as 1793, Alexander Hamilton 
advanced a structural argument in support of expansive presidential power, as “the 
text and structure of the Constitution make the President the sole organ of intercourse 
between the United States and foreign nations” (Frisch ed. 2007). In 1835, French 
traveler Alexis de Tocqueville (2000 [1835], 123) observed that the president’s 
relative domestic weakness served as a contrast to his extensive authority over 
matters of foreign affairs, pointing out that, “A negotiation can scarcely be opened 
and followed fruitfully except by one man.” Indeed, presidents are uniquely equipped 
to initiate policy efficiently, flexibly, and (if necessary) secretly on behalf of a broad, 
national constituency. The structural view of presidential authority suggests that the 
Constitution assigns powers to a legislature that is unsuited to exercise them; this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Cl. 11-16 (delegating power to declare war; raise and support 
armies; provide and maintain a navy; regulate land and naval forces; call forth the militia; and provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia). Congress’ power to appropriate funds are also 
contained in Article I, Section 8, Cl.1, 2, and 5 (empowering Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts, and excises; borrow money on the credit of the United States; and to coin money and 
regulated its value).  
141 The commander-and-chief and take care clause are among the most frequently cited: U.S. 
Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Cl. 1 (“the president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and 
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states”); Article II, Section 3 (the president 




practical shortcoming led to the “flow of power from Congress to the presidency” 
(Black, quoted in Koh 1988; also see Mills 1956).  
Additional literature on the modern presidency focuses on the institutional 
resources that allow presidents to direct policy unilaterally. Two characteristics of the 
presidency are especially critical for unilateral policy-making. Each emerged during 
the course of American political development: First, presidents are uniquely situated 
as national party leaders (Whittington & Carpenter 2003)—a distinction that grants 
them considerable leverage in setting the national party agenda and determining its 
priorities (Lee 2008, on how presidents shape partisan behavior in Congress), and 
which allows presidents to appeal directly to the national public (Kernell 1992). 
Second, presidents can engage in autonomous policy innovation, issuing directives 
such as executive orders (Mayer & Price 2002; Howell 2003), executive agreements 
(Moe & Howell 1999), presidential signing statements, proclamations, and 
memoranda (Cooper 2001). Though seldom acknowledged, the establishment of the 
intelligence community in 1947 also enables presidents to deliver national security 
directives (NSDs)—unpublished notifications used to direct foreign, military, and 
intelligence policy (see U.S. GAO 1992; Cooper 2002; Gordon 2007). Presidential 
issuances all carry the weight of law without formal congressional endorsement.142  
The political construction of presidential resources is consistent with the 
energy and vigor that Hamilton eulogized, and which later scholars have 
characterized by a “drive for leadership that almost always motivates [presidents] to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Of course, presidents must justify these extra-constitutional actions based on some statutory, treaty, 
or constitutional basis. However, the ambiguity of Article II and the extensive body laws that 





promote the power of their institution” (Moe & Wilson 1994, 25). In isolation, 
though, a purely structural view of institutional politics depicts presidential authority 
as static; institutional structures presumptively operate independent of the geopolitical 
climate. Yet, mid-to-late twentieth-century presidents have made far more extensive 
uses of their unilateral resources than their predecessors and have amassed 
unprecedented levels of authority.  
While rising executive activity traces back to the federal bureaucracy that 
originated during the New Deal, a number of scholarly assessments also suggest that 
the growth of unilateral presidential policy-making is more directly related to the rise 
of the national security establishment. This trend is most clearly evident in matters 
concerning national security and foreign affairs. Since Truman referred to the Korean 
War as a “police action”, modern presidents have launched hundreds of military 
actions without first securing a formal congressional authorization (Fisher 2004). 
Indeed, since 1947, presidents have relied on national security directives (NSD’s) as a 
primary mechanism with which to coordinate the intelligence community and direct 
military and foreign policy. The use of NSD’s sidesteps congressional consultation, 
exacerbates information asymmetries and, as one analyst readily observes, “[poses] 
particular challenges to Congress and the courts to effectively constrain the 
president’s unilateral powers” (Gordon 2007, 359).  
According to one researcher’s estimates, presidents issued at least 1,790 
(publicly known) national security directives between the Kennedy and Bush II 




using GAO and FAS figures).143 Presidents have invoked NSD’s to direct war 
strategies in Vietnam (Nixon, NSD 24) and Cambodia (Nixon, NSD 29), circumvent 
congressional restrictions on foreign arms sales (Reagan, NSD 17), implement a 
Persian Gulf security framework (Bush I, NSD 26, 45), and direct policy toward 
‘rogue’ nations such as Egypt and Syria (Kennedy, NSD 105).144  
The use of presidential signing statements—official documents in which a 
president lays out his legal interpretation of a bill for the federal bureaucracy to 
follow—formally dates back to 1822.145 However, only recently have presidents 
issued statements claiming the authority to ignore congressional legislation. President 
Reagan was first to assert the authority to disregard legislation undercutting the 
constitutional provisions that direct the president to “supervise the unitary executive 
branch.” George H. W. Bush repeated this precedent several times. Most recently, 
George W. Bush, citing his authority as commander-in-chief, has declared that he can 
ignore any act of Congress that seeks to regulate the military. Specifically, Bush has 
issued signing statements declaring his authority to ignore legislation that restricts 
U.S. troops engagements in Columbia; to bypass laws requiring him to inform 
Congress before diverting money from authorized account to a covert operation; and 
to disregard statutes forbidding the military from using intelligence that was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 According to 1988 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates, approximately 23% 
of NSD’s issued since 1961 had by 1988 been declassified. Approximately 54% of declassified NSD’s 
categorize as “significant” (as opposed to nominal) based on the author’s reading of every available 
directive (Gordon 2007, 365). 
144 See the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy for a list of declassified 
directives. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm Published volumes on the Truman 
through Nixon-Ford administrations are published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the 
Historian in the U.S. Department of State. Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/c1716.htm 





“lawfully collected”, including information gathered in violation of Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches (see Savage 2006).  
 In the domestic realm, patterns of presidential policy-making yield parallel 
developments.  During the first 150 years of the nation’s history, treaties (which 
require Senate ratification) regularly outnumbered executive agreements (which do 
not); since World War II, presidents have signed roughly ten executive agreements 
for every treaty submitted to Congress (Moe & Howell 1999). Though the total 
number of executive orders has declined since the New Deal, presidents issued almost 
four times as many “significant” executive orders in the latter half of the twentieth 
century than they did in the former (Howell 2005).  
While institutional structures encourage presidents to initiate policies that 
advance the administration’s agenda and augment their leadership capabilities, it is 
only after World War II that the domestic and geopolitical climate have encouraged 
the ongoing proliferation of resources that allow presidents to fully seize upon this 
initiative—especially in matters of national security. Indeed, since World War II, 
presidents have controlled a permanent weapons arsenal, national security apparatus, 
and permanent standing armies. They have further enhanced their authority by 
construing existing laws designed to constrain their actions as authorizations and 
structuring the intelligence community to centralize and insulate their authority over 
military decisions (see Koh 1988; Trask 1997). 
Congress is poorly structured for such initiative, largely because of its ties to 
local constituencies, competing interests, and bicameralism. Congress is a collective 




(Mayhew 1974). Structural arrangements tend to debilitate individual members’ 
willingness and ability to effectively safeguard its institutional prerogative (Olson 
1971). Indeed, Congress can only make decisions through the laborious aggregation 
of member interests and preferences, and when it does, “congressional penchant for 
blunt, simple action” (Mayhew 1974, 126) often renders legislative outcomes 
insufficiently sensitive to complex problems. While party leadership does impose 
some control over member behavior, party lesaders are still notoriously weak 
compared to their executive counterparts. Moreover, congressional structures 
reinforce this weakness: “Good leadership means promoting the reelection prospects 
of members by decentralizing authority, expanding their opportunities to serve special 
interests, and giving them the freedom to vote their constituencies” (quoting Moe & 
Wilson 1994, 25; also see Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989).  
The dubious success of major congressional reforms designed to check the 
president’s war powers underscores this institutional disparity. The Senate Church 
Committee and House Pike Committee formed to oversee intelligence activity in 
1975, following a period of widespread congressional deference to presidential 
control over military engagements and foreign affairs from the 1940s through 1960s 
(Smist 1994; Trask 1997).146 The trigger for congressional participation occurred in 
response to the CIA-sponsored domestic wiretapping,147 President Nixon’s Watergate 
break-ins, withdrawal from the unpopular war in Vietnam, and the CIA’s active role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Prior to the early 1970s, congressional interest arose only when embarrassing incidents occurred, 
such as when the Soviet Union shot down a U2 spy plane in 1960 or after the Bay of Pigs, when a 
CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles failed.  
147 On December 22, 1974, journalist Seymour Hirsch broke a front-page report on illegal domestic 




in the overthrow of Salvador Allende, a popularly elected Chilean leader. The Church 
Committee investigated and reported on FBI and CIA-sponsored domestic 
surveillance activity, covert actions abroad, and U.S. counterintelligence.   
In the height of this congressional reform movement, Congress passed what is 
acknowledged as the ambitious foreign affairs legislation following Vietnam—the 
1973 War Powers Resolution.148 Passed by a Democratic Congress over Nixon’s 
veto, the Resolution was designed to impose a check on the executive by requiring 
that the president notify Congress within 60 days of executive troop deployment. The 
Resolution has been criticized on a host of counts: it not only implicitly suggests that 
the president can independently deploy troops and direct their activities for 60 days, 
but the language also invites the executive to exploit various loopholes in its reporting 
requirements.149 Subsequently, presidents have continued to introduce U.S. armed 
forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without legislative 
authorization (Grimmett 2004a).150 While scholars have pointed to “faulty 
draftsmanship” as a basis for presidential discretion in reporting requirements (Koh 
1988), questionable wording simply reinforces the lack of congressional incentive to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Public Law 93-148 [H.J.Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, passed over President Nixon’s veto November 7, 
1973.  
149 The Resolution states that the president must only consult Congress only “in every possible 
instance,” fails to specify how many members must be notified or how far in advance, and permits the 
president to submit three types of reports—when U.S. armed forces are introduced “into hostilities” or 
imminent hostilities; into foreign territories, airspace, or waters designed for combat; or in numbers 
that substantially enlarge a combat unit. The law’s 60-day clock for removing troops from combat runs 
only from the date that a report is submitted regarding moving troops in “hostilities” pursuant to 
section 4(a)(1), and not when one of the other two types of reports are filed (see 50 U.S.C. Section 
1543(a)-(c), 1544(b)). 
150 In fact, presidents have cited section 4(a)(1) (the provision triggering the 60-day clock) on only one 
occasion—following President Ford’s order to the armed forces to retake the Mayaguez, a U.S. vessel 
seized by Cambodia—and by the time the action was reported, it was virtually over. See Law Library 
of Congress, War Powers. Accessed at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.html (last updated 




impose stronger language and absence of institutional resources with which to back it 
up.  
Congress later passed the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act (S. Res. 400) 
requiring “timely” notice of covert military or intelligence activities overseas to 
permanent select standing committees. However, one of the strongest congressional 
attempts at curtailing a large-scale covert action program simply forced the 
intelligence community to implement its program underground: In 1982, a 
Democratic Congress passed a series of amendments aimed at curtailing the Reagan 
administration’s support for the Contras, collectively known as the Boland 
Amendments (named after R. Boland (D-MA), their prime sponsor). Despite the 
broad, inclusive wording in the prohibitory legislation that Congress had passed,151 
the National Security Council had the resources and institutional mechanisms with 
which to draw on CIA operatives in Nicaragua while seeking finances for the Contras 
from friendly governments, including illicit transactions with Iran.152 A 1993 report 
by the Intelligence Oversight Board also suggests a broader trend of non-compliance 
among CIA and NSC leadership with congressional notification requirements 
pursuant to the 1980 Act.153 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 The 1984, P.L. 98-143 barred all military and covert assistance to the Contras by the CIA, DoD “or 
any other agency of entity involved in U.S. intelligence activities…for the purpose or which would 
have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua…”  
152 For comprehensive documentation of the Iran-Contra events, see National Security Archive, “The 
Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years Later,” Electronic Briefing Book No. 210, posted November 24, 2006. 
Also see Fisher (1989) for an account of President Reagan’s efforts to circumvent Congress’ explicit 
withholding of funds by seeking money from private parties and friendly foreign governments to 
finance the Nicaraguan Contras.  
153 U.S. Executive Office, Intelligence Oversight Board, “Report on the Guatemala Review,” June 29, 





Following the Cold War, President Clinton introduced U.S. forces into an air 
war in Bosnia without congressional authorization, and later, unilaterally committed 
forces in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo. The president’s latter action led 
Republican members of Congress to file a suit in the Federal District Court arguing 
that the President was violating the War Powers Resolution by introducing military 
forces without congressional authorization. (The court dismissed for lack of 
standing.)154 Although the Republican-controlled Congress introduced a flurry of 
legislation aiming to limit or cut off funds for Kosovo operations and the continuing 
air war over the former Yugoslavia, most measures failed by narrow margins. Instead, 
despite many members’ expressed opposition, Congress provided an emergency 
supplemental appropriations bill in FY1999 providing billion of dollars in funding for 
the existing Kosovo operations (Grimmett 2004b).155  
Many scholars have addressed the ways in which structural disparities create 
internal pressures among legislators to delegate, condone, or acquiesce to executive 
leadership in order to address national threats—at least until the administration abuses 
or mismanages its authority (Smist 1994; McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; Silverstein 
1997; Koh 1988) or a majority of Congress finds partisan incentives to call attention 
to executive missteps (Howell & Pevehouse 2007). Still, despite political scandals, 
unpopular wars, and intermittent periods of divided government, the geopolitical 
climate of the Cold War (followed shortly after by the ‘war on terror’) has facilitated 
tremendous complicity between Congress and the executive branch during periods of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Campbell v Clinton, 52 F. supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999) 
155 Although the House and Senate had both passed measures calling for U.S. support in the Bosnia 




both heightened security and unified government. This environment lends to the 
“explosive constitutional authority of the president…[which in turn] encourages 
legislative and judicial deference to apparent presidential prerogatives” (Whittington 
& Carpenter 2003, 499).  
As the next section demonstrates, congressional incentives to increase 
executive authority in matters over national security coincide with the efforts of key 
members to perpetuate military appropriations. These political incentives prevent 
Congress from mounting an effective defense against presidential encroachment—
despite episodic periods of heightened oversight activity and statutory reform.  
 
Enhancing Executive Resources: Defense Procurement Expenditures  
To what extent can Congress check the executive when the administration 
oversteps its authority? Congress can, of course, increase its oversight activity and 
pass legislation instructing presidents and agencies on the proper course of action. 
However, in addition to the logistical difficulty of passing a strongly worded bill, 
statutory solutions do not address structural imbalances: the legislative process is 
cumbersome, easily compromised through multiple veto points, and often suffers 
from lack of enforcement mechanisms (Silverstein 1997; Adler & George 1996, 83-
241). Congress can, however, circumvent these difficulties and control foreign affairs 
by withholding appropriations.   
The constitutional framers prioritized legislative control over wartime 
expenditures as a cornerstone of the separation of powers system and critical 




legislative and executive powers facilitates tyranny led him to favor a political system 
of separate and distinct powers in which “the legislative department alone has access 
to the pockets of the people” (Federalist 48). The power of purse, he argued, 
constitutes the “most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can 
arm immediate representatives of the people” (Federalist 58).     
The framers decisively rejected a government in which a single branch could 
both make war and fund it. Familiar with efforts by English kings to rely on extra-
parliamentary sources of revenue for their military expeditions and other activities, 
the U.S. Constitution deliberately vested the power of the purse in Congress.156 
Alexander Hamilton (Federalist 69) famously contrasted the King of England’s 
power, which “extends to the declaring of war and the raising and regulating of fleets 
and armies,” with the Constitution, which expressly grants these powers to 
Congress.157  
Given the president’s “supreme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces,” Congress’ sole control over the decision to fund wars was construed as 
a crucial element of the separation-of-powers structure (Federalist 69). Until World 
War II, members of Congress safeguarded this prerogative by regularly increasing 
military expenditures in preparation for war and demobilizing forces following the 
termination of conflict. Arthur Schlesinger was the first to prominently point out that 
although the earliest U.S. presidents often employed military forces without explicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Under Article I, Section 9, “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in the Consequence of 
Appropriations made by law.”  




authorization, they consistently performed their actions in direct consultation with 
Congress (see Schlesinger, in Sofaer 1976; also see CRS Report RL30172, 2004). 158  
While presidents have historically sought to direct foreign affairs with limited 
congressional interference, presidents prior to World War II faced the practical 
requirement of obtaining additional funds in order mobilize forces. Prior to World 
War II, Congress’ control over military resources severely restrained presidents’ 
decisions to apply force unilaterally. The need to obtain funds from Congress ensured 
that major military commitments followed from a formal congressional declaration.159 
As detailed in Chapter 1, when earlier presidents engaged military forces without 
approval, they were forced to act on a much smaller scale and to maintain direct 
consultation with Congress.  
While unilateral presidential initiative over foreign affairs is not new, scholars 
have marked World War II as the turning point at which presidents have not only 
engaged U.S. military forces without explicit authorization, but have also claimed an 
inherent right to evade legislative accountability (Wormuth & Firmage 1986; 
Silverstein 1997; Fisher 2004). As Schlesinger (2004, 135) remarks, President 
Truman’s unilateral decision to commit military forces in Korea in 1950 “beguiled 
the American Government first into an unprecedented claim for inherent presidential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Schlesinger drew on the research of Judge Abraham Sofaer, previous legal counsel to the Reagan 
administration in the State Department.  
159 The U.S. has formally declared war against foreign nations five times in its history: the war against 
Britain in 1812, the Mexican-American War in 1846, the Spanish-American War in 1898, World War I 
(declared against Germany and Austria-Hungary) in 1917, and World War II (declared against Japan, 
Germany, and Italy) in 1941. Congressional authorizations (short of formal declarations) for extended 
military engagements include the Undeclared Naval War with France from 1798-1800, the First 
Barbary War from 1801-1805, the Second Barbary War of 1815, the Vietnam War from 1964-1973, 
the Persian Gulf War of 1991, military actions against the Taliban after the September 11, 2001 attacks 




power to go to war and then into ill-advised resentment against those who dared bring 
up the constitutional issue.”   
The mid-twentieth century shift that scholars highlight indicates neither 
unprecedented executive ambition nor sudden legislative withdrawal. Rather, the shift 
reflects a consistent institutional response to structural changes in international 
politics and political economy. After World War II, geopolitical factors and industrial 
capabilities gave rise to a number of mechanisms that obviated Congress’ traditional 
power to declare war. Foremost, presidents no longer relied on emergency funds to 
mobilize an army. The practical need to consult Congress for start-up funds has been 
obsolete since World War II, in large part because congressional budgetary 
authorizations continue to provide ongoing military resources. Presidents, in turn, 
have structured institutions so as to leverage congressionally appropriated resources 
at their own discretion.  
Executive actors rely on the existence of a massive weapons arsenal when 
they initiate military engagements without consulting Congress for additional 
resources. Members of Congress prioritize ongoing expenditures that render their 
decision to initiate war unnecessary for two main reasons. In addition to a strategic 
incentive to support national defense spending during periods of crisis or heightened 
threat and an electoral incentive to appear strong on defense, key members also gain 
important parochial advantages from increased levels of weapons expenditures.  
Despite the sensitive nature of national security expenditures, congressional 
incentives to procure defense revenue are not qualitatively different from other 




1995). As previously demonstrated in Chapters 2-4, large military industries bring 
relatively secure jobs to local communities, as long as federal defense funds continue 
to flow to these areas. The rise of a permanent weapons industry, national intelligence 
establishment, and Cold War climate created strong institutional incentives to expand 
the defense procurement budget indefinitely. 
While a permanent weapons arsenal expands executive capabilities, this does 
not mean that presidents seek to increase procurement budgets indefinitely. Rather, 
presidents must consider geopolitical, strategic, and fiscal matters in setting policy 
and influencing budget levels. In fact, institutional structures and diverging 
constituencies can create competing budgetary priorities between the political 
branches. At the end of the Cold War, Presidents Bush I and Clinton sought to 
decrease military expenditures in response to a period of reduced threat and emerging 
budgetary crisis. Yet, while President Clinton pledged to reduce military spending 
and direct attention to the nation’s non-military needs, the administration did not 
cancel a single major weapon system! As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, pressure from 
influential members of Congress that oversee military programs kept most Cold War 
weapons platforms alive. 
If the institutions controlling defense spending have vested interests in 
resisting major cutbacks, then one should observe a substantial baseline of funds 
cushioning the procurement budget, regardless of a nuclear deterrent, periodic troop 
withdrawals, and periods of relative peace. At the same time, however, presidents, 
DoD, and members of Congress alike must publicly justify defense budget levels 




strategy, heightened wartime spending, and domestic agenda-setting should also 
result in budgetary fluctuations, with increased spending during major wars and 
declines during periods reduced conflict.  
To examine these assessments, Figure 5.1 displays national weapons outlays 
from 1962 to 2007. Weapons expenditures provide one important gauge of resources 
available to executives, who rely on available military technology in order to utilize 
force without consulting Congress.  For example, Presidents Bush I and Clinton have 
utilized cruise missiles—unmanned, stealth technology—in order to attack enemy 
targets without massive troop deployments. Further, as I discuss in the section below, 
presidents increasingly rely on executive agents and covert operatives to conduct 
military actions, placing less emphasis on troop strength. While troop count is subject 
to congressional reductions at any time, weapons supplies build up over time 
regardless of whether Congress authorizes further production. While these budget 
levels do not directly reveal the factors shaping them, they do gauge the extent to 
which post-war Congresses have provided expenditures that allow the executive 
branch to direct military actions unilaterally.  
Procurement outlays represent money appropriated by Congress and spent by 
DoD on contracted weapons programs in a given fiscal year. Total weapons outlays 
include expenditures for defense procurements, defense research & development 
(R&D), Department of Energy (DoE) atomic energy and weapons activity, and DoE 
national nuclear security (available from FY1999-2007). The numbers are adjusted to 
constant 2006 dollars.160  
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Figure 5.1 – Weapons Spending Outlays, FY1962 – 2007 (in thousands of 2006 dollars) 	  
 
As expected, weapons outlays follow cyclical trends. However, spending 
levels do not directly track major military engagements. Instead, these pattern are 
sensitive to several important political factors: Most noticeably, despite periods of 
threat reductions, backlash to unpopular wars, and pronounced domestic priorities, 
Congress and DoD have maintained a baseline of nearly $100 billion in annual 
weapons outlays (approximately $50 billion in defense procurements alone). Given 
this budget cushion, it is not surprising that executives enjoy considerable resources 
and flexibility to pursue their policy goals.  
As displayed in the graph, weapons expenditures hit a low ebb at the 
immediate onset of formal U.S. entrance in the Vietnam War in 1965 ($126 billion in 
weapons outlays, $75 billion of which went toward defense procurements). Though 
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Budget of the United States Government, FY 2008: Historical Tables. For a more detailed breakdown 
of national security expenditures documented by function and sub-function, refer to 
Truth&Politics.org, Federal Budget, Detailed Numbers. Accessed at 




Congress was solidly behind Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy—the 1964 Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution passed both houses with only two votes in opposition—Johnson did 
not require any additional weapons build-up in order to initiate war the following 
year. When the Tonkin resolution was repealed in 1971, President Richard Nixon 
pointed to his constitutional power as commander-in-chief as giving him the authority 
to reduce the level of U.S. troops in combat at the pace he thought best. While 
Congress voiced opposition with soft reductions in weapons spending levels, no 
constitutional confrontation arose because Congress kept appropriating the money 
necessary to fight the war (see Sofaer 1976).  
The weapons budget reached a $100 billion nadir in the 1975 fiscal year, in 
the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, Watergate and the resignation of 
President Nixon. Still, despite the absence of a major military engagement, in 
addition to heightened inter-branch conflicts, procurement outlays increased 
systematically in the mid-late 1970s until peaking at over $200 billion in 1985. 
Former Pentagon Acquisition Chief Jacque Gansler (1980, 26) documents a number 
of practical and financial problems brought on by these spending policies, including a 
rate of only 50% utilized equipment and hundreds of billions of dollars in pending 
procurement claims. Accordingly, the post-Vietnam growth in procurement spending, 
combined with the decline in military activity, helped catalyze a 90% increase in 
foreign military sales and U.S. defense industry dependence on international arms 
exports.  
In addition to the substantial baseline of funds that expenditures provide, it is 




deployment. Weapons outlays during the Reagan build-up of the 1980s exceeded 
expenditures during the Vietnam War, following 9-11, and (by a narrow margin) 
throughout the current war in Iraq (as of FY2007). Reagan’s political success in 
achieving a $216 billion arms build-up suggests that presidential leadership can help 
spur increased spending levels within the context of an ongoing cold war, but without 
a direct military engagement. However, it is also evident that the ‘Reagan build-up’ 
actually began under Carter, and began to decline before the fall of the Soviet 
Union.161 While weapons outlays gently receded in the 1990s, after the termination of 
the Cold War, Congress still spent more on weapons in FY1996 than it did in FY1975 
to counter Soviet expansion during the Nixon administration (by a factor of 30%, in 
inflation-adjusted dollars). Expenditures remained above $120 billion in the late 
1990’s and increased when Bush II took office. Weapons outlays have trended 
upward during the ‘war on terror’ and currently approach 1980s spending levels. This 
effectively allowed the Bush administration to continue to prosecute the war in Iraq—
despite the stated efforts of a Democratic majority to end the unpopular war. 
 Figure 5.2 juxtaposes weapons outlays (above) with defense procurement 
budgetary authorizations and contract obligations, adjusted to constant 2006 
dollars.162 Authorizations, obligations, and outlays comprise different stages of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The total defense budget exhibits similar trends. 
162 For data on historical procurement obligations, see U.S. Department of Defense Statistical 
Information Analysis Division, Department of Defense Procurement Summary. Accessed at 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/historical_reports/trends/PROTREND/protrend.html. These 
figures are replicated in U.S. General Accounting Office reports. See U.S. GAO 2006 (September), 






budget process.  Congress grants executive agencies authority to spend up to a certain 
level, which allow DoD to enter into legally binding agreements with contractors or 
suppliers. These contract obligations are the dollars the agency legally commits to 
spending to acquire goods and services. The obligations due result in budget outlays, 
or payments made from the federal treasury.  One scholar aptly compares budget 
authority to putting money in a checking account, and budget outlays to writing a 
check (Oleszek 2007, 45). Extending the simile, entering contract obligations is like 
making purchases with a credit card and promising payment at a later date.  
   
 
Figure 5.2 – Weapons Procurement Expenditures, FY1951 – 2007  
 
Perhaps most strikingly, DoD procurement obligations far exceed the 
budgetary authorization that Congress sets and the outlays spent on weapons 
programs. Indeed, after 1962, procurement obligations have not dipped below $150 
billion (compared to a $50 billion baseline in defense procurement outlays), and peak 
at over $300 billion in 1985 (relative to $132 billion in 1985 procurement outlays). 




cancels or refuses to fund, it also means that DoD is contracting nearly 2/3 of 
weapons purchases beyond its procurement budget. These unauthorized funds also 
reflect contracts obligated for future years or dollars that go straight into the national 
debt (see Higgs 2007).  
Obligation trends begin to suggest that DoD plays a more prominent role in 
the budget process than previously assumed: procurement obligations peaked during 
the Bay of Pigs (1961), Tet Offensive build-up (1967-68), and in the heat of the Iran-
Contra scandal (1985); sharp increases in procurement outlays echoed these trends, 
peaking in 1962, 1968, and 1987, at a 1-2 year lag. However, DoD obligation trend 
lines follow congressional budget authorizations more closely. Despite the 
considerable discrepancy between levels of authorized and unauthorized funds, 
authorizations and obligations follow almost identical patterns, peaking and ebbing in 
coinciding years. These patterns begin to suggest that DoD attempts to shape budget 
levels by systematically contracting a certain point beyond the budget authority that 
Congress sets, pending either program cancellation or future payment. The finding is 
also consistent with political economist Robert Higgs’ (2007) projections that 
defense-related expenditures roll over into deficit spending from year to year.  
These budget levels alone do not reveal whether procurement spending is 
wasteful or excessive relative to national security goals. However, these data on 
procurement spending over time do indicate that Congress has relinquished its 
traditional role in mobilizing and demobilizing forces. Procurement obligations made 
during and after the Korean War help illustrate the traditional wartime spending 




wartime procurement obligations reached over $300 billion at the height of the 
Korean War in 1952 and immediately fell below $100 billion in 1954, the year after 
the war ended. No war since Korea has required such a massive build up or motivated 
a 70% reduction in procurement spending immediately following the termination of 
conflict. Instead, key members of Congress have provided hundreds of billions of 
dollars annually to increase military technology and weapons capabilities, regardless 
of whether the U.S. was engaged in armed conflict. Presidents, in turn, have 
leveraged these resources to initiate hundreds of military actions, regardless of 
congressional approval. Congressional defense spending policies have led Senator 
Patrick P. Moynihan to conclude that, “The great armed force [created to fight the 
Cold War is] now at the president’s disposal for any diversion he may wish, no matter 
what it costs” (quoted in DeConde et al. 2002, 216).  
The next section discusses how presidents seek to enhance their own 
institutional capacity by centralizing their authority over the military establishment, 
devising mechanisms that enable greater executive secrecy, and privatizing multiple 
aspects of military activity that minimize congressional oversight.  
 
Expanding Executive Authority: Presidential Initiatives 
Following World War II, the growth of a national security establishment and 
permanent weapons arsenal coincided with two prominent presidential strategies 
concerning military affairs. Each further insulates the president’s own institutional 
authority from ongoing legislative control, restricts information from public scrutiny, 




have systematically relied on executive secrecy, utilized covert military operations 
and heightened document classification levels. These strategies remove executive 
actors from official legal channels, exacerbate informational asymmetries between the 
executive branch and Congress, and weaken legislative capacity to monitor. Second, 
and more recently, presidents have sought to privatize multiple aspects of military 
activity, including the use of contractors to handle the military’s logistical activities 
and the funding of private firms to provide security and conduct other military 
operations. As recent reports suggest, employing non-government entities in military 
operations renders oversight increasingly untenable and creates mechanisms that 
allow presidents to circumvent statutory limitations on their authority.  
Throughout the 1940s, the executive branch created numerous central 
intelligence organizations involved in intelligence analysis, propaganda 
dissemination, espionage, and guerrilla warfare. These entities were structured 
“within the executive branch almost entirely at presidential initiative” (Whittington & 
Carpenter 2003, 505). In fact, Congress did not formally authorize these institutions 
until the director of Central Intelligence requested assistance from Congress in order 
to augment his position relative to the FBI, War Department, and State Department 
(see Weiner 2007, 9-19). When the CIA went to Congress for help, they created the 
1947 National Security Act (NSA). The NSA established a new National Security 
Council (NSC) as the White House switchboard for presidential decisions. The Act 
also created the office of Secretary of Defense to unify the military departments and 




While the 1947 Act formally secured the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
within the intelligence bureaucracy, it said nothing about covert operations overseas; 
rather, it instructed the CIA to evaluate and disseminate intelligence, and to perform 
“other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security.” 
However, the NSC immediately passed a number of classified directives authorizing 
the CIA to engage in covert, paramilitary operations and other “black” activities, 
including CIA involvement in influencing the 1948 Italian elections (see NSC4-A, 
NSC-10-2).  
In response to these events, Congress passed the CIA Act of 1949, which 
permitted the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures, such as 
exempting disclosure of its “organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or 
numbers of personnel employed” (see 50 U.S.C. § 403a). A classified black budget, 
subject only to approval by a small armed services subcommittee, effectively granted 
the CIA untraceable funds buried in the Pentagon’s budget with which to raise its 
own armies and conduct classified operations overseas (Weiner 1990; 2007, 40-41). 
To date, the Pentagon’s black budget consists of classified expenditures for 
intelligence gathering, covert operations, and military research and weapons 
programs hidden in the Pentagon’s overall budget. It includes spending by the CIA, 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and 
military R&D. Though it admits to no easy calculation, estimates suggest that the 
budget may hit $30 billion a year.163  
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While the mechanisms allowing for executive secrecy (and hence, 
unilateralism) clearly expanded during the late 1940s, this still does not indicate the 
extent to which presidents or agency heads have utilized their ability to withhold 
information and operate outside of traditional legal channels. Of course, the obvious 
challenge to conducting such a study rests in the very nature of the subject: direct 
information on executive secrecy is, by definition, unavailable. However, analyzing 
the level of classified material reported in each fiscal year provides a preliminary 
gauge of level of undisclosed executive communications taking place.   
On June 28, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12065, which 
designated an official basis for classifying information.164 The Information Security 
Oversight Office (ISOO) was subsequently formed to oversee security classifications. 
ISOO is a component of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
and receives program guidance from the NSC. The organization maintains public 
records of the level and designation of all executive classification activity within each 
fiscal year. While the reports do not indicate the size of the classified documents, they 
do provide a preliminary gauge of the volume of covert communications within the 
executive branch.  
Figure 5.3 includes data on annual document classification levels from 
FY1980 to FY2006.165  Organizations reporting include the CIA, DoD, State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the military also requested $14.4 billion to buy classified weapons) Also see Weiner (1990) for a more 
detailed analysis of the Pentagon’s hidden funds.  
164 As amended by EO 12148, July 20, 1979, 44 F.R. 43239; EO.12163, Sept. 29, 1979, 44 F.R. 56673, 
which related to classification and declassification of national security information and material, was 
revoked by EO12356, Apr. 2, 1982, 47 F.R. 14874, 15557. 
 
165 There are three categories of classification: original, derivative, and combined. Original 




Department, Department of Justice (DoJ), NSC, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), DoE, and Treasury. The CIA, DoD and State Department account 
typically account for almost all of the reported document classifications (98.9% in 
FY1980). Figures for FY1980 to 1984 are reported as estimated outcomes. 
Unfortunately, ISOO labels the reported figures for FY2001 and 2002 as unreliable 
due to temporary changes in departmental reporting techniques. These figures are 
excluded from the analysis.   
 
Figure 5.3– Executive Classification Activity, FY1980-2006	  
 
 As displayed in Figure 5.3, document classification levels tend to follow 
relatively predictable patterns in light of publicly known geopolitical and domestic 
events. Classification activity peaked during the Iran-Contra scandal in FY1985 
(15,120,298 documents) and again in FY2006 during the escalation of the Iraq war 
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document incorporates, restates, and generates previously classified security information. I report 
combined classification estimates (both original and derivative) in order to gauge a more complete 





and NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (20,556,445 documents).  Also not 
surprisingly, classification levels dropped considerably throughout the 1990s, in a 
period of reduced conflict. In fact, in 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 
12937, which declassified a number of classified records dating back to the 1970s 
within the National Archives. The following year, in FY1995, classified materials fell 
to the lowest point on record (3,579,505). Nonetheless, classification activity 
increased systematically during the late 1990s, more than doubling in volume by 
FY1999 (8,038,592).  
On November 1, 2001, President Bush issued EO 13222, re-classifying a 
number of documents and setting new restrictions on access to presidential records. In 
2003, the Bush II administration initiated the war in Iraq—which later spawned 
probes regarding forged nuclear intelligence.166 Accordingly, classification levels in 
the 2003 fiscal year increased by nearly 80 percent of the FY1995 volume 
(14,228,020).  However, despite the considerable variation in levels of disclosure 
over the past sixteen years, the executive branch has systematically classified millions 
of documents annually—(at least) tens of thousands of documents per day—
regardless of whether the U.S. has engaged a major troop deployment requiring 
authorized military secrecy.  
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Figure 5.4 – Military Capability and Executive Secrecy 	  
Note: Figure 5.4 displays values from Figures 5.2 & 5.3. 
 
 The graph in Figure 5.4 displays the rate of annual classification activity 
superimposed on annual contract obligations (see Figure 5.2). It is immediately 
striking that levels of military capabilities and executive secrecy follow roughly 
equivalent trends from year-to-year. Indeed, each peaked in FY1985, gently receded 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and shot back up toward 1980s levels at the turn of 
the twenty-first century (classification activity actually surpassed 1980s levels in 
FY2004). Despite the rather arresting similarity of these patterns, however, one must 
interpret these results cautiously. These figures alone do not provide evidence that 
military capability and executive secrecy are directly related. Rather, the relationship 
could be spurious, as each factor is shaped by broader, geopolitical events and 
executive responses (such as the U.S.-Soviet arms-race in the 1980s, military de-
escalation in the 1990s, and heightened national security status following the attacks 
of September 11, 2001). However, it is worth speculating whether weapons 




activity, as an expansive pool of resources and the potential to use force make it 
easier for presidents to operate independently.  It is also possible that the executive 
agenda can successfully influence the level of weapons outlays and classification 
activity as two components of the same strategy. Despite the lack of causal evidence, 
the finding is important given the strong indication that weapons expenditures and 
government secrecy are at least indirectly related. Further, greater levels of secrecy 
weaken Congress’ capacity to effectively monitor executive actions.   
  Systematic non-disclosure within the national security and intelligence 
communities and the proliferation of hidden, untraceable funds have historically 
allowed presidents to direct covert military operations without explicit approval from 
Congress, subject only to the availability of military technology (see Koh 1990; 
Fisher 2004; Weiner 1990, 2007). Indeed, as one scholar points out, presidents have 
strategically transferred power away from larger, more accountable bureaucratic 
institutions, such as the DoD and State Department, to smaller, covert entities capable 
of swift, flexible action—such as the NSC and CIA (Koh 1990, 123). 
 The emphasis on covert action and maximum efficiency in modern warfare 
traces back several decades, with roots in the early careers of Donald Rumsfeld, Dick 
Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz in the 1970s and currently circulated in think tanks such 
as Project for a New American Century (see Mann 2004 for a detailed account). 
During the 1990s, President Clinton also embraced privatization, drawing on private 
contractors during the Balkans conflict of the 1990s and the 1999 Kosovo war. 
Clinton authorized the Virginia-based military consulting firm, Military Professional 




Serb-dominated Yugoslavia (see Hartung 2004; Scahill 2007, xvi). The shift from 
bureaucratic agencies to private firms is important because these entities operate with 
fewer restrictions and less accountability. They free up executives by minimizing 
viable congressional oversight. 
Privatization agenda (later part of the “Rumsfeld Doctrine”) reached its 
climax under the Bush II administration. The widespread use of contractors in 
modern warfare and the transformation of the Pentagon bureaucracy “to behave less 
like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists” (Rumsfeld 2002, 20) is perhaps 
most clearly observable in the internal restructuring of the Pentagon. Historically, 
civilian defense agencies have decreased in size during periods of reduced conflict 
and increased during prolonged military engagements.167 As the Rumsfeld doctrine 
was put into practice, one should expect to see substantial downsizing in the 
bureaucratic agencies that have traditionally managed these functions—despite the 
2001 military operation in Afghanistan and the prolonged military commitment in 
Iraq.  
Pentagon agencies most likely to experience reductions were those that 
traditionally managed logistical functions, including the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA, providing combat support solutions), Defense Security 
Services Agency (DSS, performing security checks on military, civilian, and 
contractor personnel), the Defense Commissary Agency (DECA, managing food 
purchases at overseas military bases), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA, 
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providing combat support, supplies, and military services). Detailed figures 
documenting DoD agency personnel employment are only available in limited years, 
from FY1996 to FY2007, at the DoD Statistical Information Analysis Division.168  
 
Figure 5.5a – Changes in DoD Agency Personnel – Military Security  
 
 
Figure 5.5b – Changes in DoD Agency Personnel  - Military Logistics 
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As shown in Figures 5.5a and 5.5b, combat support services (DISA and DLA) 
have undergone considerable streamlining, shedding 27% and 44% of agency 
personnel between FY1996 and FY2007 (respectively). DLA employment took the 
sharpest dive, with a 12,514 personnel reduction (35% drop) in the 2001 fiscal year—
the year that George W. Bush took office and Secretary Rumsfeld delivered his 
September address to the Pentagon. While the Defense Commissary Agency did 
experience minor re-structuring (an 8% reduction), DECA held considerably constant 
relative to the other agencies under study. Somewhat more surprisingly, the DSS did 
not simply downsize, but remained relatively unchanged in size until plummeting 
during the 2005 fiscal year. The sudden and dramatic drop in the number of personnel 
charged with overseeing background checks on contractors is especially striking 
given the rise in contracting activity during this time period (see below for further 
elaboration).   
 Despite overall civilian personnel reductions, however, not all agencies 
experienced the same treatment. Rather, as displayed in Figure 5.5c, Defense Legal 
Services (DLAS) and Defense Security Cooperation (DSCA) experience pronounced 
increases (increasing 58% and 50%, respectively). The former provides legal advice 
and support to the Pentagon, and the latter handles foreign military sales, the foreign 
transfer of U.S.-manufactured weapons, and international military education and 
training to U.S. allies. Indeed, DLAS employment spiked in the 2003 fiscal year, 
increasing by 33% of its size at the same time that U.S. forces invaded Iraq. Other 




Protection Agency (31% increase) also accumulated personnel strength during this 
time period.   
 
Figure 5.5c – Changes in DoD Agency Personnel – Legal Services & International Arms 
Transfers 
 
On one hand, these figures suggest that the downsizing of the Pentagon 
bureaucracy was limited to logistical activity that is instead distributed to private 
contractors in efforts to handle military services more efficiently. On the other hand, 
however, this theory is complicated by the targeted personnel cuts within every 
agency overseeing financial and contract management. Such agencies include the 
Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA), Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA), and Defense Finance and Accounting Service Agency (DFAS). 
Figure 5.5d documents change in agency personnel strength over time in 
agencies managing contract and financial oversight.  As documented in the graph, 
each agency not only streamlined personnel during the 1990s, but also deepened these 





Figure 5.5d – Changes in DoD Personnel – Contract & Financial Management 
 
The Defense Contract Auditing Agency has declined gradually, cutting 19% 
of employees from FY1996 to 2007. The Defense Contract Management Agency 
decreased by a similar magnitude (20%) but over a reduced period of time (the 
agency was established in 2000). Defense Finance and Accounting experienced the 
most dramatic restructuring, dropping most considerably in FY1998, briefly regaining 
personnel strength, and then declining steadily to the present date (decreasing in size 
by 43% overall). Head of GAO Comptroller General David M. Walker remarked that, 
“What we have seen in recent years is an explosion of contracting, while at the same 
point in time we have seen a contraction of those engaged in oversight of contracting 
matters…[This] serves to exacerbate systemic problems that have existed for years” 
(quoted in Rose 2007).   
Consistent with these findings, in 2006 the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(2006, September, 2-3, 12-13) reported an 88% increase in DoD spending on goods 
and services since fiscal year 2000 ($270 billion in FY2006), a 100% increase in 
major weapons systems acquisitions (from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion), and a 




defense missions. At the same time, GAO agency inspectors uncovered insufficient 
weapons system acquisition and contract management processes, exacerbated by 
short-staffed DoD acquisition workforce, insufficient monitoring, and “improper use 
of interagency contracts” (4, 7-8). It comes as little surprise that the companies 
providing military support and logistical services enjoyed vast gains between 2001 
and 2005—including Halliburton (12,646% budget increase), Dyncorp International 
(200%), Bechtel (139%), Parsons (104%), and Washington Group International 
(126%) (see Hartung 2006).  
While the post-2006 Democratic majority in Congress became increasingly 
critical of the excess and profligacy associated with the Bush administration’s 
privatization agenda, these bureaucratic reforms and the streamlining of legislative 
oversight processes went into effect in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 
2001—a period of domestic crisis and bipartisanship in which congressional 
opposition to the Pentagon and CIA was “not a political winner.”169 Accordingly, the 
Democratic committee formed in 2006 has held hearings and released a number of 
reports uncovering evidence of systematic profligacy and waste encouraged by 
ongoing DoD contracting practices—many of which date back to World War II and 
which, historically, Congress is complicit in implementing. For example, the use of 
cost-plus contracts (whatever a company spends, the government agrees to reimburse 
with a 3% fee), sole-source contracting (non-competitive bidding), “indefinite-
delivery, indefinite-quantity” contracts (allowing the Pentagon to commission 
whatever it wants from a company at any time), mark-ups between contract levels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




(creating incentives to subcontract indefinitely) encourage excessive cost run-ups and 
poor service returns.170 Commenting on the difficulty of effective oversight 
surrounding private military contracting in Iraq, Chairman of the Democratic Policy 
Committee Byron Dorgan remarked: “If sunshine is the best disinfectant, then we can 
only imagine what grows in the dark” (U.S. Senate DPC 2004). 
While the war on terror and war in Iraq have created a market for scores of 
companies, few have experienced the profit and prominence of Blackwater USA. The 
use of privately trained military forces allowed the administration to work outside of 
normal legal constraints and without congressional oversight. Indeed, outsourcing and 
covert mechanisms allowed to the Bush administration to easily sidestep 
congressional legislation.171 Discussing the power and influence of companies like 
Blackwater USA, Representative Jan Schakowsky reflected on the “disturbing” and 
“enormous” consequences for executive war powers: 
[Blackwater] empowers…an administration like the Bush administration—if 
they can engage in this kind of private war-making or a private army, then 
what do they even need [Congress] for? They can operate in a totally separate 
arena and engage in conflicts all over the world, and it seems like they don’t 
much need to consult with us about it (R. Schakowsky, interview with Jeremy 
Scahill, printed in Scahill 2007, 356).  
 
 Historically, the need to cooperate with Congress to mobilize troops and raise 
taxes for in order to pay for weaponry, technology, and troop mobilization created 
major obstacles to any military interventions that an administration might seek to 
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undertake. Domestic opposition to wars resulted in fewer people volunteering to serve 
in the armed forces, deflating troop size or necessitating a military draft. With private 
contractors and security companies, these dynamics change dramatically. Contractors 
reduce public sacrifices associated with military engagements, lessening internal 
resistance from Congress and the citizenry. 
 
Conclusion: The Maginot Line  
 While Congress periodically attempts to strengthen its oversight mechanisms 
through internal restructuring and statutory limitations, members also continue to 
prioritize hundreds of billions of dollars in annual weapons expenditures. Much like 
the Maginot Line—a concrete fortification designed by the French to keep German 
troops out in the run-up to World War II—congressional reforms typically avoid 
direct confrontation with the president but ultimately fail to achieve their stated 
purpose. In the French case, the Germans avoided direct assault on the line, instead 
invading France by moving through Belgium and the Netherlands. Similarly, an 
administration can utilize institutional and budgetary authority to sidestep 
congressional oversight mechanisms without direct confrontation (see Silverstein 
1997; Adler & George 1996; Koh 1988, 1990). 
The reason modern presidential administrations consistently act without 
congressional approval in matters of defense and foreign policy is because the 
president’s drive to promote the authority and leadership of his institution generally 
corresponds with Congress’ incentives to defer to executive authority and expertise in 




When an administration of the opposing party oversteps its bounds, Congress may 
find rejuvenated political incentives to check the executive branch. However, despite 
statutory reforms and increased congressional oversight, a permanent military arsenal, 
pool of covert operatives, and scores of private contractors and security firms 
continue to allow the executive branch to conduct military affairs without consulting 
Congress or asking for additional funds.  
Converging institutional incentives and the aggregation of executive authority 
suggest that political power tends to concentrate when separate institutions find 
shared incentives to cooperate. In the case of defense spending, representatives’ 
political incentives to appeal to local constituencies generally align with the 
president’s drive to promote the leadership capabilities of the executive branch. This 
coincidence of interests facilitates the rise of a permanent weapons arsenal and the 
proliferation of covert operatives and private security forces. Each further enables 
presidents to direct military engagements at a moment’s notice. In 1956, C. Wright 
Mills (1956, 266) remarked at length on the symbiotic military ascendancy and rise in 
executive authority following World War II, warning that: “The idea that the power 
system is a balancing society also assumes that the units in balance are independent of 
one another.” This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that congressional and executive 
incentives both independently encourage resources and authority over military 
engagements to concentrate in the executive branch. These arrangements weaken the 







In the late eighteenth century, James Madison (1792, in Hunt ed. 1900) 
advanced a seminal argument for structural restraints on military aggrandizement and 
warfare. Railing against an antiquated, if not naïve, reliance on collective action and 
goodwill to promote peace and avoid war, Madison argued that institutions can 
redirect the self-interest of leaders and citizens. From Julius Caesar’s Roman army to 
eighteenth century European monarchies, the allurements of war and ability to avoid 
personal sacrifice allowed rulers to reap the benefits of warfare while imposing heavy 
burdens on the general public. However, monarchies and dictatorships plagued with 
wars, revolutions and military despotism lacked institutional safeguards aimed to 
prevent the concentration of political power and check private vice. Specifically, 
these failed regimes lacked mechanisms that divided military powers between 
separate governing departments and instituted a measure of popular control over 
rulers.  
By contrast, a representative government vested with the power to declare 
war, raise armies and tax and spend will be less likely to build large peacetime armies 
and initiate unpopular military ventures when they must ultimately appeal to the 
public for reelection. In order for an executive to utilize military force or employ 
coercion, the legislature must willingly raise troops and appropriate resources—an 




Guided by this new science of politics, the U.S. Constitution grants a single 
executive broad authority to command the armed forces, but with the understanding 
that Congress controls the resources necessary to initiate military actions. Congress 
possesses the unlimited authority to raise armies and the power to declare war, though 
individual legislators’ willingness to mobilize the military depends largely on the 
popular appeal of their actions. In short, institutional structures work to ensure that 
the appropriation of defense resources reflect the immediate interests of the voters, 
who bear burdens traditionally associated with permanent armies and warfare.  
The rise of a permanent military industry dramatically altered these dynamics. 
This dissertation has argued that, after World War II, the importance of the defense 
sector of the economy to key members of Congress, Department of Defense 
personnel and the defense industry created overlapping incentives to perpetuate and 
expand the U.S. military industry. At the same time, the proliferation of defense 
expenditures has coincided with policies that systematically reduce traditional public 
costs of military mobilization and warfare. As a result, the ongoing appropriation of 
defense resources and reduced public costs of war promote increasing executive 
independence in military affairs. Reciprocal interests in defense sector expansion 
concentrate resources and authority in the executive department, weakening the 
system of checks and balances. 
The framers’ reliance on institutional structures and competing interests failed 
to prevent power from concentrating in the executive branch. Moreover, the 
constructive use of institutions as a means to compartmentalize interests, structure 




mutual benefits of voters, office-holders and industry—regardless of the long-term 
consequences or the costs to non-voting entities. This evidence suggests a flaw in the 
modern reliance on institutional checks and competing interests as principal 
mechanisms for limiting power and promoting the public good. 
 
Eighteenth Century War Powers: Public Costs of War & Patterns of Military 
Demobilization  
Prior to World War II, military expenditures were construed as 
disadvantageous in peacetime. Congress regularly mobilized forces in preparation for 
war and quickly demobilized troops following major military engagements. While the 
U.S. has regularly engaged in armed conflicts, a military establishment was expensive 
and difficult to maintain. Despite intermittent efforts to expand U.S. armies and 
increase military procurements during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
Congress did not maintain large peacetime armies or a permanent military 
establishment until the mid-twentieth century.  As Chapter 1 shows, systematic 
military draw-downs at the end of armed conflicts limited the president’s ability to 
direct military operations without ongoing congressional cooperation. 
In the late eighteenth century, the nascent republic inherited deficient 
procurement infrastructure, a tiny naval force, disorganized state militias and severe 
fiscal constraints, including limits on federal borrowing. As a result, early 
administrations and Congresses relied heavily on imported weapons procurements 
and called upon large volunteer contingents in preparation for war. Military 




domestic spending during wartime. Defense appropriations could not persist without 
broad public willingness to pay for it.   
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the emergence of domestic 
markets for weapons procurements and the ability to print money and accrue debt 
made it easier for Congress to periodically increase military appropriations without 
provoking opposition from voters. At the same time, more flexible armies (facilitated 
by a new legislative strategy of decreasing regiments rather than eliminating entire 
units during periods of demobilization) the enhanced availability of defense resources 
allowed presidents to utilize available troops and equipment without obtaining 
congressional permission in advance. 
In 1846, James Polk drew upon more expansible army contingents and 
demonstrated initial willingness to move existing forces in a manner that precipitated 
war, seeking legislative approval only after military hostilities appeared inevitable. In 
the early twentieth century, Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson took advantage of 
the modern naval resources procured during the period of industrialization and 
enhanced congressional interest in regional expansion, stationing forces abroad and 
issuing limited military engagements independently.   
While executive authority over military actions increased episodically 
throughout early U.S. history, patterns of congressional demobilization consistently 
constrained the frequency, scope and duration of presidents’ independent military 
actions prior to the Second World War. Despite temporary defense increases, a 
permanent military establishment was broadly understood to be unnecessarily costly 




congressional authority to raise armies and control military expenditures ensured that 
legislators were accountable to voters for their defense spending decisions. At the 
same time, presidents relied on Congress to raise troops and supply funds to go to 
war. 
After World War II, the electoral incentives shaping members’ defense 
spending decisions changed dramatically. The ascent of Nazi Germany during World 
War II, followed by the Soviet threat that gave rise to the Cold War, motivated 
Congress to create large standing armies and to fund an ongoing weapons arsenal. At 
the same time, the growth of a profitable military industry spurred economic 
productivity and generated various dependencies on the defense sector of the 
economy. These economic dependencies have created new legislative incentives to 
procure ongoing defense resources and resist major spending cuts independent of 
geopolitical factors or perceived security threats.  
As chapters 2-4 argue, the rise of a permanent military industry during World 
War II created overlapping institutional incentives to maintain and perpetuate the 
defense sector of the economy, separate from policymakers’ ideology or national 
security goals. Specifically, patterns of ongoing defense expenditures meet the profit-
oriented goals of the defense industry, which overlap with the Defense Department 
services competing for limited resources and communities that rely on defense sector 
employment and revenue for economic growth. The members of Congress 
representing these constituencies work to ensure continued funding for weapons 
spending. These members’ reelection strategies encourage them to protect their local 




to argue in Chapter 5, the proliferation of defense expenditures, in turn, contributes to 
the president’s ability to direct military operations independently. Patterns of 
sustained defense build-up facilitate enhanced executive independence in military 
affairs, regardless of periodic legislative attempts to check the president’s authority.  
 
World War II Military Mobilization 
The Great Depression of the 1930s and 1940s allowed for the first total 
military mobilization. Unemployment ravaged the nation, and people turned to the 
government for help. Unlike World War I, which the nation entered with a fully 
employed labor force, idle manpower and dormant industrial resources poised the 
nation for transformation to a full-scale military economy. To mobilize industry for 
large-scale military production, President Roosevelt prioritized continued deficit 
spending and greater government interventions in the economic sphere. Increased 
federal spending, subsidized wages and guaranteed cost-plus earnings ensured low-
risk industry profits and helped to meet ambitious government procurement goals.  
Reciprocal business-government relations also provided an economic stimulus 
across local, regional and even national constituencies. As economic risks shifted 
from business to government, unprecedented demand for military equipment led 
major aircraft industries to extend military production from large cities with 
preexisting infrastructure to less populous areas adjacent to the home plant. At the 
same time, government actors enjoyed considerable latitude in influencing the 
geographic dispersion of military production. In doing so, executive agencies heavily 




locations that had formerly maintained more agricultural economies and lacked prior 
defense infrastructure.  
Industry expansion to smaller suburbs and towns and government investments 
throughout the South and Southwest laid the foundation for economic development in 
areas that previously lacked extensive industrial activity. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, 
the influx of defense dollars had a disproportionate effect on growth in areas without 
a diverse industrial base. The flow of defense dollars had a greater impact on 
population growth in suburbs, towns and communities with World War II defense 
infrastructure than the large, diversified cities where the bulk of defense activity took 
place. Suburbs and towns with defense activity also grew at faster rates than other 
suburban areas of comparable size. In addition, the flow of federal funds contributed 
to the revitalization of formerly agricultural regions in the South and Southwest. 
While the South experienced a considerable population surge after World War II, 
from 1940 to 1950, Southern cities and towns with defense infrastructure grew at 
disproportionate rates compared to the average growth for the region.   
Despite a brief retrenchment in 1945, the U.S. retained an immense military 
establishment by any historical standard (Higgs 2006, 30). Many locations retained 
defense infrastructure that had been established during the war, and U.S. troops kept 
up a strong overseas presence. As a result, President Truman was able to call upon 
existing forces and utilize remaining weaponry in order to independently engage 
troops in Korea—an unprecedented military action for an executive to pursue without 
permission from Congress.  In the decades since President Truman called the Korean 




without first securing a formal congressional authorization. Congress has not issued a 
single declaration of war.  
At the same time, in the decades from the Korean War through the George W. 
Bush administration, the military industry has generated geographically targeted 
profits throughout increasing regions and localities—regardless of the geopolitical 
climate or the size of the overall procurement budget. Further, modest increments of 
defense dollars have extended to areas with less developed economic infrastructure, 
including the formerly agrarian South and Southwest, more sparsely populated areas 
on the outskirts of large cities and most recently, Plains States, desert and mountain 
regions.  
Policymakers have also worked to finance military mobilization and conduct 
wars in a way that makes it easier to sustain popular approval. The 1973 All-
Volunteer Force, followed by increased reliance on military contractors, contribute to 
lower U.S. troop counts and fewer military casualties during major wars. Enhanced 
reliance on federal borrowing and deficit spending also circumvent the traditional 
need to raise taxes and adjust domestic spending priorities in order to fund troops and 
supply ongoing military procurements. Finally, the development of increasingly 
sophisticated technology makes it easier to fight wars far removed from U.S. soil, 
minimizing disruption to productivity and domestic life. These policies shift war costs 
onto political minorities and non-voting entities, including a small minority of active 
duty soldiers and volunteers, future generations of taxpayers and foreign nations 




The ability to obviate or reduce public sacrifices in wartime undermines the 
system of checks and balances established that the Constitution’s framers envisioned. 
Rather than imposing the sacrifices on political majorities with electoral power over 
governing officials, policymakers can promote initiatives that reduce the direct costs 
of warfare among major political constituencies. The broad extension of defense 
benefits and the externalization of costs make it easier for elected officials to maintain 
a permanent military establishment and to utilize force abroad without fear of 
electoral reprisal.   
The extension of localized benefits and the reduction of public costs 
accelerated during the Cold War, persisted after the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
further intensified following the attacks of September 11, 2001. At the same time, 
defense dollars have increasingly extended to more economically reliant areas that 
lack a diverse industrial foundation.  As Chapters 3-4 go on to demonstrate, 
establishing defense industries in more economically homogenous, rural areas 
generates and sustains economic dependencies, placing a political premium on 
continued defense industry presence in these areas.   
 
“Everybody stays friends, everybody gets paid and everybody’s got a…job.”  
-Detective Jimmy McNulty, The Wire 
Although defense allocations are increasingly widespread, members of 
Congress do not typically support weapons expenditures based solely on the potential 
for constituency gain. Rather, members’ incentives to press for various weapons 




more economically homogenous, rural constituencies experience greater dependence 
on the major defense firms in their district than more industrially diverse, urban areas 
with an equal defense presence. This dependence makes it difficult for key members 
of Congress to support defense cuts during periods of reduced threat or to cancel 
outmoded weapons programs when faced with new strategic requirements. 
During the post-Cold War budget crunch, Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
Clinton urged Congress to roll back the defense budget and either cap or eliminate 
several high-cost Cold War weapons systems. As Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney 
repeatedly urged Congress to eliminate several expensive Cold War weapons 
programs designed to fight the Soviets. However, Congress failed to terminate a 
single production line. In fact, the 1998 House Appropriations bill allocated an extra 
$78 million (in addition to $611 million included in the Senate bill) for the V-22 tilt-
rotator helicopter—a program that Cheney had targeted for cancellation back in 1992, 
citing its low strategic priority, repeated crashes in test simulations, time delays and 
unaffordable cost run-ups. Despite a series of House resolutions proposing defense 
cuts introduced between FY1993-FY1998, the only bill that the House passed in a 
floor vote reduced the amount spent for maintaining bases overseas (HR2401, HRC 
419, 9/9/93). 
A decade later, a high-profile resolution to halt the production of the F-22 
fighter jet came to a floor vote in the Senate with aggressive backing from Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates and newly elected President Barack Obama. Gates and 
Obama implored Congress to consider changing military needs and limited funds, 




Democratic Senators representing California, Connecticut and Washington broke 
rank with their party and their president and voted against the measure, expressing 
support for the major defense interests in their states.172 These senators represent the 
leading developers of the F-22, in addition to more dependent local constituencies, 
including Antelope Valley, Mountain View and Sunnyvale in California; Groton and 
New London in Connecticut; and Bremerton and Bangor in Washington.  
Economic reliance helps explain why it is difficult for Congress to cut funding 
for military procurements when faced with severe fiscal constraints and reduced 
threat levels and why members continue to fund strategically questionable weapons 
programs opposed by leading Pentagon officials: Members of Congress support 
programs that are critical to the widely shared economic interests of their 
constituencies. Previous scholarship has missed these effects because prior studies do 
not sufficiently account for the economic importance of defense spending within 
particular constituencies.  
Unlike previous studies, my theory of disproportionate economic reliance 
accounts for the enhanced importance of defense employment and revenue within 
more economically homogenous, rural areas. A defense industry presence within a 
more rural locality is more critical for economic growth than for a densely populated 
urban center with an equal number of defense facilities. In other words, it is not only 
the size of the defense sector in a district that influences congressional behavior, but 
the broader economic context into which defense dollars flow.  
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Systematic evidence suggests local economic dependence is a key factor 
leading members of Congress to support controversial weapons expenditures, stave 
off program cuts and prioritize defense interests, regardless of their partisanship or 
their ideology. Congressional incentives to sustain revenue and employment in more 
reliant areas encourage key members to support ongoing defense spending and resist 
targeted program cuts during periods of reduced threat and changing defense needs—
regardless of whether top Pentagon officials prioritize these systems or consider them 
to be strategically necessary. These legislative incentives also encourage defense 
contractors to spread their operations across multiple districts to attract political 
support for weapons systems. 
In recent decades, the role of economic reliance is particularly important in 
explaining Democratic members’ voting behavior on defense measures, because they 
lack a partisan predisposition to support these policies. However, constituency 
reliance on the defense sector motivates members of both parties to support 
controversial weapons programs and resist proposed cuts to the procurement budget. 
Evidence suggests that economic goals in more dependent, rural areas influence 
congressional representation and perpetuate U.S. defense production independent of 
national security concerns. 
Congressional interests in maintaining defense expenditures that are critical to 
local economic growth also influence the allocation of defense subcontracts. Holding 
the number of defense facilities constant, economic dependence in more rural areas 
encourages representation on defense committees and the quest for program benefits. 




each draw subcontracts to a district at a rate disproportionate to the number of defense 
facilities in these areas. The allocation of defense subcontracts to more dependent, 
rural localities suggest that the defense industry gains politically by extending major 
assignments to more reliant districts, even while prime contract revenue remains 
concentrated.  
Previous academic work has missed these effects for two key reasons. First, 
previous scholars have not considered a district’s reliance on defense expenditures, as 
opposed to reliance on other types of government assistance or the potential gain that 
defense distributions may yield. Second, prior research has focused on the allocations 
of prime defense contracts, which are merely precursors to subsequent 
disseminations. Accounting for the economic composition of a district yields 
evidence suggesting that the relative concentration of defense facilities to other 
industries is a key factor influencing members’ priorities. Taking defense 
subcontracts into account suggests that defense industry managers and contractors 
have incentives to extend major subcontract assignments to more economically 
vulnerable districts of heightened political value during critical dissemination stages.   
The defense sector generates hundreds of billions of dollars per year and spans 
all fifty states and a preponderance of congressional districts. The industry contributes 
to local and regional economic growth as well as national economic output and gross 
domestic product. The scale and scope of the defense sector indicates a pervasive 
dependence on this market, which in turn shapes congressional priorities.   While 
members do not directly influence the contracting process, the defense industry plays 




weapons platforms. The prevalent use of private negotiations between contractors, 
defense bureaucrats and defense industry management allows contractors to distribute 
assignments with the goal of maximizing the chances for program funding.  
The results of the analysis in Chapters 3 & 4 suggest that defense contracting 
has resulted in a symbiotic relationship among key policymakers. Spreading defense 
benefits across multiple districts increases political demand for weapons systems 
among Congress members and sustains rural economies that rely on the defense 
industry for employment and revenue. Defense subcontracting helps meet districts’ 
economic needs, which in turn generates greater political demand for weapons 
systems. These overlapping interests encourage defense expenditures in excess of 
strategic requirements.  
 
Overlapping Incentives and Concentrated Authority 
In 1956, C. Wright Mills (1956, 266) remarked on an emerging military 
ascendancy and corresponding rise in executive authority following World War II. He 
warned that symbiotic relations between military brass, corporations and the political 
elite erode the founding principles of separated powers and balance of independent 
interests. 
This dissertation has presented evidence suggesting that overlapping 
institutional interests in defense sector expansion not only work to perpetuate military 
expenditures, but also weaken the system of checks and balances in military affairs. 
While the hierarchical structure of the executive branch encourages presidents to 




predicated upon levels of available resources and institutional mechanisms to direct 
national security policy. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that, since President Truman’s 
first major unapproved war in 1950, Congress has provided hundreds of billions of 
dollars in annual expenditures to build and maintain a national weapons arsenal. As a 
consequence, presidents no longer rely on emergency funds to mobilize an army. The 
practical need to consult Congress for start-up funds has been obsolete since World 
War II, in large part because congressional budgetary authorizations continue to 
provide ongoing military resources. Presidents, in turn, have structured institutions so 
as to leverage congressionally appropriated resources at their own discretion. Post-
war presidents have devised mechanisms for covert operations, structured executive 
organizations to carry out their foreign policy decisions, and pursued strategies that 
both exacerbate informational asymmetries and minimize congressional oversight 
capabilities.  
Presidents structure the national security establishment to insulate their 
authority over military affairs and control the available military technology that 
Congress appropriates. However, rather than acting as a check on power, Congress’ 
more democratic structure encourages individual members to appeal to local 
constituents and partisan allies—typically by deferring to executive national security 
goals. After World War II, Congress faced a high-stakes national security 
environment, executive monopoly on national security information and increasing 
executive control over ongoing defense resources and military technology. These 




that impede programmatic policymaking in Congress.  The rise of a national security 
establishment has created a new incentive structure, generally encouraging members 
of Congress to cede to the executive on national security questions rather than 
challenging presidential prerogative or determining security policy collectively. 
Although Congress does periodically challenge executive military actions 
during periods of divided government or when a war becomes unpopular, the 
legislature almost never takes the initiative to prevent an administration from carrying 
out its agenda in the first place. A majority in Congress that opposes the president’s 
party may increase the political costs of the president’s military actions with 
enhanced oversight and negative publicity. Nonetheless, presidents can anticipate that 
Congress will continue to procure funds for military operations once troops are 
engaged in battle. Congress’ sustained military build-up and delegation of power to 
executive agencies counteracts members’ willingness and ability to prevent 
independent military actions altogether.  
Patterns of congressional deference to executive authority over national 
security affairs coincide with the efforts of key members to perpetuate military 
appropriations. Despite episodes of heightened oversight activity and statutory 
reform, these institutional incentives prevent Congress from mounting an effective 
defense against presidential encroachment. Instead, patterns of ongoing defense 
expenditures facilitate an enhanced executive prerogative in military affairs. 
Legislative incentives to perpetuate defense resources inadvertently promote greater 





Concentrated Power & Externalized Costs  
Until the mid-twentieth century, military spending was understood to be 
disadvantageous in peacetime. Congress mobilized forces in preparation for war and 
sharply cut military spending at the end of the conflict. Large numbers of Americans 
were asked to sacrifice in wartime by joining the armed services or carrying a heavier 
tax burden. Traditional antipathy to standing armies, higher taxes, lost productivity 
and military service requirements made it difficult for locally elected politicians to 
promote unpopular wars or accumulate military resources during peacetime. Rather, 
as leading Federalists had argued in support of ratification, the public costs associated 
with large peacetime armies, legislative control over resources and the structure of 
congressional representation facilitated important political constraints on military 
appropriations and independent executive actions. Patterns of demobilization required 
that presidents seek congressional cooperation in order to successfully prosecute 
military operations, constraining executive ability to employ military force 
independently.  
This dissertation provides evidence that the rise of a permanent military 
industry created a new context and a new incentive structure. Since World War II, a 
broad dispersion of defense dollars across regions and localities has generated 
widespread local dependencies on the defense sector of the economy. Local economic 
dependence encourages members of Congress to join defense committees, support 
ongoing defense spending and resist program cuts, while contractors and defense 
bureaucracies allocate defense subcontracts to economically vulnerable districts. The 




coincided with a series of policies that decrease public burdens traditionally 
associated with military mobilization and warfare, reducing electoral opposition to 
these costs.   
Coinciding interests in economic sustainability, job security, electoral 
strategies and profit margins encourage policymakers to extend defense expenditures 
independent of their ideology or national security goals. Consequently, ongoing 
weapons expenditures concentrate resources and authority in the executive branch, 
enhancing the president’s ability to direct military actions without consulting 
Congress. At the same time, policies that have systematically reduced the direct 
public costs of war make it easier for presidents to utilize force abroad and initiate 
major wars, regardless of the long-term costs of these initiatives.  
Taken cumulatively, these findings suggest that the constitutional framers’ 
reliance on institutional mechanisms and competing interests as a means to minimize 
warfare and disperse power ultimately fell short of their professed aims.  The 
constructive use of popular and institutional checks failed to prevent resources and 
authority from concentrating in the executive department. An institutional structure 
premised on competing interests has generated a system geared toward policies that 
maximize short-term benefits of office-holders, voters, and defense industries, while 
externalizing costs on future taxpayers and foreign populations.  Institutional checks 
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Appendix 3.1. Table of Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent Variables 
(continuous)  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  
Defense Spending Score  0.6225994 0.3430504 0 1 
Defense Spending Score 
(Democrats only) 0.4077421 0.2994701 0 1 
Defense Spending Score 
(Republicans only)  0.8465494 0.220525 0 1 
Controversial Weapons 0.5835641 0.3359385 0 1 
Arms Sales 0.6035523 0.3096163 0 1 
Defense Cuts 0.6835145 0.3303816 0 1 
     
Independent Variables      
Low Density*Facilities 
(Continuous) 390777.6 464479.4 0 2927584 
Low Density*Facilities 
(Democrats only) 333032.3 448732 0 2927584 
Low Density*Facilities 
(Republicans only) 450962.7 473243.9 0 2349273 
Low Density (Continuous) 188149.6 21394.77 0 196600.8 
Low Density (Dem) 183029.3 28456.79 0 196583 
Low Density (Rep) 193486.2 5967.387 153829.8 196600.8 
Defense Facilities (count) 2.043678 2.425028 0 16 
Defense Facilities (Dem) 1.756757 2.358346 0 16 
Defense Facilities (Rep) 2.342723 2.459051 0 12 
Military Population (count) 3990.444 8131.725 43 82240 
Military Population (Dem) 4002.8 9223.217 43 82240 
Military Population (Rep) 3977.567 6817.906 135 45191 
Defense Committee 
(dummy) 0.1471264 0.3543677 0 1 
Defense Committee (Dem) 0.1396396 0.3468733 0 1 
Defense Committee (Rep) 0.1549296 0.362121 0 1 
Defense Contribution 
(continuous)  11765.97 20326.19 0 207175 
Defense Contribution (Dem) 10371.97 20934.04 0 207175 
Defense Contribution (Rep) 13218.87 19583.6 0 143490 
Party (dummy) 0.4896552 0.5000846 0 1 
Ideology (continuous)  0.0117716 0.4211312 -0.832 1.045 
Ideology (Dem) -0.3657868 0.1804627 -0.832 0.499 
Ideology (Rep) 0.4052833 0.156974 -0.575 1.045 
     
N= 1305 corresponding to the number of districts across three Congresses. N=666 for all Democratic 









































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4.2. Table of Economically Reliant Districts  
Member of Congress -109th 





Young, Donald E. 1 AK R 2.22178 13 
Gibbons, Jim 2 NV R 23.25397 4 
Cubin, Barbara 1 WY R 17.65281 3 
Bonilla, Henry B. 23 TX R 49.27853 6 
McKeon, Howard P. (Buck) 25 CA R 113.7822 9 
Janklow, William J./ Herseth, 
Stephanie  1 SD D 33.43214 2 
Bishop, Rob 1 UT R 118.444 7 
Grijalva, Raul M 7 AZ D 112.3566 5 
Taylor, Gene 4 MS D 330.0687 13 
Carter, John R 31 TX R 524.9293 18 
Hefley, Joel 5 CO R 295.7593 10 
Nethercutt, George 5 WA R 91.00121 3 
Everett, Terry 2 AL R 243.0076 8 
Cramer, Bud 5 AL D 531.2726 17 
Ross, Mike 4 AR D 125.9273 4 
Cole, Tom 4 OK R 260.5885 8 
Davis, Jo Ann 1 VA R 601.4974 14 
McIntyre, Mike 7 NC D 393.2233 9 
Ryun, Jim 2 KS R 175.4128 4 
Tiahrt, Todd 4 KS R 265.45 6 
Kingston, Jack 1 GA R 221.3098 5 
Bass, Charles F. 2 NH R 320.4823 6 
McHugh, John M. 23 NY R 161.2328 3 
Tancredo, Thomas G 6 CO R 551.9182 10 
Jones, Walter B., Jr. 3 NC R 342.3258 6 
Marshall, Jim 3 GA D 230.3529 4 
Dicks, Norman D. 6 WA D 299.0596 5 
Udall, Mark 2 CO D 397.808 6 
Gallegly, Elton 24 CA R 642.8491 9 
Pickering, Charles W. (Chip), Jr. 3 MS R 216.0164 3 
Wilson, Heather 1 NM R 504.1901 7 
Edwards, Chet 11 TX R 293.9391 4 
Hobson, David L. 7 OH R 809.1984 11 
Spratt, John M., Jr. 5 SC D 368.0385 5 
Miller, Jeff 1 FL R 524.0443 7 
Larsen, Rick 2 WA D 307.8799 4 
Porter, Jon C. 3 NV R 540.4948 6 
Wolf, Frank R. 10 VA R 1281.591 14 
Kolbe, Jim 8 AZ R 286.785 3 
Allen, Thomas H. 1 ME D 578.486 6 
Aderholt, Robert 4 AL R 294.6671 3 
Hoekstra, Peter 2 MI R 416.904 4 
Rogers, Mike 3 AL R 318.082 3 






Member of Congress -109th 
Congress (2005-2006) 
Distric





Shuster, Bill 9 PA R 324.0652 3 
Costello, Jerry F. 12 IL D 540.228 5 
Norwood, Charles W., Jr. 9 GA R 349.5964 3 
Schrock, Edward 2 VA R 1852.126 15 
Bartlett, Roscoe G. 6 MD R 787.339 6 
Wilson, Addison G. (Joe) 2 SC R 531.4725 4 
Feeney, Tom 24 FL R 1483.955 11 
Dunn, Jennifer 8 WA R 812.3622 6 
Ortiz, Solomon P. 27 TX D 686.4715 5 
Weldon, Dave 15 FL R 923.3434 6 
Scott, Robert C. 3 VA D 2035.548 13 
Simmons, Rob 2 CT R 1164.755 7 
Hayes, Robin 8 NC R 727.9709 4 
Istook, Ernest J., Jr. 5 OK R 1286.319 7 
Bradley, Jeb 1 NH R 818.2983 4 
Miller, Brad 13 NC D 1039.37 5 
McNulty, Michael R. 21 NY D 1171.751 5 
Hunter, Duncan L. 52 CA R 1201.857 5 
Turner, Mike 3 OH R 1445.906 6 
Beauprez, Bob 7 CO R 1782.748 7 
Price, David E. 4 NC D 1845.268 7 
Baker, Richard H. 6 LA R 816.2053 3 
Eshoo, Anna G. 14 CA D 2895.622 10 
Smith, Adam 9 WA D 3204.331 11 
Capps, Lois 23 CA D 2394.188 8 
DeMint, Jim 4 SC R 1209.806 4 
Hoyer, Steny H. 5 MD D 1600.493 5 
Akin, W. Todd 2 MO R 1794.035 5 
Inslee, Jay 1 WA D 4311.622 12 
Terry, Lee 2 NE R 4867.593 13 
Saxton, H. James 3 NJ R 2271.285 6 
Meehan, Martin T. 5 MA D 3844.06 10 
Moran, James P., Jr. 8 VA D 19173.29 47 
Gerlach, Jim 6 PA R 2790.258 5 
Kennedy, Patrick J. 1 RI D 5401.147 9 
Granger, Kay 12 TX R 1931.382 3 
Johnson, Sam 3 TX R 5370.004 8 
Reyes, Silvestre 16 TX D 4355.25 6 
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Party              
(Republican)    -- -- -- -- 
-.05 (.27)  
[-0.004] 
      
 
N =435 
McFadden’s R²= .15 
Count R² = .81 
Prob>Chi2=0.00 
N=435 
McFadden’s R²= .13 




McFadden’s R²= .13 
Count R²= .76 
Prob>Chi2=0.00 
N= 435 
McFadden’s R² = .15 
Count R² = .79 
Prob>Chi2= 0.00 
N= 435 
McFadden’s R² = .15 
Count R² = .78 
Prob>Chi2= 0.00 
Note: Appendix 4.3 displays logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Changes in predicted probabilities from +- 
1/2 standard deviation around the mean are in brackets. The dependent variable indicates a defense committee assignment 
(coded “1” for defense committee and “0” for non-defense committee assignment).  
α Coefficients in thousand people/sq mile  
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